THE COMMUNICATIVE DIMENSION AND SECURITY IN ASIA PACIFIC: A COMMUNICATIVE-VIEWING PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF THE JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

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Abstract:

The postwar development of the Intelligence Services in Japan has been based on two contrasting models: the centralized model of the USA and the collegiality of UK, neither of which has been fully developed. This has led to clashes of institutional competencies and poor anticipation of threats towards national security. This problem of opposing models has been partially overcome through two dimensions: externally through the cooperation with the US Intelligence Service under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; and internally through the pre-eminence in the national sphere of the Department of Public Safety. However, the emergence of a new global communicative dimension requires that a communicative-viewing remodeling of this dual model is necessary due to the increasing capacity of the individual actors to determine the dynamics of international events. This article examines these challenges for the Intelligence Services of Japan and proposes a reform based on this new global communicative dimension.

Keywords: Japan, Intelligence, Asia, Security, Communication, Terrorism, International Relations.

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Resumen:

El desarrollo de los servicios de inteligencia japoneses se ha basado en dos modelos opuestos (el centralizado de los EEUU y el colegiado británico) ninguno de los cuales ha sido desarrollado plenamente. Esto ha provocado choques de competencias institucionales y una pobre anticipación ante las amenazas hacia la seguridad nacional. Este problema de oposición de modelos ha sido parcialmente superado a través de dos dimensiones: externamente, mediante la cooperación con los EEUU bajo el Tratado de Mutua Cooperación y Seguridad; internamente, mediante la prevalencia del Departamento de Seguridad Pública en la esfera nacional. Sin embargo, la eclosión de una nueva dimensión comunicativa global hace necesaria una remodelación orientada a la comunicación de este modelo dual debido a la creciente capacidad de los actores individuales para determinar las dinámicas internacionales. Este artículo analiza estos desafíos para los servicios de inteligencia japoneses y propone una reforma basada en esta dimensión comunicativa global.

Palabras clave: Japón, Inteligencia, Asia, Seguridad, Comunicación, Terrorismo, Relaciones Internacionales.

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1. Introduction

The Japanese Intelligence Services have been designed around two distinctly opposite models since the end of the Second World War. These models are: the American centralized approach characterized by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the British collegial model characterized by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) established in July 1986.2

These contracting models have made it impossible for Japan to completely develop either one of these approaches, which has damaged the Japanese Intelligence capacity. Furthermore, it forces the country to consume institutional resources that, in many cases, are redundant and hinders the ability of Japan to develop the necessary infrastructures required to anticipate threats to its national security.

Japan has endured these shortages in two different ways according to whether it is an external or internal threat. Externally, Japan has relied on help from the American CIA3 (and other allied Intelligence agencies) within the legal framework of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between both countries.4 The Japanese policy of constitutional and social antimilitarism has been compensated in the Intelligence field and also in the military field thanks to the cover of the so-called American “nuclear umbrella”.5

In relation to the internal threats, Japan endured limitations due to the hegemony in the domestic field of the National Police Agency (NPA). These limitations involve working on Intelligence production regarding ongoing investigations and those which violate Japanese law. This prevents the NPA from being able to anticipate larger threats such as religious and political radicalism or the infiltration of foreign agents.

Various experts such as Kotani, Williams and Oros have highlighted the necessity to completely reform the Japanese Intelligence structure. It is true that some parties and governmental institutions have launched different reform proposals, but none of them has been able to fully accomplish the objective of definitively rationalizing the system. Among the causes of these failures are the resistance of the public workers themselves, excessive bureaucracy and political inertia, all of which impede any effective change in the status quo.

An example of the new transnational nature of the threats that these Intelligence Services have to face is the territorial dispute between Japan and China in the Senkaku/Diaoyu6 island conflict. These new dangers do not replace the ongoing threats to the

3 The international cooperation on Intelligence matters has also been affected by the domestic debate and public criticism about the political exploitation of the American Intelligence Services. See Segoviano, Soledad: “La instrumentalización política de la inteligencia en EEUU”, Papeles de cuestiones internacionales, No. 90 (Summer 2005), pp. 73-85.
stability in this region during the recent decades, such as the military projection of the DPRK. Instead, these new factors aggravate the causes of regional instability.

The hypothesis on which this proposal for a reformation of the Japanese Intelligence Services is based is that any attempt in this direction should have a strong communicative-viewing approach. This is for three reasons: a) the new communicative paradigm in which the external and internal threats to the national security of a country are closely interlinked due to the effects of a globalized Information Society and the effective erasing of borders between countries; b) the increasing ability of individual actors to influence the development of international conflicts between states due to the new communicative panorama in which everyone can be a global mass communicator; and c) the consolidation of global public opinion that plays a significant role in exerting pressure on governments to modify their international policies.

The novelty in the theoretical framework of this approach lies in the fact that the international playground is made more complex by the exponential increase in the number of communicative in the new Information Society and the global popularization of the distributive communicative tools such as social networks. This new Information Age paradigm has great potential for the establishment of a permanent dialogue between the institutional actors and society as a whole, but it would also impose a great cost associated with the analysis of this international information overdose. In order to solve this issue, there have been some academic proposals for optimizing the communicative analytic cost. One of these proposals offers a model for the unification of individual collaborative public bodies into a more effective organization. For example, different cities within a country that implement their own diplomacy strategies can be gathered into a single national strategy. This model allows the creation of communicative clusters organized by their international objectives, strategies and behavior, thereby reducing the communicative analytic cost for the scholars and policy-makers.

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8 Marquina Barrio notes that the concept of “stability” in the International Relations discipline is profoundly ambiguous and vague. Marquina points out that its interpretation as “the capacity of exercise influence in other regions with the purpose of reducing the tensions and promoting the establishment of democracies and market economies” is far from a functional definition for the needs of the armed forces. See Marquina Barrio, Antonio: “La revisión estratégica de la defensa (II): Las misiones de las fuerzas armadas, las fuerzas armadas del siglo XXI”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 4 (January 2004), pp. 1-9, at http://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72537/rev2.pdf. Other academic considerations in the same way pointed out that the assimilation of “stability” to “maintenance of status quo” is erroneous because not all the crystallization of a certain political status quo become an increment in the stability of the actors that participate in it. And in the same way, not all the modification of a status quo turn out to be a destabilization of the actors. In the complex environments, constant micro-modifications of the status quo are needed in order to maintain the stability and the adaptation of the political actors to the new international and social factors. See López-Aranguren, Juan Luis: “China y el mantenimiento del status quo en Asia-Pacífico”, in Rodríguez Virgili, Jordi (ed.) (2010): Un renacentista del siglo XXI: Homenaje a Pedro Lozano Bartolozzi, Pamplona, EUNSA, pp. 365-373, at https://www.academia.edu/21669661/China_y_el_mantenimiento_del_status_quo_en_Asia-Pacífico. See López-Aranguren, Juan Luis: “China ¿exportadora de estabilidad?”, in Rios, Xulio (ed.) (2011): Actas del I Simposio Electrónico Internacional sobre Política China, Baiona-Pontevedra, IGADI - Observatorio de Política China, pp. 1-6, at https://www.academia.edu/21663202/China_exportadora_de_estabilidad.
The novelty of this academic research is that this contribution is not just a proposal for institutional reform of the Japanese Intelligence Services, but also a proposition that transcends the structural dimension, offering a more integrated approach to the international dynamics of the security discipline due to this communicative dimension. The justification of this hypothesis, which will be analyzed in depth, is: first, that communication is a channel of articulation of transnational movements that can become a security threat; and second, that the threats to domestic and regional security aim to maximize the communicative effects of their actions. Therefore the communicative dimension can play a role both as a cause and as a consequence (objective) of the threats to domestic and regional security, a challenge that should be addressed with this communicative-viewing reform.

This article begins with a general and critical view of the current state of Japanese Intelligence, continues with an analysis of the relation between the communicative dimension and the increase in the number of individual and collective threats towards Japan, and concludes with a justified recommendation for a structural reform of the Japanese Intelligence Services that takes into account the communicative reality.

2. The Intelligence Service in Japan

The Japanese Intelligence Service is split into five self-contained institutions that generally operate independently of each other. The service employs over 5,000 people and comprises of four independent agencies, integrated in different ministries, plus one autonomous agent (CIRO) created specifically with the objective of centralizing all Intelligence activities.10

The existence of two opposing approaches to the organization of their Intelligence Services (the British collegial and the American centralized) means that neither of the two can become fully developed, resulting in less effective anticipation of the threats affecting Japan.

The Japanese Intelligence Institutions associated to different ministries are the following:

2.1 Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA)

The Public Security Intelligence Agency or PSIA (in Japanese: 公安調査庁; in rōmaji: Kōanchōsa-chō) is formally in charge of the investigation of internal threats towards the security of Japan in a similar manner to the British MI5. As part of the Ministry of Justice, this agency was established by the Subversive Activities Prevention Law on July 21, 1952 in an attempt to combat the internal communist threat in Japan,11 a role that developed during the Cold War. An example of the work of the PSIA were the actions taken to neutralize the Japanese Red Army (日本赤軍, Nihon Sekigun) founded by Fusako Shigenobu in 1971, which was responsible for the airport massacre of Lod in Tel Aviv on May 30, 1972.12

After the fall of the Communist bloc, the PSIA focused on other threats such as the ultranationalist Japanese groups and the criminal networks that had infiltrated the North Korean population in Japanese Territory. Furthermore, the PSIA took charge of the extremist religious threats when the Aum Shinrikyo sect committed the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo metro on March 20, 1995, killing 13 people and injuring over 50. Popularly known outside

Japan by translations such as “Supreme Truth”, Aum Shinrikyo (オウム真理教, Ōmu Shinrikyō) was founded in 1984 by Shoko Asahara. After the attacks of 1995, and the social and political pressure that followed, the sect renamed itself Aleph. This sect tested its chemical weapons in a remote sheep farm in Australia, which was being investigated by the Australian Federal Police. A chain of mistakes and poor coordination between Japan and Australia resulted in a failure to detect and nullify the sect and, consequently, their members were free to acquire the chemical weapons and use their knowledge to successfully commit the Tokyo Metro terrorist attempt. These investigative mistakes, and the resulting failure to prevent the attacks, provoked strong media and political criticism towards the agency. A public debate took place to decide whether it made sense to maintain the PSIA. The government decision was to reduce the organization, but not eliminate it, resulting in a large number of personnel being transferred to other institutions and Intelligence agencies. Currently the number of employees is around 1,700 to 1,800 people.13

2.2 Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH)
The Defense Intelligence Headquarters or DIH (情報本部, Jōhōhonbu) is the Intelligence agency that forms part of the Japanese Ministry of Defense.14 With 1,910 members this is the main organ in all the Japanese Intelligence agencies (MOD, 2014), representing almost half the entire Japanese Intelligence Community.

Founded on January 20, 1997 to unify the independent structures of the Japanese Self-Defense Intelligence, its main task is to manage the signals intelligence (SIGINT) of Japan through the six interception bases in the country, a task that has enjoyed important successes. In one of the tensest moments of the Cold War, September 1, 1983, a Soviet fighter Su-15 shot down flight number KAL007, a South Korean Boeing 747 passenger flight traveling from Anchorage to Seoul, taking the lives of 269 people onboard. The DIH intercepted communications between the Soviet fighter and its control airbase, communications that were subsequently published by the American Government.15

Additionally, DIH provides the Self-Defense Forces with human intelligence (HUMINT), but since the Constitution of Japan denies the country the capability to wage war even to the extent of sustaining a formal Armed Force, it is legally limited to a marginal dimension, despite the reinterpretation that the Japanese Government made in 2014 to Article 9 accepting the “Collective Self-Defense”.16

2.3 National Police Agency (NPA)
The National Police Agency or NPA (警察庁, Keisatsu-chō) is the agency that coordinates the police system in Japan. Founded by the Political Law June 8, 1954,17 the NPA is the widest Intelligence network in Japan with approximately 300,000 police agents on which the country depends. According to various analysts, this large force of personnel allows the

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agency to be more centered in the country, overcoming CIRO in this aspect. The NPA can also send support personnel to other agencies like CIRO and the DIH and collect information regarding these institutions in a unified manner. However, the agency is somewhat limited to operations related to police investigations and application of the law, similar to the American FBI, which prevents them from using these resources in long term projects oriented towards national security.

The NPA is administered by the National Public Safety Commission (国公安委員会, Kokka Kōan Iinkai), a government substructure within the Cabinet of Japan. Despite this hierarchy and its internal efficiency, friction with other Japanese Intelligence institutions has arisen, reflecting rivalry between ministries and agencies and, as a result, requiring the whole Japanese Intelligence model to be rethought. One of the most serious instances of this phenomenon was the competence clash between NPA agents and Japanese military after the desertion of the Soviet pilot Belenko during the Cold War. On September 6, 1976 Lieutenant Viktor Ivanovich Belenko deserted the USSR with his MIG-25 and landed at Hakodate Airport in the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido, where he applied for political asylum. Both the NPA and the Japanese Self-Defense forces tried to take custody of the pilot and his fighter jet which was of extraordinary strategic value, but this resulted in a strong clash of competences that ended in the expulsion of the military from the airport by the NPA. Despite the administrative conflict, the defection meant that the United States and Japan could examine the MIG-25 for the first time, which was an extraordinary strategic advantage for the Western bloc and a blow to the USSR.

2.4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (外務省, Gaimu-shō) has the Intelligence and Analysis Service (IAS) to handle the research management of international issues affecting Japan, the collection of information on behalf of the diplomatic staff and the processing, analysis and interpretation of such information.

The MOFA is considered to be the institution with the widest experience in Japanese Intelligence having been established in 1869. Its personnel has increased from 3,500 in the 1980s to approximately 5,200 in 2010, 80 of whom are specifically dedicated to the IAS.

As the MOFA has all the embassy networks, consulate delegations and diplomatic staff at its disposal, this ministry has significant capacity to collect raw data. However, as analysts point out, the fact that their personnel are diplomatic and not professional in Intelligence tasks means they cannot conduct Intelligence work abroad. This, together with the possibility that the diplomatic network sends information directly to the MOFA without it being processed and analyzed by the IAS, means that this information is not always useful for the Intelligence needs of the Japanese Cabinet.

22 In an escalation of international conflict, an important communicative role of the diplomatic services is to keep communication channels open with the rest of the political actors involved in order to have the option to take a step back and de-escalate the conflict as a fail-safe. See Ruiz Campillo, Xira: “Materiales para una aproximación a la prevención de conflictos en el siglo XXI”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 4 (January 2004), pp. 1-21, at http://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72537/Xira4.pdf.
2.5 Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO)

The Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) (内閣情報調査室, Naikaku Jōhō Chōsashitsu) is the institution with the greatest similarity to the American CIA, having been created in its image. Generally abbreviated as Naichō (内調), it was funded in 1952 by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (吉田 茂) in close alignment with the pro-American reform policy dictated by the occupied allied forces after the Second World War. This body is the most centralized institution of the Japanese Intelligence Services and employs around 70 exclusive professionals and another 100 people from other agencies or ministries, often from the police force.\(^\text{23}\)

The CIRO is focused on the analysis of threats mostly originating from outside Japan. The institutional client of all the information that is collected, processed and interpreted by this agency is the Cabinet of Japan (内閣, Naikaku) and, specifically, the Prime Minister, whom they advise weekly.\(^\text{24}\)

The focus on external threats, especially the need to monitor activity in North Korea\(^\text{25}\) after the country launched a Taepodong-1 test missile\(^\text{26}\) on August 31, 1998\(^\text{27}\) that went over Japanese territory, has meant that the CIRO is responsible for the Japanese satellite surveillance network through the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC) founded in 2001. The CSIC employs 320 people, including 100 imagery intelligence (IMINT) analysts to process and interpret data provided by the network, which is formed by two optical satellites and two based on radar detection.\(^\text{28}\)

Excluding the technical staff of the CSIC, the shortage of personnel in the CIRO (fewer than one percent of the 18,000 workers in the American CIA) is considered by some Japanese and foreign analysts to be the main cause of the agency’s inability to achieve their main objective of centralizing Japanese Intelligence activity as its American counterpart has done.\(^\text{29}\) These analysts further identify other problems that undermine the efficiency of CIRO such as insufficient budget allocation and the legal impossibility of conducting operations.

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\(^{23}\) Ibid., pp. 201-208.

\(^{24}\) The government Cabinet is the main executive branch of Japan formed of the Prime Minister and the other ministerial positions. Therefore, occasionally the CIRO is known by a version of the complete name together with the government range such as the Cabinet Secretary (内閣官房内閣情報調査室, Naikaku Kanbō Naikaku Jōhō Chōsashitsu).

\(^{25}\) The death of Kim Jong-Il on December 17, 2011 and the ascension of his son and dynastic heir, Kim Jong-Un, strengthened the factors of a process of regional destabilization as was feared by different scholars. See Yank, Eunsook: “Corea del Norte en la encrucijada”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 30 (October 2012), pp. 143-150, at http://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72491/UNISCI%20DP%2030%20-%20YANG.pdf. This event marked the end of an era characterized by the capacity of Kim Jong-Il to effectively safeguard his personal regime from the progressively international volatile environment in order to guarantee his political survival. See Paik, Haksoon (2006): “Changing Dynamics of the North Korean System”, in New Paradigms for Transpacific Collaboration, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies Series, Vol. 16, Washington DC, Korea Economic Institute of America.

\(^{26}\) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not only developed its own missile technology, but it also sells it to other countries. North Korea is not a subscriber of The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), established in November 2002, which was an international attempt to stop the threat of these weapons. See Lara, Belén: “El Código de conducta de La Haya”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 7 (January 2005), pp. 1-10, at http://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72534/Lara2.pdf.


\(^{28}\) Ibid., pp. 201-208.

abroad. These limitations of CIRO’s foreign activity have been made in collaboration with the American CIA and within the legal context of cooperation between the two countries. Specifically, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互協力及び安全保障条約, *Nippon-koku to Amerikagasshūkoku to no Aida no Sōgo Kyōryoku oyobi Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku*), which was signed in 1952, demanded that the USA commit to aid Japan in defense of its territorial integrity. In this way, Japan could constitutionally renounce the need for a war-making capability while still retaining protection under the American nuclear umbrella.

2.6 Previous reformation attempts of the Japanese Intelligence Services from 2005 to 2015.

These five intelligence institutions are the result of having applied two opposing Intelligence models without completely developing either one of them: the American central model and the British collegial model. The complex and non-operational structure of the Japanese Intelligence Services has created problems of overlap between agencies, clashes of skill, a lack of cooperation between them and even Intelligence productions that never reach the policy-makers of the government Cabinet.30

Kotani identifies the causes of these problems as: a) the lack of overseas human Intelligence collection capabilities, b) the lack of central machinery and poor information sharing, c) the lack of security legislation, and d) the malfunction of the Intelligence cycle.31

These factors have, since the end of the Second World War, prevented Japan from developing its Intelligence capabilities in accordance with the important geo-political role that she enjoys;32 Japan is one of the main non-member allies of NATO with maritime boarders with Russia,33 the People’s Republic of China34 and North Korea.35 The cooperation between

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32 A similar development of the Intelligence Services of other important global actors like the European Union and Russia has also had to adapt to the multi-polar world of the 21st century and negotiate with different strategies to the different regional powers to which it interacts with, such as Japan. See Pardo, Eric: “Rusia y sus relaciones bilaterales con Japón: presas de la disputa territorial” in Morales Hernández, Javier (ed.) (2012): *Rusia en la sociedad internacional. Perspectivas tras el retorno de Putin*, Madrid, Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation - Unidad de Investigación sobre Seguridad y Cooperación Internacional (UNISCI), Universidad Complutense de Madrid, at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0snR4A6uqyxa0s1eEhFeC1QN0k/view?pref=2&pli=1.
34 Security scholar Marquina Barrio has pointed out the different negotiation attitude of the USA with the nuclear threat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and other actors of George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the Korean case, serious poverty, the abruptness of its political behavior and the risk of a systemic political collapse of the Korean regime seriously limit the spectrum of negotiation possibilities, causing an increase in the security uncertainty under which the Japanese institutions are developing their work. See Marquina Barrio, Antonio: “Los conflictos internacionales con Irán y Corea del Norte (I): El proceso negociador”, *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 13 (January 2007), pp. 101-127, at http://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72528/Marquina13.pdf.
NATO and Japan began in 1990\textsuperscript{36} and over time has deepened, bringing the country to participate in NATO missions of peacekeeping\textsuperscript{37} in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Also the territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands led Shinzo Abe to issue a joint statement in May 2014 with the Secretary General of NATO, General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in which the plan to strengthen cooperation between the military alliance and Japan was announced in the fields of counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations.\textsuperscript{38}

It is also true that Japan has started legislative and political reforms in an attempt to resolve this situation, but none of these has been successful in completely remodeling the services. From 2005 to 2008, up to five attempts were made by different centers and governmental institutions trying to offer some advice on how to reform and rationalize the complicated landscape of the Japanese Intelligence Services. Kotani summarizes some of these attempts and highlights the fact that the organizational problem of Intelligence in Japan is perfectly reflected in the methods of the policy-making Japanese community.

Among these attempts, the following are emphasized because of their importance in the institutional dimension:\textsuperscript{39} In 2005 MOFA published the Report of Enhancement of Overseas Intelligence Activities, popularly known as the First Machimura Report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nobutaka Machimura. The following year, the Liberal Democratic Party published the Second Machimura Report, Report of Enhancement of National Intelligence, and the PHP Research Institute published Japanese Intelligence System – A Roadmap to Change. In 2007 the Cabinet Office (内閣府, Naikaku-Fu) published the Improvement of Counter-Intelligence Function and in 2008 the Prime Minister’s Office published a new version of this document.

These ambitious reform plans were recommended to: establish relations of equals between policy-makers and Intelligence agents in the Cabinet Office, to improve Intelligence production activities, to promote the exchange of information between ministries and to reform the security mechanisms. Regarding this, Kotani thinks that they fail because they try to maintain the collegial British system while demanding that it works administratively like central Intelligence, all without removing the CIRO itself. The four major obstacles according to Kotani are: a) excessive and outdated bureaucracy, b) the few political leaders who base their actions more on internal consensus than in obtaining the necessary Intelligence to make political decisions, c) public opinion being predominately opposed to the military dimension and, by association, to Intelligence, and d) the absence of a national debate over which of the two models to adopt – the American or the British.\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{37} See Rynning, Sten: “The geography of the Atlantic peace: NATO 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall”, in International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6 (November 2014), pp. 1383-1401.


\textsuperscript{40} Kotani, “Japan”, op. cit., pp. 201-208.
On the practical side, these unresolved shortcomings of Japanese Intelligence have been mitigated by the support of the American Intelligence services, mirroring the military protection provided under the American nuclear umbrella. Both the USA and Japan are increasingly aware of the need to develop Japanese skills (military and Intelligence) in order to address the security challenges that arise with increasing virulence in the Asia-Pacific, to the point of generating a political and communicative debate about whether Japan (and the Republic of Korea) should aspire to become a nuclear power. A debate that has attracted the attention of the international media and International Relations scholars since the 1990s argues that an enhancement of the nuclear capabilities of these influential countries could benefit regional stability if it occurs alongside the maintenance of the US nuclear dissuasive power. This vision of the benefits of international cooperation to East Asian security has also been applied to other fields, such as the naval collaboration between Japan and the Republic of Korea. This requirement (not only of Japan, but also of her allies) depends on a reformulation of the Japanese Intelligence Services that takes the communicative dimension into account, because the perpetrators of many international threats seek to achieve public awareness through media propaganda.

In addition to these general and institutional reformation efforts, more specific attempts for Intelligence improvements were carried out. These improvements can be classified under three different headings: technical, diplomatic and legislative.

On the technical side, one of the biggest Intelligence enhancements was the announcement in November 2015 of the Japanese Cabinet Office Committee to propose using the National Space Policy program to double the intelligence gathering satellite fleet of Japan over a 10 year period. Previously, in the January of that year, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) launched a spy satellite from Tanegashima Space Center. This was identified as a radar satellite, the sixth of its type and the thirteenth of the overall Joho Shushu Eisei (JSE) satellite fleet (or Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) as it is known in English), a growing surveillance resource composed of optical reconnaissance satellites

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48 The Mainichi: “Cabinet to propose doubling Japan’s intelligence gathering satellite fleet over next 10 years”, *Mainichi Japan*, 11 November 2015, at http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20151111/p2a/00m/0na/013000c.
created primarily to face the emergent North Korea’s aerospace threat and, subsequently, to counterbalance the increasing Chinese aerospace capabilities.

For diplomatic and international cooperation, one of the biggest advances in this area was the creation of a new counterterrorist intelligence unit in December 2015, with 24 specialist members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the National Police Agency and the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office. When this new unit was launched it included experts on Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and North and Western Africa. Eventually, it incorporated 20 intelligence officers assigned to foreign antennae in overseas posts, probably, but not confirmed, in Amman, Cairo, Jakarta and New Delhi. In his presentation, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga explained that “collecting and centralizing intelligence on terrorism have become urgent tasks as the risk of attacks grows. The unit has a crucial mission to secure the lives of Japanese in and outside the country”. This measure would try to solve one of the biggest problems of Japan in the fight against terrorist threats, namely the lack of institutional and technical experience in this arena. In this context, academic research on terrorism and risk management at Aomori Chuo Gakuin University warned that “Japan is still a novice in counterterrorism measures, and there are lots of blind spots. The biggest concern is intelligence gathering. There is a serious shortage of experts who can gather real intelligence and analyze it”.

Another important diplomatic success has been the international cooperation with the USA and Australia and trilateral relations with other regional actors, such as the extension of the US-Japan data link to South Korea. This military tactical data exchange network, known as the Link 16 and used by NATO, US and countries authorized by the MIDS International Program Office (IPO), will allow Seoul, Tokyo and Washington to share imagery data and real-time intelligence information among their Intelligence Services, military units and Defense policy-makers. This announcement was made after North Korean claim of a successful test of a hydrogen bomb in early January 2016. According to the News Agency Yonhap, the information exchange among the three countries would be limited to data about the North Korea’s missile and nuclear capabilities, thus recognizing the influence that the

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52 The Japanese Government took the control of the information and the protection of the unit’s members so seriously that the journalist and photographers were only allowed to take pictures of the backs of the members. See Yamaguchi, Mari: “Media only allowed to photograph back of Japan’s new anti-terror unit”, National Post, 8 December 2015, at http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/media-only-allowed-to-photograph-back-of-japans-new-anti-terror-unit.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
Kim Jong-un regime is having on the creation of a regional security framework in Asia-Pacific.

International cooperation with Japan’s allies was also evident in different initiatives aiming to enhance the Japanese Intelligence Services and its technical capabilities. Australia’s overseas intelligence agency, the ASIS, assisted in the training of Japanese intelligence specialists.\(^{59}\) In a similar way, cooperation with the USA was strengthened, especially in the Cyber Security dimension, through the establishment, in October 2013, of the US-Japan Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) between the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).\(^{60}\) As the Security analyst, James Andrew Levis, stated about this initiative: “For Japan, adequate resourcing of cyber defense activities is the most important. Japan needs to commit resources commensurate with its status in the world to defend this new domain”.\(^{61}\) Following this, some recommendations were made for future improvements in the US-Japan Cyber Security cooperation, based on six proposals: allocating sufficient resources for this area, especially in the Japanese case; moving from a national approach to a collective approach; creating a bilateral mechanism for cooperation and information sharing; developing joint training programs; increasing domestic and joint efforts for the protection of civilian critical infrastructure and counter espionage; and, finally, coordinating international efforts in the creation of a Cyber Security framework in the Northeast Asian region.\(^{62}\)

In the legislative and political dimension, one of the most important reformation attempts was the announcement by the Liberal Democratic Party in March 2015 to study the possible creation of a CIA-style Japanese Intelligence institution.\(^{63}\) If this project becomes a reality, it would imply a decisive institutional commitment for a centralized conception of Japan’s Intelligence, ending the long lasting conflict provoked by its dual centralized-decentralized nature. This political endorsement was produced as a reaction to the assassination of two Japanese hostages by the Daesh in January 2015\(^{64}\) and the killing of three Japanese tourists in the Tunisia museum attack of March that same year.\(^{65}\)

Due to the vital nature of this initiative, academics such as Jeff Kingston warned about the dangers of a political expansion of Japanese Intelligence capabilities without sufficient

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\(^{62}\) Ibid.


economic support, resulting in a heavy-laden initiative.\(^{66}\) And fellow academic Yuki Tatsumi pointed out that these reformation efforts were too centered in HUMINT and not enough effort was being made in other kinds of intelligence, such as open-source intelligence (OSINT), electronic intelligence, signals intelligence and others. Therefore there is still the need “…to invest enough financial resources to equip its intelligence organizations with meaningful wherewithal to boost their capacity to collect, analyze and distribute the intelligence they gather”.\(^{67}\) Among the causes for this situation, scholar Masaki Mizobuchi highlighted the “complacency due to the absence of any terrorist incident for two decades in Japan and the rivalry between the ministries and the […] emotional/ideological opposition toward strengthening the power of police or intelligence organizations”\(^{68}\), a situation that needs to be addressed in order to face the security challenges of the 2020 Olympic Games.

Another important legislative innovation in the Japanese Intelligence dimension was the approbation by the Security Council on October 25, 2013, of the State Secrecy Law, also known officially as the Act No. 108 of 2013 on Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS) (特定秘密の保護に関する法律, Tokutei Himitsu no Hogo ni kansuru Hōritsu). The law was promulgated on December 13, 2013 having been approved by the National Diet on December 6. The State Secrecy Law came into force one year after its promulgation, on December 10, 2014.

The Act on the Protection of SDS state that “The Head of an Administrative Organ shall designate, as Specially Designated Secrets, information concerning the matters [of Defense, Diplomacy, Prevention of Specified Harmful Activities and Prevention of Terrorist Activities], which is publicly undisclosed, and which if disclosed without authorization, has the risk of causing severe damage to Japan’s national security and therefore which is particularly required to be kept secret”.\(^{69}\)

This legislative initiative raised some controversy and criticism in the public debate in Japan due to an alleged “severity, vagueness and lack of a proper oversight mechanism”\(^{70}\). However, the State Secrecy Law also proffers a solution to the international security and diplomatic dimension concerning the U.S. government, thus opening the door to a deeper exchange of information, international collaboration in the fight against terrorism and a more solid global initiative in the search for regional stability and security in Asia-Pacific.\(^{71}\)

3. The Japanese Intelligence Services and the importance of a communicative-viewing reformation.

Any proposal to reform the Intelligence Services (of Japan or of any other country) will have to confront the fact that the massive popularization at the beginning of the 21st century of new communication technologies, such as smartphones, social networks and the omnipresent


\(^{67}\) Ibid.

\(^{68}\) Ibid.


\(^{71}\) Ibid.
Internet, has consolidated the model of global society based on information.\textsuperscript{72} If traditional media has enabled the leap from one-to-one communication to one-to-many, so the digital information technologies have enabled a many-to-many communication model.

Japan’s Intelligence Services should face the fact that, in the current technological context, any individual can become not only a receiver of global information but also a sender. This technological revolution has occurred so extensively and at such speed that it is already a global phenomenon capable of affecting not only the regional sphere of influence of Japan, but also geo-politics worldwide.\textsuperscript{73} For example, the Arab Spring started in Tunisia in December 2010 and, thanks to the new forms of decentralized digital communication, it spread rapidly to over a dozen countries in North Africa and the Middle East, culminating in global protests.\textsuperscript{74}

The international conflicts\textsuperscript{75} that are faced by Japan and other countries have not been immune to these profound social changes.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, the explosive increase in the capacity to send and receive information has also been exploited by extremist political and religious organizations, posing a real threat to societies and countries.\textsuperscript{77} This is the case, for example, of jihadist movements\textsuperscript{78} that use new information technologies in their role both as senders, (where they can control the media presentation of their propaganda,\textsuperscript{79} including videos of

\begin{itemize}
\item Political Science scholars such as Herrero de Castro highlighted the importance of the collective perceptions when the time comes for two or more political actors to act in the international sphere. These collective perceptions are constructed and defined in the psychological dimension by the concepts, structured messages and other communicative inputs that a society receives. See Herrero de Castro, Rubén (2006): \textit{La realidad inventada: percepciones y proceso de toma de decisiones en política exterior}, Madrid, Plaza y Valdés.
\item Bruns, Axel; Highfield, Tim and Burgess, Jean: “The Arab Spring and Social Media Audiences: English and Arabic Twitter Users and Their Networks”, \textit{American Behavioral Scientists}, Vol. 57, No. 7, Special Issue on New Media and Social Unrest (July 2013), pp. 871-898.
\item Neither the Intelligence procedures have been an exception to the impact of the Information Society. The problems in managing this communicational challenge have affected them even at the level of the Tactical Intelligence. See Sainz de la Peña, José Antonio: “Inteligencia táctica”, \textit{UNISCI Discussion Papers}, No. 28 (January 2012), pp. 213-232, at http://www.ucm.es/data/com/medial/www/pag-72494/UNISCI%20DP%2028%20-%20SAINZ%20DE%20LA%20PENA.pdf.
\item In a similar way, an enhancement in the communicative-oriented approach to these international phenomena by the diplomatic strategies of different nations can be perceived. See Priego Moreno, Alberto: “Spanish, soft power and its structural (NON-traditional) model of diplomacy” in García Cantalapiedra, David and Pacheco Pardo, Ramón (eds.) (2014): \textit{Contemporary Spanish Foreign Policy}, London, Routledge, pp. 48-63.
\item An important cause of political tensions between the religious dimension and the secularism in Asia is –as is in other parts of the world- the Islamic-Western oriented conflict of the diverse nation’s legislative developments. See Corral Salvador, Carlos: “Proclamaciones expresas de la estatalidad del islam en Constituciones asiáticas”, \textit{Derecho y religión}, No. 10 (2015), pp. 301-316.
\item Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda or Daesh use the dialectics described in Huntington’s concept of ‘Clash of Civilizations’ with a propagandistic purpose. In this strategy, the communication plays a vital role. See Aydin, Mustafa and Ozen, Çınar: “Civilizational futures: Clashes or alternative visions in the age of globalization?”, \textit{Futures}, Vol. 42, No. 6 (August 2010), pp. 545-552, at https://www.academia.edu/1517813/Civilizational_futures_Clashes_or_alternative_visions_in_the_age_of_Globalization.
\item The new decentralized nature of the terrorist threats towards the democracies has resulted in a challenge not only for the Intelligence Services, but also for the International Law that was traditionally used to deal with defined and state threats, not with undefined and asymmetrical coercions. See Bermejo García, Romualdo: “El Derecho Internacional frente al terrorismo: ¿Nuevas perspectivas tras los atentados del 11 de septiembre?”, \textit{Anuario español de Derecho Internacional}, No. 17 (2001), pp. 5-24, at http://dadun.unav.edu/bitstream/10171/21433/1/ADI_XVII_2001_01.pdf.
\end{itemize}
beheadings, and hence influence public opinion)\(^{80}\) and as receivers. There are examples of individuals in Japan, USA and Europe\(^{81}\) becoming radicalized via the internet and emerging as lone operators with no direct link to a parent organization that might be based thousands of miles away in the Middle East. This process opens doors to homeland attacks in these threatened societies.

### 3.1 The communicative dimension of Japan’s regional sphere of influence: The Asia-Pacific region.

The main sphere of political, cultural and economic influence of Japan is the Asia-Pacific region. By analyzing this region,\(^{82}\) and the political role that Japan plays in it, it can be observed that the dynamics of the conflicts have not been an exception to the previous described phenomenon of a more communicative-based nature of the international interactions among the political actors (be conflictive or cooperative).\(^{83}\) The case of the territorial dispute between Japan, the People’s Republic of China\(^{84}\) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands\(^{85}\) (\textit{de facto} under Japanese administration from the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century) was especially significant. In this case, the dispute among these three countries has been aggravated by the appearance of uncontrolled individuals or groups who perform acts of provocation intended to sway public opinion and precipitate a change in the foreign policy of their country.\(^{86}\)

In the case of the People’s Republic of China,\(^{87}\) Japan’s main competitor in the Asia-Pacific region, its foreign policy, from the turn of the millennium, has been focused on

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\(^{81}\) The effective capacity of the European Union to face the current security challenges like the asymmetrical conflict of the terrorism as a unified political actor has been questioned. Even when it comes to negotiate a joint European position in relation to foreign policy sanctions to non-democratic countries, the resistances of individual member states to abandon their single policies of regional influence obstructs the reach of a European consensus. See Portela, Clara: “Member states resistances to EU foreign policy sanctions”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 20, No. 2/1, Special Issue (August 2015), pp. 39-61, at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280949541_Member_states_resistance_to_EU_foreign_policy_sanctio.


\(^{84}\) The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has gone through a process of modernization. This plan downsized the PLA Ground forces manpower–useful as a domestic stability factor but excessive for any modern army- while at the same time modernized the technological dimension, especially the PLA Navy (PLAN), the Second Artillery (the strategic missile division) and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The selection of these military priorities points at an enhancement of China’s capabilities of dissuasion in a territorial conflict. See Li, Nan (January 2010): \textit{Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era: Implications for Crisis Management and Naval Modernization}, China Maritime Studies Series, No. 4, Newport, U.S. Naval War College, at https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/China-Maritime-Study-No-4-January-2010.aspx.


\(^{87}\) China surpassed Japan in 2010 as the second biggest economy in the world when the Japanese Gross Domestic Product reached a total of $1.288 trillion in the second quarter of that year while the Chinese GDP achieved a total of $1.337 trillion. Bloomberg News: “China GDP Surpasses Japan, Capping Three-Decade Rise”,
relations with other countries in Southern and Eastern Asia, as well as other countries that supply energy and raw materials. In this Chinese case, these individual actors group together in the Baodiao movement (in Chinese: 保釣運動; in pinyin: Bǎodiào Yùndòng) that asks for the “return” of the islands to China through Taiwan. This movement was internationally popularized by Hong Kong activist, David Chan Yuk-cheung, a few months before the British colony returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.

Chan led a fleet of activists who set sail for the islands on September 26, 1996 as an international protest against Japan and to reclaim Chinese Sovereignty over them, drowning the following day after an accident. From then on, Chan became a martyr for the cause and the movement Baodiao spread via the traditional Hong Kong and Taiwanese media (before the age of social media) popularizing the claim.

In October 2006, Japan had to deal with Baodiao’s launch of a new fleet in which 22 activists set out to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the death of Chan. The expedition did not meet its objective to arrive at the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands due to a blockade created by Japanese patrol boats, but the new communicative tools (smartphones, social networks and discussion forums on the Internet) enabled them to project the operation with great global success. Furthermore, they were able to articulate this political movement at a transnational level to the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, increasing the pressure towards the CPC.


which had been gradually increasing military and political pressure on Japan in order to maintain their internal national legitimacy.  

In this manner individual activists such as Chan achieved, through the use of the communicative vector, a change in public opinion that jeopardized the political decisions of the countries involved and modified the resulting interactions with other states. In short, Japan sees the external threat to its territorial integrity increasing through the communicative actions of foreign activists.

Therefore, the analysis of the chain of government policy-making by Japan that may pose a risk to national security should not be limited to the decision-making process, but should also include the origin of the events that influence these governments limiting their decisions.

In the same way that individual actors can compromise policy decisions of foreign powers, Japan is also susceptible to this phenomenon internally. In Japan, the nationalist groups or *Uyoku dantai* (右翼団体) have repeatedly disobeyed the government ban on visiting the islands. These extremist groups have launched individual fleets in the same way as the *Baodiao* movement, also erecting flags and illegal structures such as a lighthouse to make the Japanese nature of the islands visible in the media.  

Furthermore, *Uyoku dantai* have committed acts of aggression against Chinese interests within Japanese territory, such as the bus crash against the Chinese consulate in Osaka on April 23, 2004. These types of actions are a serious diplomatic and security problem for Japan, affecting their international position regarding China. The escalation of tension that can occur between Japan and China due to these types of actions is not an accidental bonus for these groups, but a goal sought intentionally.

The extremist groups are organized around a communicative dimension as core to their activity. In this way, public protests, speaker vans driving through the cities, launching of leaflets and the public exhibition of their growing power are all part of their political agenda. Furthermore, the way in which these groups make use of communication tools is not limited to these sporadic actions, but extends to the development of a permanent communicative structure that is constantly trying to influence Japanese public opinion. An example of this is that some of these groups were coordinated through the digital content distribution platform *Japanese Culture Channel Sakura* (日本文化チャンネル桜, *Nihon Bunka Channeru Sakura*) that acted as an agglutinative platform and a driver to these nationalistic groups.

This audio-visual distribution channel is characterized by its ultra-nationalistic and revisionist position to the Second World War and, in fact, one of their directors, the filmmaker Satoru Mizhushima, is the leader of one of the most active *Uyoku dantai* groups  

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regarding the island conflict: Ganbare Nippon (頑張れ日本！全国行動委員会, Ganbare Nippon! Zenkoku Kōdō Iinkai; in the abbreviated translation: “Go Japan”).

This organization visited the islands without authorization on August 18, 2012. This action was launched as a response to the incursion of 14 Hong Kong activists on the 15th who hoisted Chinese and Taiwanese flags on the island. The Japanese nationalist expedition was made up of 150 sympathizers of the organization who had departed from Ishigaki city, in the Okinawa prefecture. A year later they repeated the operation without being able to disembark because the Japanese Navy Coastal Patrols blocked them. This last action was conducted after Beijing confirmed the deployment of ships of the Chinese Coastal Guard (in Chinese: 中国海警; in pinyin: Zhōngguó hǎijǐng) to the waters that surrounded the disputed islands, escalating the friction between the two nations. This escalation continued the following year with China’s announcement of the world’s largest coastguard ship deployment in order to increase its naval projection capabilities.

### 3.2 A communicative-viewing proposal for reform of the Japanese Intelligence Services.

The impact of the new information technologies on the Japanese political agenda has increased constantly, perhaps because the Japanese traditional media went convergent, providing very similar informative coverage. This new landscape in which individual activists are able to influence the state through the communicative dimension –both traditional and distributed- is important enough to be taken into account by any reform proposal for the Japanese Intelligence Services.

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108 This more distributed social power to influence in the agendas of the national actors has also led to a wider nature of the security threats. Human traffic networks, transnational crime activities, infectious diseases and damage to the environment have become important factors of regional and global instability. The security agenda has been pushed to an expansion over its military original conception and the mechanics of the inter-state relations. See Caballero-Anthony, Mely; Emmers, Ralf and Acharya, Amitav (eds.) (2006): Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation, London, Ashgate Publishers.
The need to analyze the traditional and distributed media in order to understand, with sufficient foresight, new threats extends even to the academic world.109 Hardacre points out that even Japanese religious scholars were unable to foresee the sarin gas attacks committed by the Aum Shinrikyo sect. This lack of anticipation arose because they didn’t pay enough attention to the publications and communicative messages of the sect, which gradually became more radicalized.110 In other words, the deficiencies in the study and in the analysis of the communicative dimension have led to an inability to predict individual threats—not only internal and external—but also countries112 with less stable participative political systems.113

In order to face the new security challenges proposed by both the increasing power of activist and activists groups and the impact of the communicative dimension in this arena, a remodeling of Japanese Intelligence should take into account the following points:

First, the Intelligence Services of Japan can no longer treat the internal and external threats separately, as was done up until the end of the Cold War.111 In the early 21st century, both the internal and external dimensions became connected due to the increasing intensity of a global public opinion and the use of the communicative dimension to maximize the political and social consequences of these groups’ actions. This new paradigm affects not only stable democracies like Japan, but also countries112 with less stable participative political systems.113

In this context, the increasing level of globalization,114 international mobility and growing inter-relation between companies,115 media and cultural consumption are resulting in the elimination of frontiers between political and communicative actors. As globalized problems increasing affect many countries, academics such as Tsuchiyama have argued in support of the idea that the traditional conception of national sovereignty should be replaced by a progressive regional institutionalization116 that could deal with these transnational

116 In this sense, regional organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with its ten members state (in order of accession: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia) and its further expansion with the creation of the ASEAN Plus Three add-on
problems; such has been the case in US-Japan relations where different approaches to this practice (unilateral, bilateral and multilateral) have been applied.\textsuperscript{117} This dynamic political environment\textsuperscript{118} forces the different Intelligence Services to adapt to the new nature of the threats, adopting a greater role in the East Asian security field.\textsuperscript{119} This is especially necessary due the intensity and variety of changes experienced by this region since the end of the 1990s in their global economic\textsuperscript{120} role, political situation, social fluctuations\textsuperscript{121} and universalization of the digital communicative tools.\textsuperscript{122}

The communicative dimension has traditionally been approached by Japanese Intelligence as a press clipping task.\textsuperscript{123} This reactive approach is no longer useful because it


\textsuperscript{118} Scholars like Ravenhill and MacIntyre pointed out that the main factor driving this process of regional institutional integration in Asia is not the growing transnational trade and pro-liberalization pressure of the companies –despite all important factors- but, instead, a strategic and diplomatic desire and effort. In this sense, the proposal of a reformulation of the Intelligence Security would root in this strategic vision. See MacIntyre, Andrew and Ravenhill, John: “The Future of Asian Regional Institutions”, in Kahler, Miles and MacIntyre, Andrew (eds.) (2013): \textit{Integrating Regions: Asia in Comparative Context}, Stanford, Stanford University Press, pp. 245-266.


\textsuperscript{120} See Abad Quintanal, Gracia: “The Beijing Consensus in the Shadow of the Global Financial Crisis”, \textit{UNISCI Discussion Papers}, No. 24 (October 2010), pp. 45-60, at \url{http://www.ucm.es/data/content/media/www/pag-72501/UNISCI%20DP_24%20ABAD.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{121} Scholars like Terriff and Farrell point at the cultural dimension, the political sphere and the technological evolution as the three pillars that drive a contemporary society towards modernization in the military dimension of their national defense. See Farrell, Theo and Terriff, Terry (eds.) (2002): \textit{The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology}, Boulder, Lynne Rienner. Since the communication affects and determines the cultural identity, the political capital of a government in terms of social endorsement and the technological adoption both as a communicative vehicle and as a purpose itself, it could be concluded that the communicative dimension could be added to a comprehensive vision of the security as a discipline, especially in the Intelligence field.


\textsuperscript{123}Kotani, “Japan”, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 201-208.
always comes after perpetration of the vents themselves which, therefore, enjoy maximum political and social exposure in the media. A more useful approach to the needs of a nation’s Intelligence system would be to adopt a proactive approach, anticipating the activities of individual and collective extremist actors and mobilizing public opinion so that the terrorist events can be prevented.

The anticipation of threats to national security means it is necessary to analyze the communicative dimension, since the potentially threatening actors will try to project their identity, goals and objectives in the communicative dimension, prior to any political action. This paradigm has been stepped up due to the universalization of access to the Internet and the digital communicative tools associated with it: social networks, blogs, political forums, etc. This has led to an increase in the global digital audience and hence in the audience to whom the various political groups can promote their activities; it also enables them to make the most of the opportunities of international projection that these digital paradigms offers to political communication.\(^{124}\)

Therefore, any proposal to remodel\(^{125}\) Japanese Intelligence should take into account this new communicative context in order to achieve the effectiveness that is desired. Whether the structural nature of the reform is toward a functional centralization of Intelligence (as in the USA) or toward a more collegial model (as in the UK), the model chosen will have to be fully implemented in order to avoid the problems caused by the dual paradigm of the current situation. This is due to the special political nature of the Japanese bureaucracy and policymaking. In the first case, the stovepiping effect produced by the different ministries diminishes the usability of the Intelligence produced. In the second option, the desire for consensus among the political leaders encourages them to avoid Intelligence updating that can ruin this costly consensus. These two reasons point to total reform as being the only functional solution for Japan’s Intelligence Services. Consequently, and due to the fact that the new, global communicative paradigm necessitates the inclusion of communication analysis as a fundamental part of any Intelligence reform, the proposed model incorporates

\(^{124}\) The emergence of this Information Society has also had an impact in the mechanisms of the democratic participation in the political sphere. This phenomenon has aired a public debate on the relation between the Intelligence Services and the democratic societies. See Díaz Matey, Gustavo: “Conceptions of Intelligence: Intelligence as a Democratic Indicator”, Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) Research Paper, No. 165 (October-November 2014), pp. 1-18, at http://www.rieas.gr/images/publications/rieas165.pdf.

\(^{125}\) There have been previous proposals of reform of the Intelligence task processes in order to incorporate the communicative analysis as an essential part of it using the Game Theory as its theoretical framework. The Game Theory is a model for the quantitative study of the interrelation among any number and type of actor (political, social, economic, etc.) that analyzes the interaction that they establish among them with the purpose of maximizing the benefit expected of aforesaid interaction. This model proposes the adaptation of the Intelligence Cycle of Robert M. Clark (Planning, Collection, Processing, Analysis and Diffusion) to the communicative discourse analysis applying the Game Theory. This proposed model tries to answer a triple challenge for the Intelligence discipline from the consolidation of the new social paradigm of the Information Society: First, the strength in the use of open sources or OSINTs in the Intelligence collection phase. Secondly, the displacement of the localization of the most conflictive and costly part of the Cycle of Intelligence from the collection phase (demanding the highest quantity of human and economic resources) to the analysis phase (due to the complexity and quantity of the information gathered). And thirdly, the wide variety of dimensions that can affect the security of the state actors like diplomacy (both formal and public), trade agreements, religious movements, environmental challenges, migration displacements and transnational social movements. See López-Aranguren, Juan Luis: “Aplicación de la teoría de juegos en el análisis comunicativo como parte integrante del ciclo de inteligencia”, in Velasco, Fernando and Arcos, Rubén (eds.) (2012): Cultura de Inteligencia: Un elemento para la reflexión y la colaboración internacional, Madrid, Plaza y Valdés, pp. 67-76, at https://www.academia.edu/21669676/Aplicacion_de_la_teoria_de_juegos_en_el_analisis_comunicativo_como_parte_integrante_del_ciclo_de_inteligencia.
this communicative-viewing approach in order to be fully functional for the security needs of Japan.

4. Conclusions

Prior to this communicative-viewing proposal for reform of the Japanese Intelligence Services, two contrasting notions for the organization of the JIS had been considered by academics and policy makers: the centralized model of the USA and the decentralized model of the UK. Also, previous suggestions for reform have been mainly centered on the institutional dimension, but also including three related aspects: technical enhancement, diplomatic strengthening and legislative reforms.

In the institutional dimension, the greatest effort has been aimed in four directions: 1) reducing overlapping of structures in the Japanese Intelligence community, which consists of: the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA), the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), the National Police Agency (NPA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO); 2) avoiding the clash of competencies between these agencies and structures by establishing protocols of intervention and information sharing among them; 3) progressing towards a complete reorganization of the Japanese Intelligence Services; and 4) initiating a public and political debate in the communicative dimension about what kind of Intelligence Services Japan needs in order to face transnational threats to its national security, fulfill its duties with its international allies and develop a leading role in the security field as it has in the economic and political dimension as a regional power.

These reform attempts are likely to achieve complete success when the inner challenges regarding the reorganization of the existing overlapping Intelligence structures, the modernization of the bureaucracy and the communicative engagement with the declining, yet dynamic, public opposition to Japan’s development of its Defense dimension are solved.

In the area of technical enhancement, it is possible to identify the reinforcement of the Japanese Intelligence satellite constellation in 2015 as one of the most important recent steps towards this objective. In the diplomatic aspect, the biggest advances can be recognized as the creation of the counter-terrorist intelligence unit in December 2015, the trilateral cooperation with USA, Australia and other regional actors, and the incorporation of South Korea to the Link 16 intelligence exchange system that will be better able to monitor North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Finally, the political and legislative dimension has had an impact, with the announcement of the Liberal Democratic Party in March 2015 to study the creation of a CIA-style Japanese Intelligence structure that would coordinate all the Intelligence activity of the country, as well as the Act on Protection of Specially Designated Secrets that came into force in December 2014.

These renovation efforts show that the communicative dimension, be it manifested in the domestic sphere or at the international level, plays a fundamental role in the dynamics of the security activities of an actor like Japan. Therefore, in seeking to achieve fully functional Japanese Intelligence Services it is necessary to adopt and implement a reform that features a communicative-viewing approach as an integral part of its core.

The need for this reform and its focus on the communicative dimensions, is justified for three main reasons: a) the threats to the national security of Japan are becoming transnational, erasing the borders between the domestic and the international sphere (as was the
case, for example, in the Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict where the threat to Japan came from both the domestic *Uyoku dantai* groups and from the international behavior of China; b) the increasing power of individual activists and groups to threaten the security of nations such as Japan and its citizens (for example the risk of anonymous lone wolves, the attacks of extremists groups like the Aum Shinrikyo sect or the kidnapping and assassination of Japanese hostages by Daesh in opposition to Japan’s international cooperation in the fight against jihadist terrorism); c) the emergence of a global public opinion that plays a significant role in pressurizing to modify their international policies (as it was demonstrated in the regional public opinion of Northeast Asia following the exhibitions of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities).

Finally, due to the increasing role of the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), it is imperative that the Japanese Intelligence Services work in this communicative dimension. This dimension can also be exploited in ways that could present additional challenges for Japan, for example: a) as a cause of the emergence of threats to national security (such as the communicative strategies developed by extremist religious or political groups for promoting the radicalization of vulnerable sectors of the population); b) as a propaganda objective of terrorists and terrorist groups to influence domestic (Japanese), regional and global public opinion and force concessions in any negotiations based on the threat of violence and terror (in the way that North Korea is pursuing through the nuclear threat). In any of these cases, the study, analysis and operational response in the communicative dimension is vital for the Japanese Intelligence Services in anticipating dangers to the country’s national security, providing effective answers to those threats, and developing an effective security system with adequate human, economic and logistic resources to be able to respond to future threats.

In conclusion, and as presented in the initial hypothesis, in order to obtain fully functional Japanese Intelligence Services it is necessary that any plans for reform are based firmly on the concept, development and implementation of integral communicative-viewing as the core feature.