Course ID Number: ADC5365

Course Title: Contemporary Political and Economic Regionalism

No. of Credits: 2

Graduate School of International Relations
International University of Japan

Term: Spring 2013
Syllabus

Contents:
The rising tide of regionalism has been a striking feature in international relations during the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century. Initially, most analysts regarded regionalism as a European phenomenon, modeled upon the institutions established in postwar Europe, then merged into the current European Union and successively, though unsuccessfully, applied in the so-called developing countries of Latin America and Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, however, regionalism has become more diversified, and the European model has mostly been rejected as inapplicable. Instead, new variants of regionalism have emerged, both in conceptual terms as well as in political practice, most dramatically in Southeast Asia but, to some extent, also in Latin America and parts of Africa. ‘New regionalism’ has become a serious rival and better appreciated
strategic and conceptual alternative to globalization. Even more recently, China’s inclusion into the World Trade Organization has boosted expectations that regionalism will also take roots in East Asia, where the Chinese government has launched a series of provocative initiatives to advance prospects of economic cooperation, political strategies of conflict resolution and patterns of cultural communication within processes of the formation of transnational civil society.

The course aims at allowing students to develop and sharpen their own views about past and ongoing processes of regional integration and regional cooperation. It does so by contextualizing regionalism with its history in various parts of the world, thereby contending the perception that regionalism is essentially of European origin. It also interconnects regionalism with parallel processes that partly impact on and partly result from it, namely migration and the security discourse. It is neither a surprising nor a contingent matter that ‘new regionalism’ began to feature in the academic debate simultaneously with ‘new migration’ and ‘new security’. ‘New migration’ stands for perceptions of new attitudes towards migration among migrants and administrators in charge of controlling migration. ‘New security’ stands for the widening scope of the notion of security beyond the reach of military affairs into the area of human security. ‘New migration’ and ‘new security’ are interconnected with ‘new regionalism’ because regionalism makes existing international boundaries threadbare and thereby reduces the border-controlling capability of governments of sovereign states. As a consequence, the security discourse can no longer be limited to matters concerning the military nor can it be confined to issues that fall within the competence of governments of sovereign states. The study of regionalism thus has much to reveal about the structure of institutions of statehood and their fates vis-à-vis pressures emerging from populations within and beyond the boundaries of sovereign states.

The course examines long-term as well as short-range factors that are behind the rise of regionalism. It seeks to reveal long-term factors through historical description. It seeks to establish short-term factors through theory-based analysis. It will also reflect on the likely consequences of regionalism, namely the reduction of the border-controlling capability of governments of sovereign states and its results, legal as well as undocumented migration together with rising human security concerns. For the purpose of this course, regionalism will comprise regional integration and regional cooperation. Regionalism will be approached in its historically grown and regionally specific forms. It will be defined formally as a process of the shift of collective identities and loyalties within various levels of regionalness. Levels of regionalness are institutions of governance in which certain types of control over population groups in areas of various extensions are vested legitimately. Among the levels of regionalness that are taken into account in this course are institutions of local governance, institutions of district governance, institutions of regional
governance within or regional agreements across sovereign states, governments of sovereign states and institutions of regional governance above sovereign states. The course will also provide an introduction to a number of controversial issues. Among them are: the merit of distinguishing between contractual and institutional regionalism; the difficulty of separating regional identity from national identity; the logic of differentiating between macroregions and microregions; the problematique of ranking the legitimacy of regional institutions above that of institutions of sovereign states; the possibility or lack of possibility of controlling undocumented migration within states with a liberal constitution; the advantage of allowing a competition among governments of sovereign states and civil society as security providers; the problem of determining the role of transnational civil society as a factor of regionalism.

Grading:

Regular attendance, active participation in class and the submission of one full-length research paper are the requirements for the awarding of two credits.
Lecture summaries

Lecture I:
Theories of the State and of International Relations

Part A: Normativity versus the Forces of Power

1. International Relations Theories
1.1. Theories of the state and theories of international relations: the legitimacy of the state too often taken for granted in too many states, compared to prevailing legitimacy problems.
1.2. The conventional perspective: separate branches of social science and legal theory.
1.3. The need combine both sets of theories in the context of regional integration (affects the unity of the territory of the state; the need for international borders too often taken for granted compared to the lack of agreement about these borders; regional integration affects border control regimes), migration (affects the unity of the population of the state; the quest for national identity too often taken for granted compared to identity controversies; migration may call into question existing collective identities) and security (affects the unity of the government of the state; the need for the effectiveness of government security provision capability too often taken for granted, compared to implementation problems; the demand for the provision of ‘human security’ for the benefit of individual recipients may call into question government security providing capability).
1.5. Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr (1937-), Pan-Africanism and East African Integration (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 8-10 (Nationalism in Africa is a category imposed by European colonial rulers for the benefit of a tiny, European-trained indigenous elite. Pan-Africanism, as a continental integration scheme, carries leverage, whereas regionalism is likened to tribalism.)
1.6. Anthony David Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 1, 2-3 (nationalism was seen as a means to overcome regionalism as separatist parochialism, equivalent of tribalism).

1.7. Supranationalism (representing integration as the making of institutions) – intergovernmentalism (or transgovernmentalism) (representing inter-government interaction concerning regional issues with or without the making of regional institutions, with national prerogatives prevailing over regional concerns) – nationalism (national prerogatives dominating) [Sandra Lavenex, 'Transgovernmentalism in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice', in: *Innovative Governance in the European Union*, edited by Ingeborg Trömmel and Amy Verdun (Boulder and London: Rienner, 2009), pp. 255-271].

1.8. Bottom-up regional integration: involvement of private corporations, considerations of cross-border interactions of private persons; see below, Lecture V, for “New Regionalism”.

2. Martin Wight (1913 – 1972)’s dogma: There is no theory of international relations, as international relations are couched in the empirical world ['Why Is There No International Theory', in: *Diplomatic Investigations*, edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp; 17-34]

3. Prediction, generalization and explanation as the dominant features of international relations theories

3.1. **Standard theories**
3.1.1. The functionalist tradition
3.1.1.1. biologism of functionalist theories.
3.1.1.2. the concept of the system.
3.1.1.3. systemic change versus change of systems.
3.1.1.4. the peace movement and international law using functionalism.
3.1.1.5. integration as a goal (the global perspective of the peace movement).
3.1.1.6. regional blocks as a goal (the perspective of the Pan Movements).
3.1.1.7. the making of institutions as a goal.
3.1.1.7.4. Woodrow Wilson (1856 – 1924, President of the USA, 1913 – 1921) and the making of the League of Nations [John A. Thompson, ‘Wilsonianism. The Dynamics of a Conflicted Concept’, in: *International Affairs* 86 (2010), pp. 27-47 (Wilson’s political focus shifted from the quest for democracy to the demand for the establishment of international organizations during World War I and was connected with the change of US foreign policy from neutrality to belligerency)].

3.1.1.7.5. Wilson’s legacy: traditions of Wilsonianism in US foreign policy and in foreign policies elsewhere [*The Crisis of American Foreign Policy. Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knoch, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Tony Smith (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 1, 3, 6 (is Wilsonianism primarily the bid to ‘make the world safe for democracy’, or is Wilsonianism primarily a quest for building and maintaining global international organizations?)].


3.1.1.10. integration as a goal (the regional perspective of neofunctionalists).

3.1.1.11. integration as NATO propaganda: functionalism as communication theory.

3.1.1.12. return to institution-making: neoliberal institutionalism.

3.1.1.13. the legacy of Kant and the theory of ‘democratic peace’.

3.1.1.14. classical functionalism leads to assessments of regional integration according to assumptions about their capacity of promoting global integration.


3.1.1.14.2. Open versus closed regionalism.

3.1.2. The realist tradition.

3.1.2.1. biologism.

3.1.2.2. the concept of the system and the needs of predictive theory: the demand for prediction regarding international relations rests on the postulate that no principled changes will occur in the structure of the international system.

3.1.2.3. systemic change versus change of systems.

3.1.2.4. the state as actor.

3.1.2.5. the concept of state interest.

3.1.2.6. Realism, contractualism, representation, democracy and the legitimacy of the state.
3.1.2.7. the ‘cooperation under anarchy’ dilemma.
3.1.2.8. the ‘security dilemma’.
3.1.2.9. Classical realism:
3.1.2.9.1. Edward Hallett Carr (1892 – 1982).
3.1.2.9.3. Quincy Wright (1890 – 1970), ‘Realism and Idealism in International Politics’, in: World Politics 5 (1952), pp. 116-128, at pp. 119-120 (argues that there is no need to differentiate between realism and idealism in the study of international relations from the point of view of international law).
3.1.2.10. neorealism (or defensive or structural realism): Kenneth Neal Waltz (1924 -) (emphasizing the structural feature of anarchy of the international system; states must defend themselves under conditions of anarchy).
3.1.2.11. rationalism as postrealism (or offensive realism): John Mearsheimer [1947 -; The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001) (states seek power to obtain security)].
3.1.2.12. the belief in the ‘time-honoured wisdom’ of realism, historicism and cultural relativism.
3.1.2.13. realism as behavioralism and Cold-War ideology: Morton A. Kaplan (1921 -).
3.1.2.14. a realist in office: Henry Alfred Kissinger (1923-).
3.1.2.15. Realism leads to assessments of regional integration in its capacity of promoting perceived state interests.
3.1.3. The English School of International Relations between realism and constructivism
3.1.3.1. Martin Wight: the conceptualization of states systems as based on the commonality of cultural values [Wight oscillating between the position of a theorist of power politics and a peace activist].
3.1.4. A challenge to functionalism and realism: constructivism.
3.1.4.1. the evolution of the theory:
3.1.4.1.1. chaos theory.
3.1.4.1.2. catastrophe theory: René Thom (1923 – 2002).
3.1.4.2. perceptions of change:
3.1.4.2.1. the demands of predictive theory and the lack of awareness of systems change.


3.1.4.3. the constructivist revolt:

3.1.4.3.1. the myth that constructivism has focused on explaining ‘identity’ (whereas it is predominantly a methodology, not an explanatory theory)

3.1.4.3.2. the reception of the theories of John Langshaw Austin (1911 – 1960) and the input of the ‘Linguistic Turn’ (the significance of speech act theory).

3.1.4.3.3. the input of postmodernism: Jean-François Lyotard [1924 – 1998; *La condition postmoderne* (Paris: editions de Minuit, 1979)].

3.1.4.3.4. the input of sociology: Anthony Giddens (1938 -), structuration theory and the legacy of catastrophe theory in the social sciences [*The Constitution of Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)]


3.1.4.3.6. The belated reception of the methodology and political philosophy of Jürgen Habermas (1929 -): the public sphere, speech act theory and communication in International Relations. The differentiation between “system” and “life-world”.


3.1.4.3.8. Alexander Wendt [1958 -; *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)] and the breakdown of the
disciplinary boundaries between sociology and political science.

3.1.4.3.9. A forgotten forerunner: Hans Joachim Morgenthau and his work of the early 1930s.

3.1.4.3.10. Feminists as constructivists: the gendering of war and peace.

3.1.4.3.11. Some reasons for the constructivist revolt:

3.1.4.3.11.1. The ‘end of the Cold War’ syndrome and the quest for reflections on change.

3.1.4.3.11.2. The restructuration of actorship in international relations.

3.1.4.3.11.3. The redefinition of security.

3.1.4.3.11.4. Migration.

3.1.4.3.11.5. Regional integration.

3.1.5. Responses to Constructivism:

3.1.5.1. The ‘English School’ and the history of international relations: analyzing the ‘expansion of international society’ on the basis of the transformation of the international system:

3.1.5.1.1. The Expansion of International Society, edited by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) (European patterns of the conducts of international relations in war and peace, called ‘International Society’ by the English School, expanded out from Europe to the boundaries of the globe during the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries under the impact of European colonial rule; decolonization after World War II created weak states, supported political fragmentation and enhanced the instability of the international system; towards the end of European colonial rule, political elites in the colonial dependencies revolted against the colonial governments using Western political ideas against the ‘West’).

European colonial rule and the globalization of European International Society; argue that the validity of norms wanes under the conditions of system expansion).

3.1.5.2. Historicizing the arguments of the “English School”: Edward Keene, Beyond Anarchical Society. Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), claims that the notion of order has been more significant in the history of international relations in Europe since the seventeenth century than the belief in anarchy but does so on the basis of an analysis of theory texts and his claim that the notion of ‘divided sovereignty’ has existed as an element in international relations theory since the seventeenth century, while ignoring the controversies about the divisibility of sovereignty; uses this argument to defend his view that the sovereign state has never been the sole type of legitimate international actor.

3.1.5.3. Creating a framework for “international legitimacy”: Ian Clark, International Legitimacy and World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) claims that legitimacy of state constitutions can only be obtained through ‘world society’, which he separates from the notion of ‘international society, the latter standing for Great Power, the balance of power, international law, diplomacy and war, and claims that ‘world society’ became activated in 1815 through the ban on slavery and the slave trade at the Congress of Vienna, between 1899 and 1907 through the Hague Conference, and in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference.

3.2. The historiography of international relations theories


3.2.1.1. the ‘realism versus functionalism’ debate.

3.2.1.2. the quest for professionalization and the debate over behavioralism within realism.

3.2.1.3. the debate between neorealism/Structuralism and neoliberal institutionalism.

3.2.1.4. postrealists versus constructivists, alternatively: positivists versus postpositivists.

3.2.1.5. The culturalism inherent to the ‘debates’ pattern.

3.2.2. The ‘systems’ pattern (regarding International Relations as a paradigmatic science).

3.2.2.1. Thomas S. Kuhn [1922 – 1996; The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962)’s view of the social sciences as ‘pre-paradigmatic’.


3.2.3. The cultural bias of international relations theories.


3.2.3.2. the globalization of the European international system and international relations theories: the institutionalization of International Relations after World War I.

3.2.3.3. international relations theories and international law: the globalization of the *ius publicum Europeum* in international relations theory (controversies about Carl Schmitt, 1888 – 1985).

3.2.3.4. Asian and African perceptions on international relations: the state, the region, non-state actors.

3.2.3.5. the limits of Western theorizing about international relations.

4. The concept of the international system

4.1. The history of the concept of the international system

4.1.1. Mechanicism and the definition of the system.

4.1.2. Biologism and the definition of the system.

4.1.3. From biology to politics: the making of the concept of the global international system in nineteenth century Europe.

4.1.4. Institutions as definitional elements of the global international system.

4.1.5. Norms as the definitional element of the global international system.

4.2. The locus of the international system

4.2.1. The international system of an objective reality (assumption enshrined in
realism and functionalism).

4.2.2. The international as being-in-the-world (assumption enshrined in constructivism).

5. The theory of norms (in contradistinction to normative theory)

5.1. Norms and patterns of behavior

5.1.2. Norms as prescriptions for patterns of behaviour (in addition to the prohibition of specific actions or stipulations of specific actions), norms as factors constraining choices of patterns of behaviour: Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, in: *International Organization* 52 (1998), p. 891: norms defined as ‘a given standard of regulated behavior for actors with a given identity’. Difference of norms against standards: standards are not necessarily related to behavior. Difference against rules: rules are not necessarily given to but can be established by actors at their own discretion.

5.1.3. How and why do we adopt patterns of behaviour?
5.1.3.1. voluntary adoption versus mandatory adoption.
5.1.3.2. the problem of the legitimacy of mandatorily adopted norms: the requirement of the existence of institutions.
5.1.3.3. the problem of enforcing mandatory norms in international relations: or, how can norms be enforced without institutions?

5.1.4. Types of norms:
5.1.4.1. legal norms.
5.1.4.2. moral norms.

5.1.5. Categories of norms:
5.1.5.1. laws.
5.1.5.2. rules.

5.2. The origin of norms
5.2.1. Norms as givens (natural law, human rights).
5.2.2. Legislated norms.
5.2.3. Norms agreed upon through treaties.
5.2.4. Customary norms.
5.2.5. Norms as institutions (e.g. marriage rules, succession rules, rules of diplomatic conduct, combat rules).
5.2.6. Norms and institutions: questions of enforcibility once again:
5.2.6.1. institutions creating norms.
5.2.6.2. institutions enforcing norms.
5.2.6.3. norms required for the making of institutions.
5.2.6.4. norms and state institutions.
5.2.6.5. norms and regional institutions.
5.2.6.6. ‘global’ norms?
5.2.7. Perceptions of the difference between norms relating to domestic institutions and norms relating to international institutions (or international relations beyond institutions).
5.2.8. The question of the origins of norms is core to understanding processes of regional integration, as the norms required to conduct these processes cannot exist at the time they are being launched.

5.3. The change of norms
5.3.1. Change of patterns of behaviour preceding change of norms.
5.3.2. Change of social context ushering in change of norms.
5.3.3. Endogeneity versus exogeneity: identifying the 'factors' of change within and outside groups.
5.3.4. Law versus politics: choosing the procedure for change.
5.3.4.1. the logic of due process.
5.3.4.2. the logic of the use of force.
5.3.4.3. the logic of revolution.
5.3.5. Norms change and change of institutions.
5.3.6. Intention: ex ante rationalization of norm change.
5.3.7. Causality: ex post rationalization of norm change.

5.4. Norms versus regimes: various types of constraints on the choice of patterns of behavior
5.4.1. Normative versus non-normative constraints on the choice of patterns of behaviour:
5.4.1.1. habits (traditions).
5.4.1.2. anticipated expectations (status).
5.4.1.3. age, health condition (stability and perceptions thereof).
5.4.1.4. income (affluence and perceptions thereof).
5.4.1.5. access to resources (power and perceptions thereof).
5.4.1.6. the significance of non-normative constraints on the choice of patterns of behaviour in international relations under conditions of scarcity of institutional constraints.
5.4.1.7. normative constraints: the question of enforcibility beyond state institutions again.

5.4.2. Norms and international relations.
5.4.2.1. the significance of legal norms in international relations.
5.4.2.2. the significance of moral norms in international relations.

5.4.3. Regimes as non-normative constraints.
5.4.3.1. the definition of regimes [Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983): a set of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area]; norms are regimes but not all regimes are normative.
5.4.3.3. lack of distinguishability between regimes and moral norms.

5.5. The enforcibility of norms in international relations
5.5.1. Legal enforcibility.
5.5.1.1. the lack of institutionality of international relations.
5.5.1.2. the voluntariness of the acceptance of court arbitration.
5.5.1.3. the voluntariness of treaty-making.
5.5.1.4. the debate about the principle *pacta sunt servanda* as a base norm or not.
5.5.1.5. the *clausula de rebus sic stantibus* and the enforcibility of norms.
5.5.2. Political and military enforcibility.
5.5.2.1. states as norm-enforcement agents in international relations through:
5.5.2.1.1. diplomacy.
5.5.2.1.2. war.
5.5.2.2. the United Nations and the enforcement of norms through:
5.5.2.2.1. Peace Keeping Operations.
5.5.2.2.2. Peace Enforcement Operations.
5.5.2.2.3. Peace Building Operations.
5.5.3. Moral enforcibility
5.5.3.1. economic sanctions.
5.5.3.2. the ‘rogue-state’ syndrome.

5.6. Constructivism and norms in international relations
5.6.1. Survey of the history of constructivism:
5.6.2. regimes (moral norms) as social constructs? (Alexander Wendt: Sociology of international relations)
5.6.3. the politics of norm-constructing and regime definition:
5.6.3.1. agenda setting at international conferences.
5.6.3.2. definitional authority concerning norms.
5.6.3.3. norm-making and perceptions of political / military power.

6. The forces of power

6.1. The conceptual history of power
6.1.1. Power as a personal gift (Francesco Guicciardini, 1483 – 1540).
6.1.3. The equation of power with institutional assets (nineteenth-century political theory).
6.1.4. Power as the expectation to be able to impose one’s own will upon others (Max[imilian] Weber); explicated in the context of Weber’s concept of rule; constitutes power as a condition of rule which he understood as the institutionalization of the execution of power; however, Weber did not specify
these implications.

6.1.4.1. lack of absolute power.
6.1.4.2. the relational character of Weber's concept of power (power over whom?)
6.1.4.3. the intentional character of Weber's concept of power (power to do what?)


6.2. Power holders in international relations
6.2.1. International organizations and institutions:
6.2.1.1. the United Nations Organization.
6.2.1.2. other international public organizations and institutions:
6.2.1.2.1. The World Bank (since 1944).
6.2.1.2.2. The International Monetary Fund (since 1944).
6.2.1.2.3. The International Committee of the Red Cross (since 1863).
6.2.1.2.4. The Universal Postal Union (since 1878).
6.2.1.2.5. The International Organization of Migration (since 1951).
6.2.2. Transnational institutions and groups:
6.2.2.1. civil society groups.
6.2.2.2. religious organizations and institutions.
6.2.2.3. Multi-national corporations.
6.2.3. Governments of sovereign states.
6.2.4. Institutions of public governance within states.
6.2.5. Regional institutions.
6.2.6. The mix of power holders in international relations varies by region.
6.3. **Measurements of power**

6.3.1. Conventional approaches (considered objectifiable):

6.3.1.1. state assets (the category of ‘form of government’ plays little role).

6.3.1.1.1. territory.

6.3.1.1.2. population.

6.3.1.1.3. military capacity.

6.3.1.1.4. access to mineral resources.

6.3.1.1.5. economic achievement.

6.3.1.1.6. norms and values to the extent that they are considered to be measurable.


6.3.1.2. actorship in international relations: subjectivity in terms of international law.

6.3.2. The constructivist critique of conventional approaches: lack of the objectivity of power measurements as a starting point.


6.3.3.1. scope: aspect of an actor’s behavior in a given situation.

6.3.3.2. domain: number of actors under the sway of one actor.

6.3.3.3. weight: probability of an actor’s decision having some impact.

6.3.4. Power assessments by proxy:

6.3.4.1. agenda-setting capability.

6.3.4.2. size of ambassadorial staff.

6.3.4.3. intermediating capability.

6.3.5. The politics of determining the criteria for power measurement.

6.3.6. Cultural traditions shaping assessments of power and pitched against externally imposed assessments: the cases of ASEAN and the EU.

6.4. **Political decision-making between the implementation of norms and the pursuit of power**
6.4.1. Theories about legally binding and non-legally binding commitments.
6.4.2. Legal demands for the abiding by norms and the honoring of legally binding commitments.
6.4.3. Political demands for honoring non-legally binding commitments.
6.4.4. The politics of ascertaining 'breach of rules'.
6.4.5. The politics of ascertaining 'breach of treaties'.
6.4.6. The 'scrap-of-paper' logic: reputation and the political freedom of sovereign decision-making.
6.4.7. The problem of unjust norms and the right to resist.
6.4.8. The problem of morality in the pursuit of power.

6.5. The balance of power
6.5.1. Conceptual history of the balance of power and the change of balance-of-power models:
6.5.1.1. the scales model.
6.5.1.2. the machine model (static equilibrium).
6.5.1.3. the living body model (dynamic equilibrium).
6.5.2. Balance-of-power rules:
6.5.2.1. Emeric de Vattel (1714 – 1767), Droits des gens (London [recte: Neuchâtel]: the author, 1758).
6.5.2.2. Morton A. Kaplan (System and Process in International Politics, 1957).
6.5.3. The balance of power as political propaganda.
6.5.4. Realism and the balance of power (Henry Alfred Kissinger).
6.5.5. The debated normativity of the balance of power.

6.6. The notion of power politics
6.6.1. 'Machiavellianism': Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 63-65) [first published 1939].
6.6.2. Models of power politics:
6.6.2.1. brute force: the right of the fist.
6.6.2.2. the jungle.
6.6.2.3. the state of nature.
6.6.3. Political theorists and the need to hedge power politics.
6.6.3.1. Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679); *Leviathan* (London: Crooke, 1651).

7. Power Transition Theory

7.1. The quest for stability (as the goal of normative theory) versus perceptions of changing power relations (as an issue of the theory of power).


7.3. Hegemons and challengers within the context of realism: George Modelski's theory of the global war ([the economic, political and military costs of maintaining global leadership and the cycle of hegemons; Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987).]

Part B: States and Power, Agents and Structure, Sovereignty and the Notion of Anarchy

1. The State

1.1. The word and the concept
1.1.1. The classical Latin root.
1.1.2. Standing and stability.
1.1.3. Stabilitas loci and the state (Justus Lipsius).

1.1.4. The machine model and the word state (Thomas Hobbes).

1.1.5. August Ludwig von Schlözer (1735 – 1809) and the etymology of the word state [Schlözer, *Theorie der Statistik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1804)].

1.1.6. Biologism and the word state [Friedrich Ratzel, 1844 – 1904; Ratzel, *Politische Geographie* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1897)].

1.1.7. The logic of state succession (George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770 – 1831).

1.1.8. Georg Jellinek (1851 – 1911) and the nationalist concept of the state (1900).

1.1.9. Georg Jellinek and the formation of the state.


1.1.12. Nations definitions


1.1.12.4. Ernest Renan, *Qu’est-ce que c’est la nation?* (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1882): a nations definition under the auspices of biologism and contractualism.


1.2. Modifications of the nationalist paradigm in the later twentieth century

1.2.1. Reducing the significance of the unity of territories and of borders: regional integration.

1.2.2. Reducing the significance of population unity: migration.

1.2.3. Reducing the significance of the unity of government: security provision.


1.2.7. Discussing the problematique of collective identities and their transformation: Anthony David Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, p. 4.

1.3. ‘Non-state-actors’ / transnational actors

1.3.1. Civil society (local, national, transnational).

1.3.2. Non-sovereign institutions as international actors (private firms, cultural organizations).

1.3.3. The ‘Yao-Ming’ effect: the impact of cultural ambassadors.

2. Power in relation to the state

2.1. Power assessments

2.1.1. The threat potential: power assessment from a military point of view.

2.1.2. The bargaining potential: power assessment from a political point of view.

2.1.3. The market access potential: power assessment from an economic point of view.

2.1.4. The media, public opinion and language control potential: power assessment from an ideological and cultural point of view.

2.1.5. The potential to influence: cultural politics and the setting of values.

2.2. Actors and agents


2.2.2. The legacy of nineteenth-century biology:

2.2.2.1. The changing use of the body-politic metaphor.

2.2.2.1.1. under the prevalence of mechanicism (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651: the body as a machine).

2.2.2.1.2. under the prevalence of biologism [Johann Caspar Bluntschli, 1808 – 1881:
the state as an extended human body; Bluntschli, *Die Bedeutung und die Fortschritte des modernen Völkerrechts* (Berlin: Lüderitz, 1866).

2.2.2.2. the conflicting meanings of the body-politic metaphor
2.2.2.2.1. transience invoked specifically by the biologistic use of the model (the birth and death of states).
2.2.2.2.2. permanence (or long-lastingness) of state existence as a postulate of ideologies attached to existing state institutions.

2.2.3. The fallacy of expression:
2.2.3.1. realist theory and the reductionist belief that state speak with one voice.
2.2.3.2. the notion of 'state behaviour'.

2.2.4. The implications of actorship: agency as subjectivity in international law.

2.2.5. The implications of legal personality for the conduct of international relations.

2.2.6. The institutionalization of the state: from the personal to the institutional conceptualization of statehood within the biologistic body-politic metaphor: the conflicting character of the metaphor.

2.2.7. Levels of actorship:
2.2.7.1. local.
2.2.7.2. regional.
2.2.7.3. national.
2.2.7.4. transnational.
2.2.7.5. international.
2.2.7.6. global.

2.3. Agency and international relations theory
2.3.1. realism and agency: power maximization versus security maximization.

2.3.3. Constructivism and ascribing agency.

2.4. Structure
2.4.1. Science, the social sciences and the legacy of objectivism in the definition of structure.
2.4.1.1. Kenneth Neal Waltz (1924–) and the notion of structure: structure as an element of the construction of the system.
2.4.1.2. Alexander Wendt and the notion of structure: structure as pattern of action.
2.4.1.3. Constructivism and the notion of structure.
2.4.2. The theory of relative (neorealism) versus absolute (classical realism) gains and the notion of structure.
2.4.3. The notion of structure, the imagery of lastingness and the legacy of objectivism.
2.4.3.1. the epistemological invocation of the subjective-objective dichotomy.
2.4.3.2. the impersonalization of the structure as an act of epistemological objectification.
2.4.4. The looseness of the concept of structure as applied to international relations:
2.4.4.1. refers to habits (regimes / moral norms).
2.4.4.2. refers to legal rules.
2.4.4.3. refers to institutions as established procedures.
2.4.5. The constructivist (deconstructivist) onslaught on the notion of structure.

2.5. Relations of the concepts of agents and structure to the concept of power
2.5.1. Another legacy of the nineteenth century: the reversal of the dichotomy of individual and milieu:
2.5.1.1. realism and the focus on the individual (in the tradition of nineteenth-century liberalism).
2.5.1.2. functionalism (neofunctionalism and neoliberal institutionalism) and the focus on the milieu (in the tradition of nineteenth-century socialism).
2.5.2. The concept of anarchy.
2.5.2.1. anarchy as expectation of the absence of rule.
2.5.2.2. anarchy as a term for institutions that humans should create but cannot or do not create.
2.5.3. The agent-structure debate as a veil obstructing insight into allocations of power.

3. Sovereignty (supposedly an element in the structure of the international system)

3.1. History of the word
3.1.1. Medieval Latin *sovranus.*
3.1.2. Classical Latin *supremus.*

3.2. History of the concept
3.2.1. The context of universalism: the unity of humankind.
3.2.2. The context of pluralism: the world of states.
3.2.3. Changing elements of the concept:
3.2.3.1. shifts in the assignment of hierarchy.
3.2.3.2. shifts in the number of sovereigns.
3.2.3.3. various references to space in the application of the concept of sovereignty (absence of the regional level):
  3.2.3.3.1. local polities.
  3.2.3.3.2. states (pluralism).
  3.2.3.3.3. the world (universalism).
3.2.3.4. overlaps between the universalist and the pluralism conceptualization of sovereignty in Early Modern Europe (c. 1500 – c. 1800).
3.2.3.5. Sovereignty as a hybrid concept [Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999)]: maintains that the concept of sovereignty rests on claims that are prescriptive rather than ascriptive.
3.2.3.7. the contested notion of Chinese sovereignty to c. 1842.

3.3. Sovereignty and equality
3.3.1. Contractual groups (long-distance trading companies), the late medieval urban leagues and confederations and the notion of equality:
  3.3.1.1. The trading companies:
    3.3.1.1.1. Merchant Adventurers.
    3.3.1.1.2. Bristol merchants and the penetration into the Atlantic Ocean.
    3.3.1.1.3. The English East India Company (1600 – 1849).
    3.3.1.1.4. The Dutch East India Company (1602 – 1798).
    3.3.1.1.5. Other East India companies (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
  3.3.1.2. the Hanseatic League.
  3.3.1.3. the Rhenish League.
  3.3.1.4. the Swabian Confederation.
  3.3.1.5. the Princes’ League (1785).
  3.3.1.6. the Holy Alliance (1815-1848).
3.3.2. Jean Bodin’s theory of sovereignty.
3.3.3. From personal sovereignty to institutional sovereignty.
3.3.4. From horizontal (international) sovereignty to horizontal (international) and
vertical (domestic) sovereignty.


3.3.6. The Holy Roman Empire and the notion of sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: precursor to regional institutions and European law.

3.3.7. Sovereignty and the transnational empires of the nineteenth century (Austria-Hungary, Russia, Turkey).

3.3.8. Sovereignty and the doctrine of federalism.

3.3.8.1. Johannes Althusius [1557 – 1638; *Politica* (Herborn: Corvinus, 1603)].

3.3.8.2. the making of the USA (1776 – 1783).

3.3.8.3. nineteenth-century legal discourses on federalism (Paul Laband, 1838 – 1918).

3.3.9. Sovereignty, nationalism and democracy.

3.3.9.1. the legacy of nineteenth-century liberalism [John Stuart Mill, 1806 – 1873; *Considerations on Republican Government* (London: Parker & Bourn, 1861)].

3.3.9.2. realism and democratic sovereignty.

3.3.10. Sovereignty and actorship.

3.3.10.1 sovereigns as subjects of international law.

3.3.10.2. non-sovereigns as subjects of international law:

3.3.10.2.1. The Catholic Church.

3.3.10.2.2. The Maltese Order (“The Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta”), sovereign of Rhodes to 1517, sovereign of Malta from 1530 to 1798: maintains diplomatic relations with about 100 states (including Malta), has had its headquarters in Rome since 1834, led by a “Grand Master” who has the rank of a Cardinal in the Catholic Church, comprises three “estates”, first the “profess knights”, having sworn the three vows of poverty, celibacy and obedience, second the “obedience knights”, having sworn the vow of obedience only, and third all other members of the Order, namely women, men and priests, has in total c. 12000 members in 42 national congregations.

3.3.11. Sovereignty as an impediment against regionalism.
Lecture II:
Regional Integration: An Historical Overview, Part I:
The Region Before the State

1. Some definitions

1.1. The region (regionalism)

1.1.1. Three models:
1.1.1.1. The block: AGEG map: the thinning of borders internal to the region.
1.1.1.2. The IDB Spaghetti Bowl: the drawing of circles.

1.1.2. Typology of regions:

1.1.2.1. Regions as spaces defined in terms of administrative institutions: the EU and ASEAN as case for the block model.

1.1.2.2. Regions defined in terms of political attitudes: e. g. Bruce Russett (see below 1.1.3.1.2.1.).

1.1.2.3. Regions defined in terms of geographic proximity: e. g. Mercosur, Ecowas.

1.1.2.4. Regions defined in terms of economic interdependence: e. g. APEC, NAFTA.

1.1.2.5. Regions defined in terms of social and / or cultural homogeneity: the apparent dichotomy of ‘natural’ versus ‘constructed’ regions. ‘natural’ regions

If the EU is based on a ‘natural’ regions, as these authors assume, one wonders why there is so much political debate about regional integration in the EU.

1.1.3. Various approaches to the definition of a region:
1.1.3.1. Institutionalist approaches (old regionalism):
1.1.3.1.1. The case of a negative approach: Margaret Thatcher in 1979: Europe is not just the European Community.
1.1.3.1.2. Top-down approaches:
1.1.3.1.2.1. Bruce Russett (1935 -) and political agreements: voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly as a criterion (intellectualist approach); Russett, International Regions and the International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).
1.1.3.1.2.2. Andrew Geddes in 2000 and the blank spot: defining the outside in terms of heterogeneity (approach based on the use of space and distance as criteria); Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).
1.1.3.1.2.3. Louise Fawcett, ‘Regionalism from an Historical Perspective’, in: Global Politics of Regionalism, edited by Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne and Luk van Langenhove (London: Pluto, 2005), pp. 23-24: Regions, as in the case of the EU, should be built up through commonality within a territory uniting states and groups sharing identifiable interests (as drawn from the historical experience).
1.1.3.1.2.4. Karl Wolfgang Deutsch (1912 – 1992) in 1953 and the “community of values”: defining the inside in terms of homogeneity (approach using intensity of general communicative interaction as a criterion), Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953).
1.1.3.1.2.5. Ernest Bernard Haas (1924 – 2003) in 1964 and the bureaucrats: putting into effect administrative control (approach using the intensity of
specialist communicative interaction as a criterion); Haas, *Beyond the Nation State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); seen as having set the direction for the political discourse on European integration and regional integration elsewhere in the world, although his theory was based on erroneous assumptions about the structure of the state as a supposed “Nation-State”: Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-17, especially at p. 12.


1.1.3.1.2.8. Christopher Chase-Dunn (1944 -) in 1997 and the mapping of international systems: the system as a region (neo-evolutionist approach).


1.1.3.1.2.8.2. State systems (large scale, hierarchical, complex).

1.1.3.1.2.8.3. Evolution of core/periphery hierarchies as a consequence of the transition from kin to state systems.

1.1.3.1.2.8.4. Systems as combinations of linkages (Deutsch, Haas, Viner; top-down approaches).

1.1.3.1.2.8.5. Linkages emerging from networks of bulk- and prestige-good distribution, marriage alliances, political/military alliances and information networks.

1.1.3.1.2.9.1. The notion of subsidiarity.

1.1.3.1.2.9.1.1. Subsidiarity as a formal organizing principle.

1.1.3.1.2.9.1.2. Making decisions vs implementing decisions.

1.1.3.1.2.9.1.3. Subsidiarity as a potential alibi for political withdrawal.

1.1.3.1.2.9.2. The notion of legitimacy in the context of the definition of a region (not taken into consideration in top-down approaches).

1.1.3.1.2.9.2.1. Legitimacy granted by whom?

1.1.3.1.2.9.2.2. Legitimacy granted for whom?

1.1.3.1.2.9.2.3. Legitimacy granted for what?

1.1.3.2. Bottom-up approaches. The notion of new regionalism and the Spaghetti Bowl: Pluralism of institutions and actors.


1.1.3.2.2. The focus on multiplicity rather than monolithic structures.

1.1.3.2.3. The focus on communicative interaction and mutual respect rather than on identity-imposition.

1.1.3.2.4. The focus on inter-governmental cooperation rather than institution-building: Eero Palmujoki, Regionalism and Globalism in Southeast Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), p. 4: regions as intergovernmentally negotiated alliance relationships, drawn on the example of ASEAN.

1.1.3.2.5. The focus on the fusion of regional integration and regional cooperation rather than on placing both processes into an opposition.

1.1.3.2.6. The focus on subsidiarity rather than on hierarchical institutional order and top-down political decision-making: running the risk of political controversy over principles informing regional integration, the choice of procedures and legitimacy issues rather than choosing options for bureaucratic efficiency.

1.1.4. The region as a device for the blurring of borders:

1.1.4.1. New regionalism and non-institutionalist approaches against institutionalist
approaches.

1.1.4.1.1. The priority of multipolarity over bipolarity of politics at the transnational level.

1.1.4.1.2. The priority of bottom-up over top-down decision-making.

1.1.4.1.3. The priority of openness and competitiveness over protectionism and inwardness.

1.1.4.1.4. The admission of non-state (civil society) actors against the privileging of governments as sole or major legitimate actors in international relations.

1.1.4.1.5. The admission of multi-dimensionality of issues in lieu of the focus on single-issue politics (security-domination, trade-domination).

1.1.4.1.6. The admission of multiplicity of collective identities rather than the programming of the making of single homogeneous collective identities within and for a region.

1.1.4.1.7. The significance of migration as a definitional element of regional integration.

1.1.4.2. The significance of space in the process of defining regions.


1.1.4.2.2. Space as a construct and a construction: regional integration as the process of space-making.

1.1.5. The words:

1.1.5.1. Region, as distinct from regionalism.


1.1.6. The definition of a region: Region is a voluntaristic, identity-conveying part of a larger whole.

1.2. Integration.
1.2.1. Voluntarism as a condition of integration.

1.2.2. Democratic legitimacy as a condition of integration at the national level (A. D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*).

1.2.3. The legacy of contractualist theories and integration at the global level:

1.2.3.1. The notion of cosmopolitan democracy (David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 227-8, as a condition for the explanation of state legitimacy, anticipating Ian Clarke’s 2007 statement on the impact of “World Society” for the generation of the legitimacy of sovereign states (Lecture I, 3.1.5.3.).

1.2.3.2. The notion of personhood and the making of loyalties through migration (Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship*; Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994); omits the regional level.

1.2.4. The notion of regionalness (regional identity).

1.2.4.1. The hierarchy of regions.

1.2.4.1.1. The globe cannot be a region.

1.2.4.1.2. Continents as regions?: the fallacy of the Pan-movements.

1.2.4.1.3. Regions above states.

1.2.4.1.4. States as regions.

1.2.4.1.5. Regions below and across states.

1.2.4.2. Macroregions vs microregions.

1.2.4.3. Various types of groups:

1.2.4.3.1. Kin groups.

1.2.4.3.2. Neighbourhood groups.

1.2.4.3.3. Contractual groups.

1.2.4.3.4. Political groups.

1.2.4.3.5. Social groups.

1.2.4.3.6. The social history of types of groups.

1.2.5. The definition of integration: Integration is a shift of loyalties and collective identities in between levels of regionalness through contractualisation or institutionalization.

1.2.6. Regional integration as the combined processes of conveying and shifting identities and loyalties.

1.2.6.1. Strategies of regional integration:

1.2.6.1.1. Conventional strategies focusing on political feasibility.

1.2.6.1.2. Innovative strategies focusing on legitimacy.

1.3. The problem of legitimacy.
1.3.1. Legitimacy and democracy theory: voting as a potential fallacy?


1.3.3. Regional integration as contractualization through intergovernmental bargaining (top-down approach; Moravcsik).

1.3.4. Regional integration through the issue of charters, basic laws, constitutions (top-down approach; ASEAN).

1.3.5. Regional integration through practical action (bottom-up approach).

1.4. A story of words.

1.4.1. *Regio*.

1.4.2. *Provincia*.

1.4.3. *Systema*.

1.4.4. Regional integration.

1.4.5. Regionalism.

1.4.6. Regionalization.


1.4.6.2. Criticism of this approach: it ignores the theory of “new regionalism” which posits the need for a multi-actorship approach.

1.5. Defining regional integration as political action.

2. A short general history of regional integration before the state

2.1. The region before the state

2.1.1. Lack of separability in historical terms between region and system.

2.1.1.1. The case of East Africa.

2.1.1.2. The so-called Zulu Empire.

2.1.1.3. The Chinese tributary international system as a region up until the middle of the nineteenth century.
2.1.1.4. The Aztec Empire, as a product of conquest, was not a region.

2.1.1.5. The Iroquois League [Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire. The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744* (New York: Norton, 1984)].

2.1.1.6. The Kula Ring.

2.1.1.7. The Hansa League, the League of the Rhenish Towns and the Swabian Confederation.

2.1.1.8. Switzerland as a rare case where a league (established in the fourteenth century) transformed into a state in accordance with the nineteenth-century definition of the state (in 1848).

2.1.1.9. Imperial Law as predecessor of European Law.

2.2. **The impact of colonialism on regional integration**

2.2.1. The issue of slave trade and slave holding.

2.2.1.1. The trans-Atlantic slave trade preceding European colonial intervention in Africa.

2.2.1.2. The demographic impact of the slave trade.

2.2.1.3. The political impact of the slave trade.

2.2.1.4. Banning the slave trade in terms of international law.

2.2.1.5. Enforcing the ban on slavery as an ideology of colonial intervention (Frederick John Dealtry Lord Lugard, 1858 – 1945, Memorandum of 1918).

2.2.1.6. The divisiveness of colonial border-making: enforced social and political segregation as regional disintegration.


2.2.1.8. The invention of “development” as a means to reduce the costs of European colonial rule (Oliver Frederick George Stanley, 1896 – 1950, Memorandum of 1943).

2.2.1.9. Decolonization as state-making.

2.2.1.10. Regional institutions as part of the colonial legacy (e.g. East Africa).

2.2.1.11. Regional institutions as instruments to overcome aspects of the colonial legacy (e.g. Southeast Asia).
Lecture III:
Regional Integration: An Historical Overview, Part II:
The State Succeeding the Region as a Major Category in International Relations

1. The state succeeding the region as major category in international relations
   1.1. the notion of the state as a sub-category of regionalness:
      1.1.1. the case of England.
      1.1.2. the case of France.
      1.1.3. Nineteenth-century state-making in Europe as processes of the disintegration of transnational empires:
         1.1.3.1. the Balkans.
         1.1.3.2. the German Speaking Areas.
         1.1.3.3. the Italian Peninsula.
         1.1.3.4. Central Asia.
         1.1.3.5. North Africa.
      1.1.4. The destruction of regions through the making of European colonial empires:
         1.1.4.1. The case of Africa.
         1.1.4.2. The case of Oceania.
         1.1.4.3. The case of South Asia.
         1.1.4.4. The case of West Asia.
         1.1.4.5. The case of Central Asia.
      1.1.5. Nineteenth-century state-making in East and Southeast Asia as processes of the superimposition of the European concepts of sovereignty and international law:
         1.1.5.1. China.
         1.1.5.2. Japan.
         1.1.5.3. Thailand.
         1.1.5.4. Treaty-making as an instrument of the globalisation of European international law.
         1.1.5.5. Imposing free-market regimes as an instrument of the globalization of the European world market.

2. Major political concepts related to processes of state-making in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
   2.1. Nationality and biologism, or: the conditions for the imposition of Jellinek’s
concept of the state.


2.1.1.1. *ius soli*.

2.1.1.2. *ius sanguinis*.

2.1.1.3. The privileging of the *ius sanguinis* and the impact of biologism.

2.1.2. Nationality as an authoritative (top-down) and exclusive definition of collective identity.

2.1.2.1. The notion of exclusion as a principle of defining states.

2.1.2.2. The notion of inclusion as a principle of defining regions.

2.1.2.3. The lack of possibility to define the coming into existence of states in legal terms.

2.1.3. All politically relevant collective identities that are not defined in terms of nationality are labeled “ethnic” identities (or variants in other languages), even though there is no structural difference between “national” and “ethnic” collective identities.

2.1.4. Processes of national identification:

2.1.4.1. Creating an interface between collective and personal identities.

2.1.4.2. Demanding the priority of “national” collective identity over personal identity (e.g. mandatory military service).

2.1.4.3. Privileging state interests over individual personal interests of nationals.

2.1.5. Constructions of nations and states as quasi-personal actors (as if speaking with one voice).

2.1.6. Creating myths of cultural and/or racial homogeneity as conditions, elements and factors of “national” collective identities.

2.1.7. Biases the perception of the state population as a group of residents (residentialism).

2.2. Society.


2.2.2. Contractualisation as a feature of social theory since the seventeenth century (Althusius).

2.2.3. Horizontal stratification as a principle of social order vs vertical coordination as a principle of social order.

2.2.4. Social theory under the impact of biologism.

2.2.5. The Eurocentrism of nineteenth and early twentieth-century social theory.

3. Regional integration as federation and federation as a strategy towards the
maintenance of peace:


3.4. Victor Hugo [1802 – 1885], using the phrase “The United States of Europe” in his address to the Peace Congress of Paris, 21 April 1849.


4. The imposition of the European concepts of state, nation and society upon Africa, Asia and the South Pacific through colonial rule (direct or indirect or regime colonialism).
Lecture IV:
Regional Integration: An Historical Overview, Part III: The Region After the State

1. The region after the state: the making of regional institutions

1.1. Plans for the uniting of Europe in the nineteenth century:
1.1.1. See Lecture III, 3.

1.2. Plans for the integration of Europe in the twentieth century:

1.2.1. Cases of non-regionalness during and after World War I:
1.2.1.1. *Mitteleuropa*.
1.2.1.2. *Grossraumpolitik*.
1.2.1.3. The continental Pan movements:
1.2.1.3.1. Pan-Americanism (1826/1889 -).
1.2.1.3.2. Pan-Asianism: Okakura Tenshin, *The Ideal of the East* (London, 1903): “Asia is one.”
1.2.1.3.3. Pan Europe (1919 -).
1.2.1.3.4. Pan-Africanism (c. 1943 -).
1.2.1.3.5. Karl Haushofer (1869 – 1946)’s theory of the continental blocks.
1.2.1.3.6. Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894 – 1972) and aristocratic universalism.

1.2.2. The integration of Europe after World War II.

1.2.2.1. The practice of integrating states until 1957.
1.2.2.2. Regional integration theory to 1957.
1.2.2.3. Regional Integration in Europe from World War II to the Maastricht Treaty (1991): EEC to EU.
1.2.2.3.1. European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM, 1950 -).
1.2.2.3.2. European Community of Steel and Coal (1951 -).
1.2.2.3.3. The failed European Defence Community (1954).
1.2.2.3.4. The making of the European Economic Community (1957 -).
1.2.2.3.5. Expansion talks to 1971.
1.2.2.3.6. The admission of the United Kingdom and Ireland (1972).
1.2.2.3.7. The admission of Greece, Portugal and Spain (1986).
1.2.2.3.8. The Single European Act (1987).
1.2.2.3.9. The “End of the Cold War” and the making of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
1.2.2.4. Ernest Bernard Haas and neofunctionalism.
1.2.2.5. The ‘obsolescence of regional integration theory’ (1975) and political Euro-skepticism.
1.2.2.6. The politics of making the Maastricht Treaty and the legacy of neofunctionalism.
1.2.2.7. The expansion of the European Union under the auspices of the Maastricht Treaty (1993): establishing the “pillar” structure of the European Union: Pillar I: Social and Environmental Policy (with the EU having legal personality); Pillar II: Common Foreign and security Policy (cooperative policy-making); Pillar III: Justice and Home Affairs (competitive legislation with regard to crime combatting); the “pillar” structure was replaced by more comprehensive legal personality in 2009 (Lisbon Treaty).
1.2.2.7.1. The admission of Austria, Sweden and Finland (1995).
1.2.2.7.2. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997): strengthening the “Community” pillar.
1.2.2.7.3. The expansion of 2004.
1.2.2.8. Regions in Europe crisscrossing with the EU:
1.2.2.8.1. The Nordic Council and Baltic Sea Cooperation.
1.2.2.8.3. The expanding range of official EU languages (languages in which official EU documents must be made available): Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish, Swedish; EU member-states not represented with a language of their own: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg.
1.2.2.8.4. Euroregions.
1.2.2.8.4.1. EU-Interreg III Programme CADSES (Central Adriatic, Danubian and South-eastern European Space; Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia; Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine, 2007-).
1.2.2.8.4.2. EU-Interreg III Programme Alpine Space (33 regions in seven EU
member states, 2007-).

1.2.2.8.4.3. EU Interreg III Programme Northern Periphery (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Scotland, Faroe Islands, Greenland, 2007-).

1.2.2.8.4.4. EU Interreg IV Programme North Sea (2007-)

1.2.2.8.4.5. EU Atlantic Area Programme.

1.2.2.8.4.6. NATO Northern Europe Programme.

1.2.2.9. The EU as a model?.

1.2.3. The integration of the Americas.

1.2.3.1. Various competing schemes after World War II: the making of the Spaghetti Bowl.

1.2.3.2. The Organization of American States (OAS, 1948 -), based on the Congress of Panama, organized by Simón Bolívar in 1826, followed up by the First International Conference of American States, meeting at Washington, 1889-90. The Charter of the OAS was approved at the Ninth International Conference of American States, meeting at Bogotà in 1948.

1.2.3.3. The Group of Rio, established in 1986 as informal group, organized as a sequence of summit meeting of heads of Latin American and some Caribbean states. Members: Argentina, Velize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Eciador, El; Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. As Cuba joined the Group, which has not been a member of the OAS since 1959, the Group has been viewed as a rival to the OAS.

1.2.3.4. The Group of Rio and the EU: framing the Cumbre de América Latina y del Caribe y la Unión Europea (CALC, 1999-).

1.2.3.5. Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC, 2010-): transforming the Group of Rio and CALC into an organization for the promotion of regional integration and development.

1.2.3.6. From Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA, 1960 – 1980) to Latin American Integration Association (LAIA, 1980 -).

1.2.3.7. The Andean Community (Bolivia, Chile [to 1976], Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela [1973 – 2006], 1969 -).


1.2.3.9. Central American Integration System (SICA, 1991 -, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama),
established the Treaty for Economic Integration in 1993.

1.2.3.10. From Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA, 1965 -) to Caribbean Community (CARICOM, 1973 -).

1.2.3.11. MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, 1991 -).

1.2.3.12. Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, 2005 -), a roof organization bringing together members from the Andean Community and Mercosur.


1.2.3.14. Systems of bilateral agreements, usually with inclusion of the USA.

1.2.3.15. The ‘New World Order’ and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, 1994 -).

1.2.4. The making of the African Union, or: the establishment of a Spaghetti Bowl.

1.2.4.1. Colonialism versus regional integration.

1.2.4.2. Pan-Africanism and the logic of ‘Balkanization’: the OAU [Organization of African Unity, 1963 – 2000].

1.2.4.2.1. The Casablanca-Group: Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco: for speedy continental integration.


1.2.4.2.3. Both groups merged into the OAU.

1.2.4.2.4. The African Charter of Human Rights (Banjul, 1981), established within the OAU: promulgates the right of peoples to use the natural resources and grants them the right for peace and development.

1.2.4.2.5. Additional grouping: Brazzaville Group (Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache [OCAM], 1961-, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Dahomey, Gabun, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Rwanda, Congo Kinshasa admitted 1965)

1.2.4.2.6. Joint administration schemes for international river basin development:

1.2.4.2.6.1. The Organization of the Riparian States of the River Niger (1968/: Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal)

1.2.4.2.6.2. The River Niger Commission (1964-, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria)

1.2.4.2.6.3. The Lake Chad Basin Commission (1964-, Cameroon, Chad, Niger,
1.2.4.3. British “Closer Union” projects, 1920 – 1948: coordinating British colonial administrations in East Africa.


1.2.4.5. The East African Community (I) (1965 – 1984): Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda; coping with the legacy of colonialism.

Community of West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group – ECOMOG); has established ten inter-governmental institutions; introduction of an ECOWAS passport. The foundation Treaty of Lagos of 1975 was revised by the Treaty of Cotonou in 1993.

1.2.4.7. Communauté des Etats Sahélo-Sahariens (CEN-SAD, 1998-); established in Tripolis at the initiative of Libya for the formation of an economic union and the promotion of foreign trade and the improvement of transportation; members: Benin, Burkina-Faso, Chad, Central African Republic (since 1999), Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti (since 2000), Egypt, Eritrea (since 1999), The Gambia (since 2000), Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania (accession planned for 2012), Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal (since 2000), Sierra Leone, Somali Democratic Republic, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia.

1.2.4.8. Arab Maghreb Union (UMA, 1989 -), established for the facilitation of the freedom of the movement of persons, goods and capital; members: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia.

1.2.4.9. Mano River Union (MRU, 1973 -), established for the promotion of economic cooperation; members: Côte d’Ivoire (since 2008), Guinea (since 1980), Liberia, Sierra Leone.


1.2.4.11. Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA, Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan (acceded in 2011), Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 1994 -).

1.2.4.12. South African Development Community (SADC, Angola, Botswana, Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe , 1992 -).

1.2.4.13. South African Customs Union (SACU, 1910 -).

1.2.4.14. The East African Community (II) (1999 -): Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda acceding in 2007, South Sudan acceding in 2011: moving beyond the colonial legacy and institutionalizing through the establishment of the East African Court of Justice and the East African Legislative Assembly; an
East African passport has been issued since 1999.
1.2.4.14.1. Headquarters in Arusha, a location separate from any member-state capital.
1.2.4.14.2. Customs Union established 2005.
1.2.4.14.4. The East African Monetary Union envisaged for 2012.
1.2.4.15. From OAU to African Union [AU] (1963 – 2000, 2000 -) and African Economic Community as an AU organization (with ECOWAS; ECCAS; COMESA, EAC, SADC, UMA, CEN-SAD, MRU as a pillar):
1.2.4.15.1 institutionalized the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD, 2001) with the stated goals of:
1.1.4.15.1.1. achieving conflict prevention,
1.1.4.15.1.2. promoting democracy and human rights,
1.1.4.15.1.3. restoring macroeconomic stability,
1.1.4.15.1.4. establishing transparent legal framework for financial markets,
1.1.4.15.1.5. fostering education,
1.1.4.15.1.6. advancing the role of women in society,
1.1.4.15.1.7. maintaining law and order,
1.1.4.15.1.8. developing infrastructure, agriculture, agro-industries and manufacturing;
1.1.4.15.2. agreed on the Protocoll Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, 9 July 2002, entering into force on 26 December 2003;
1.1.4.15.3. seen in 2011 as being more successful in stopping violence in Mogadishu than any other previous intervention force.
1.1.5. ASEAN and its neighbours: the reception of the block model.
1.1.5.1. The legacy of colonialism and divisiveness in Southeast Asia.
1.1.5.2. Communism, Anti-communism and border conflicts.
1.1.5.4. Greater Mekong Subregion / Mekong River Commission (1995 -) (Lecture VI, 3.5.1.2.4.2.).
1.1.5.6. From ASA (Association of Southeast Asia, 1961) to Maphilindo (1963) and to

1.1.5.7. Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN, 1971 -).

1.1.5.8. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of Southeast Asia (1976):

1.1.5.8.1. the stated purposes of the treaty: accomplishing mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; securing the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; guaranteeing the non-interference in the internal affairs of states; enabling the settlement of disputes through peaceful means; enforcing the renunciation of the threat or the use of force; providing the basis for effective cooperation among signatories.


1.1.5.8.3. ASEAN Charter of 2007: creating an economic community (AFTA, a free trade area) and APSC, the ASEAN Political and Security Community.


1.1.5.10. ASEAN Free Trade Association (AFTA, 1992 -).

1.1.5.11. ASEAN Communities: Economic, Political, Security (2003 -)

1.1.5.12. The problem of expanding ASEAN:

1.2.5.10.1 East Timor: a candidate ASEAN member seeking admission by 2011.

1.2.5.10.2 Papua New Guinea: showing interest to join.

1.2.5.10.3 ASEAN PLUS THREE: first meeting in 1997 of the ASEAN member states, China, Japan and Korea (in the aftermath of the so-called Asian financial crisis).

1.2.5.10.4 the East Asian Summit, ASEAN 10, ASEAN PLUS THREE, India, Australia, New Zealand.

1.2.5.10.5 ASEAN PLUS EIGHT: the East Asian Summit and the prospect of adding
Russia and the US to the framework of ASEAN.

1.2.5.10.6 The prospect of adding Bangladesh, Pakistan, Mongolia as East Asian Summit members, the European Union and the Arab League as East Asian Summit observers.

1.1.5.13. ASEAN and its neighbours:

1.1.5.26.1 South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC, 1985 -): Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; Afghanistan joining in 2005); the SAARC Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) initiated in 1993 and expanded into the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in 2006; SAARC vs ASEAN: the case of Bangladesh.

1.1.5.26.2 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC, 1997 -; the current name has been applied since 2004): Bangladesh, Bhutan; India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand.

1.1.5.26.2.1. Trade and Investment Sector: Lead Country Bangladesh;
1.1.5.26.2.2. Technology Sector: Lead Country: Sri Lanka;
1.1.5.26.2.3. Energy Sector: Lead Country Myanmar;
1.1.5.26.2.4. Transportation and Communication Sector: Lead Country India;
1.1.5.26.2.5. Tourism Sector: Lead Country India;
1.1.5.26.2.6. Fisheries Sector: Lead Country Thailand;
1.1.5.26.2.7. Agriculture Sector: Lead Country Myanmar;
1.1.5.26.2.8. Cultural Cooperation Sector: Lead Country Bhutan;
1.1.5.26.2.9. Environment and Disaster Management Sector: Lead Country India;
1.1.5.26.2.10. Public Health Sector: Lead Country Thailand;
1.1.5.26.2.11. People-to-People Contact Sector: Lead Country Thailand;
1.1.5.26.2.13. Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime Sector: Lead Country India;

1.1.5.26.3. Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (2000 -: Cambodia, India, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam): a “South-South Cooperation” scheme:

1.1.5.26.3.1. Working Group on Tourism: Lead Country Thailand;
1.1.5.26.3.2. Working Group on Education: Lead Country India;
1.1.5.26.3.3. Working Group on Culture: Lead Country Cambodia;
1.1.5.26.3.4. Working Group on Communication and Transport: Working Group Laos;
1.1.5.27 Singapore and the FTA projects.
1.1.5.28 ASEAN PLUS ...
1.1.5.29 ASEAN Observers: East Timor, Australia.

1.1.6 Regions left out, regions where regional integration is underrepresented, interregionalism:

1.1.6.1. White Australasia’.
1.1.6.2. The South Pacific.
1.1.6.3. East Asia: the establishment of the East Asia Summit (members of ASEAN PLUS THREE) in 2005 and the project of forming an East Asian Community as a trade block (East Asia conceived as East and Southeast Asia).

1.1.6.4. Central Asia (externally generated projects):

1.1.6.4.2. Eurasian Economic Community (EurASEC, emerged in 2002 from the Central Asian Economic Cooperation [Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia acceded to the community in 2004], emerged from the Central Asian Economic Union in 1998 [Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan], emerged from the Central Asian Cooperation Organization in 1994 [Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan]; 1995 customs union established between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan acceded 1996, Tajikistan acceded 1999; estabing an economic union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2011.
1.1.6.4.3. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established in 1991 from the member states of the Soviet Union, when the Soviet Union was dissolved, except for the three Baltic states; CIS charter not ratified by Moldova, Ukraine, Turkmenistan; Turkmenistan becomes an observer in 2005, Georgia leaves CIS in 2008.
1.1.6.4.4. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 2002 -), established within the CIS framework as an organization counterweighing NATO and SCO (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova conspicuously absent).
1.1.6.4.5. Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC, Azerbaijan, China [Uygur Autonomous Region], Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, supported by the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the
Islamic Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank, 1997 -).

1.1.6.4.6. GU[U]AM: defense cooperation scheme established by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova in 1996, Uzbekistan joined the scheme in 1999 and left in 2005; close cooperation with NATO, since 2006 called Organization for Democracy and Economic Development.

1.1.6.4.7. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, established in 1996 with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, with Mongolia, India, Iran, Pakistan as observers, concerning matters, first, of security (“terrorism, separatism, extremism”), then, from 2003, of economics, lately of culture).

1.1.6.4.8. Lack of local ownership of the projects: will a Spaghetti Bowl emerge?

1.1.6.4.9. West Asia / North Africa: GAFTA (Greater Arab Free Trade Area, within the Arab League: Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Morocco, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, Kuwait, Tunis, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, since 1998); the case of an organization defined in terms of collective identity.

1.1.6.4.9.1. The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (1981 -): United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait.

1.1.6.4.9.2. The Arab League (1945-; Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen [West Sahara].

1.1.7 Interregionalism: ASEM (the rejection of Australia’s bid to join ASEM): 16 Asian states plus the 27 member states of the EU, established in Bangkok in 1996.

1.1.8 The Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC, 1963 – 1973), established with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand as original members, dissolved over disagreement about the admission of China after the so-called Nixon Shock.

1.1.9 The rim as the basis of a region I: APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, 1989 -): Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, USA, Vietnam.

1.1.10 The rim as the basis of a region II: Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (for fair competition in trade and investment, 1997 -): Australia, Bangladesh, Indien, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Yemen (the Seychelles left in 2003 aus (within the Association: Indian Ocean Tourist Organization as observer and China, Egypt, France, Japan, UK as ‘Dialog Partners’).

2 The Eurocentrism of Regional Integration Theory

2.1 The European experience as the prototype of institutional regional integration.

2.2 The mistaken identification of the EU with regional integration in Europe.

2.3 The mistaken belief that Europe is the only region having witnessed regional integration over long time spans.

2.4 The antiquity of regional integration processes elsewhere.

2.4.5 Africa.

2.4.6 The Indian Ocean.

2.4.7 The South Pacific.

2.5 Non-institutional (intergovernmental) regional integration processes as non-European types of regional integration.

2.6 The concept of the state as an “Invented Tradition” [Eric John Hobsbawm, Terence Osborn Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)].

2.7 Two models: Block versus Spaghetti Bowl

2.7.1. the Block:

2.7.1.1. the legacy of neofunctionalism.

2.7.1.2. Overcoming the legacy of neofunctionalism through the insertion of some elements of democratic legitimacy.

2.7.1.3. The planned EU constitution and the Lisbon Treaty as attempts, their problems in consequence of contractual legitimacy (which demands the existence of a collective identity before constitutions can be enforced).

2.7.2. the Spaghetti Bowl: pluralism of overlapping institutions and competing programmes.

2.7.2.1. its origin as elite accommodation schemes.

2.7.2.2. addition of new types of actors through the admission of NGOs, especially in the case of the African Union, and individuals, in the case of Latin American integration schemes.

2.7.2.3. New Regionalism as a constructivist theory of regional integration, drawing on evidence from Latin America, rather than the EU, and the emergence of
EU-skepticism.

2.7.2.4. the region as a construct (Ashley).

2.7.2.5. The attraction of the Spaghetti Bowl as an analytical model capable of dealing with issues of identity, subjectivity and constructivity.

3. **Is East Asia a region?**

3.1. The quest for boundary-making as an aspect of the European legacy:

3.1.1. The Russian Far East since 1689.

3.1.2. Open Door Policy towards China.

3.1.3. French Indochina.

3.1.4. Dutch Indonesia.

3.1.5. British colonialism in Southeast Asia.

3.1.6. Japanese colonialism (The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and the influence of Haushofer’s geopolitics and British colonial administration).

3.1.7. US colonialism.

3.1.8. The creation of Chinese diasporas through the Coolie Trade.

3.1.9. Separating South from Southeast Asia.

3.1.10. Separating the South Pacific from Asia.

3.1.11. Separating Southeast from East Asia in the course of the Vietnam War.

3.1.12. Legacies continuing in the geographical demarcation of ASEAN and SAARC.

3.2. The impact of ideology.

3.2.1. The political impacts of the Cold War: the making of defence alliances.

3.2.1.1. SEATO.

3.2.1.2. ANZUS.

3.2.1.3. Bilateral alliances (Japan – USA).

3.2.2. The ideological impacts of the Cold War: the combat over communism.

3.2.3. Traditions of Chinese imperialism (Ching Dynasty) and the Tibetan and the Uygur Questions.

3.2.4. Orientalism, Asianism and the intellectual legacy of the Pan-movements.

3.2.5. State-making in China and its impacts on regional integration in East Asia.

3.2.6. East Asia Summit (first meeting held at Kula Lumpur in 2005): drawn on an initiative of ASEAN PLUS THREE.

3.2.7. The East Asian Community:

3.3.10.1. An intellectual concept and an evolving economic and political scheme: from the idea of a CSCE for East Asia (Yutaka Akino, 1948 – 1998) to a political cooperation scheme.
3.3.10.2. Summit diplomacy: China-Japan-Korea summits (the fifth in 2012)

3.3.10.3. FTAs

3.3.10.3.1. ASEAN-China-Free Trade Area (ACFTA): framework agreement signed in 2002; went into effect on 1 Jan. 2010, claims to be the largest free trade area in terms of population.

3.3.10.3.2. TPP (2011-).

3.3.10.3.3. Bilateral FTA proposals: China-Korea, Japan-Korea.

3.3.10.3.4. ASEAN-India FTA (AIFTA) in force since 2010.

3.3.10.3.5. Chiang Mai Initiative, based on ASEAN PLUS Three: an agreement on swap arrangements made in Chiang Mai in 2000 and going into operation in 2002.

3.3.10.3.6. Asian Bond Market Initiative.

3.3.10.3.7. Asian Bond Fund.

3.3.10.3.8. Asian Currency Unit planned and drawn on the European Currency Unit (ECU).

3.4. Legacies.

3.4.10. Legacies of functionalism: institutionalisation and border-making.

3.4.11. Legacies of neofunctionalism in the EU and in Central Asia.


3.4.13. The regional specificity of experiences in regional integration, the norms and standards informing it and the patterns of behavior constituting it.

3.4.14. The task of intellectuals in the region: research in the regionally specific political, social, cultural conditions for regional integration.

3.5. Various concepts of East Asia concurring:

3.5.1. East Asia = China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia.

3.5.2. East Asia = ASEAN PLUS THREE, Mongolia, Siberia, the combination of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.
Lecture V: Regional Integration Theory

1. What is “new” about “New Regionalism”?


1.1.1. But the biologism innate in the conceptualization of actorship has remained unchanged.

1.2. Selecting models:


1.2.2. But model-making as a strategy of theorizing about regional integration has continued to take the place in lieu of the comparative approach.

1.3. Allocating initiative:


1.3.2. But political and economic strategies are still dominating regional integration, whereas cultural issues are not considered salient (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization belonging to the few schemes where culture features officially in the agenda).

1.4. Constructivism:

1.4.2. But boundaries still tend to be regarded either as givens or as imposed schemes, not as perceived markers in transnational social space, due to the absence of migration as a policy issue in many integration schemes or, when regional institutions. Cross-border cooperation leads to the demand for the establishment of special economic zones defined as regions straddling international borders of states, thereby widening linear borders into border zones: Bob Jessop, ‘The Political Economy of Scale and the Construction of Cross-Border Micro-Regions’, in: *Theories of New Regionalism*, edited by Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 179-196.

1.5. Globalisation:


1.5.2. Regional integration judged in its capacity to contribute to global integration (within the legacy of functionalism, recast in terms of international trade): if regional integration strengthens world trade and if regional institutions cooperate with international trade organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, regionalism is termed ‘open’; if there are tensions or contradictions, regionalism is termed ‘closed’ (in the case of the EU, the use of the metaphor of ‘fortress Europe’ has occurred in the context of EU trade and migration restriction policies). Governments of sovereign states may play off regional integration schemes and FTA’s pending their perceived contributions to global integration (e.g. Singapore, ASEAN and bilateral FTA’s involving Singapore).

1.5.3. But the correlationship between regional integration and globalisation is defined purely in economic and political terms without concern for attitudes of personal actors [the issue of glocalisation].
2. Contextualizing regional integration

2.1. Theorists evaluating regional integration.

2.1.1. Regional integration theory as the field of activity of political scientists.

2.1.1.1. The primacy of politics (even where trade issues are dominant).

2.1.1.2. The trend to politicize regional integration processes.

2.1.2. Regional integration theory as the field of activity of economists.

2.1.2.1. The primacy of economics (even where elite accommodation is dominant).

2.1.2.2. The trend to subject regional integration processes to the logic of economics.

2.1.3. Lack of multidisciplinary approach: lack of focus on bottom-up strategies (migration in connection with the pursuit of livelihood, security as an indicator of the legitimacy of institutions of governance); lack of the cultural dimension.

2.2. Positioning regional integration at the interface between domestic politics and global international relations.

2.2.1. Ascriptions of the political significance of regional integration: Measuring gains and losses in terms of economics and politics (the legacy of neofunctionalism); interconnecting regional integration with domestic policies of the stabilization of state institutions.

2.2.2. Lack of willingness to regard regions as a given framework of politics of its own rather than being derived from the state (equivalent of the state and the international system).

2.2.3. Positioning regional integration as a state-making process (with the problems that result from the application of biologistic models for the construction of states as well as regions).

2.3. The emergence of transgovernmentalism as a concept: networking among bureaucrats versus concerns for the legitimacy of non-state actors as participants in regional integration (regional integration analyzed from a neofunctionalist point of view).

3.1. Challenges to regional integration

3.1.1. The determinism of conventional regional integration theory and policy-making to the Maastricht Treaty and ASEAN politics.

3.1.2. Progressism and theories of economic integration (features some facets of the bottom-up approach, by taking into account demands of local business persons):
3.1.2.1. Jacob Viner (1892 – 1970), *The Customs Union Issue* (London and Lancaster, PA: Stevens and Sons, 1950): drawing boundaries for customs unions and common markets on the basis of trade relations; progressivism combined with determinism, mandating stages; NAFTA seems to follow the logic for the purpose of avoiding its postulated consequences of incremental intensification of regional integration; ASEAN, jumping from AFTA to the Common Market [the ASEAN Economic Community to be established by 2020], ignoring Viner’s predictive framework.


3.1.3. Eurocentrism:


3.2. **Institutionalism and the spillover-effect argument**

3.2.1. the theoretical demand for spillover: Haas’s neofunctionalism (Lecture I, 1.1.3.1.2.5.)

3.2.1.1. the empirical lack of spillover.

3.2.1.2. spillover backlash: the failure of the European constitution plans (2006), the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty (2008) and the crisis of European institutions, despite the eventual approval of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (e. g. the troubles with the Euro since 2010).
3.2.1.3. determinism as a demand of theory versus voluntarism of political practice.
3.2.1.4. counting and comparing benefit and assets:
3.2.1.4.1. the crisis of the EAC (I) and controversy between Tanzania and Kenya.
3.2.1.4.2. the responsibility of theorists for practice.
3.2.2. regional integration and cross-border cooperation schemes within the EU: the PHARE / INTERREG programs, seeking to facilitate EU expansion: an instrument for the widening of linear borders into border zones.
3.2.3. ‘Intensive intergovernmentalism’ versus ‘limited transgovernmentalism: the difficult concept of transgovernmentalism as applied in the context of regional integration theory:
3.2.3.1. Transgovernmentalism as revitalised neofunctionalist networking among bureaucrats and the demand for the transparency of government action in democratically constituted states (the counterproductiveness of an approach that demands the priority of efficiency over legitimacy; the inclusion of NGOs is not categorizable under ‘governmental’) [Helen Sarah Wallace, William Wallace and Mark A. Pollard, eds, Policy-Making in the European Union, fifth ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); first edn (London: Wiley, 1977)].
3.2.3.3. The claimed actorship of “non-state actors” and the predicament of transgovernmentalism.

3.3. Regional integration as a political strategy: the realists.
3.3.1. US attitudes towards regional integration:
3.3.1.1. NAFTA (1994 -).
3.3.1.2. FTAA.
3.3.1.3. APEC (1989 -).

3.2.1. The politics of free trade and regional integration: the coming and going of FTAs.

3.3.2. Regional integration considered and pursued as an instrument for the aggrandizement of state power:
3.3.2.1. Henry Alfred Kissinger (1923- ).
3.3.2.2. Central Asian governments.
3.3.2.3. The predicament of state-centric regional integration processes: cross-border cooperation as part of the processes.

3.4. Regional integration as the interface between local and international politics.
3.4.2. Devolution and integration
3.4.2.1. in the United Kingdom.
3.4.2.2. in Spain.
3.4.3. Transnational versus international regionalism: Euroregions and cooperation among regions across states.
3.4.3.1. Working Group of Danube Ripuarian Countries (1990 -).
3.4.3.2. Greater Mekong Subregion (1995) (Lecture VI, 3.5.1.2.4.2.)

3.5. Regional integration as a response to globalization
3.5.1. The false dichotomy of ‘open’ versus ‘closed’ regionalism: existing only within the state-centric approach.
3.5.2. The intellectual and political legacy of the ‘blocks’.
3.5.3. Trade issues.
3.5.4. Migration issues.
3.5.5. Security issues.

3.6. The perceived lack of compatibility between regional integration and state policy: regional integration in its impact on state territory
3.6.1. The EU as a ‘regulatory empire’.
3.6.2. The open regionalism of ASEAN PLUS ... versus the pursuit of the block strategy in ASEAN proper: the logic of establishing concentric circles.
3.6.3. Regional integration, shifts of collective identities and voluntarism.
3.6.4. The skepticism of state politicians and the deficits of democratic legitimacy of regional institutions.

3.6.5. The promises of voluntarism: migration as a definitional element of regional integration.

3.6.6. The challenges of regional integration for the state: the flexibilization of international borders through migration and the demand for the unity of territory as a definitional element of the state.

3.6.7. The significance of identity and identity formation for regional integration.
Lecture VI:
Institutional vs Contractual Integration: Shifting Loyalties and Identities

1. Problems to be discussed comparatively:
   1.1. Which issues drive regional integration (economics, politics, society, culture) and what are the leading factors of regional integration (law, administration, trade, social interactions, culture)?
   1.2. How can regional integration be differentiated from state-making, federalization and multilateralism (positioning regions as quasi-personal actors vs accepting regions as factors obfuscating biologism)?

2. The notion of comparative regionalism
   2.1. The comparative method in regional integration research: an underdeveloped enterprise:
      2.1.1. Comparisons of cases.
      2.1.2. Comparisons of arguable ideals pitched against manifest practices.
      2.1.3. measuring exceptionalism as a research goal.
   2.2. The concept of identity in politics, sociology and cultural studies (the concept of identity being so far ignored in economics).
      2.2.1. The definition of identity is the same as the answer to the question who we are or who I am.
      2.2.2. Collective identity vs. personal identity.
      2.2.2.1. different and competing definitions of collective identity.
      2.2.2.1.1. state-centric definitions (what is written in a passport).
      2.2.2.1.2. personhood-based definitions: Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994) [third edn (ibid., 2007)].
      2.2.2.2. the issue of shifting collective identities.
      2.2.2.3. the issue multiple collective identities.
      2.2.3. The significance of the past in the context of defining regional collective identities
2.3. Collective identities and regional integration

2.3.1. Regions as parts of a whole: the definition invokes the pluralism of coexisting collective identities against the state-theoretical assumption that only one collective identity is allocatable.

2.3.2. The problem of steering the formation and transformation of collective identities through political means:

2.3.2.1. cases:

2.3.2.1.1. Singapore.

2.3.2.1.2. Malaysia.


2.3.2.2. problems:

2.3.2.2.1. clashes between short-term political goals and long-term political effects.

2.3.2.2.2. clashes between stated political intentions and recognizable political results.

2.3.3. Collective identities as indicators of regional integration.

2.3.3.1. the diaspora: the Vincent Jean Chin case (1955 – 23 June 1982; beaten to death in Detroit) and the formation of Pan-Asianism in North America.

2.3.3.2. hyphenization: immigrant groups claiming multiple collective identities.

2.3.3.2.1. the ideology of the melting pot (Jean de Crèvecoeur, 1735 – 1813, Lettres d’un cultivateur américain, 1784).

2.3.3.2.2. the emergence of nativism: closing the door to newcomers (US immigration legislation debates in the early 1920s): Henry Pratt Fairchild (1880 – 1956), The Melting Pot Mistake (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1926).

2.3.3.2.3. the melting pot recognized as “ceasing to melt” (Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, Cambridge, MA: 1963).
2.3.3.2.4. discovering diversity and multiculturalism (1990s).
2.3.3.2.5. moving away from multiculturalism to quests for ‘national integration’ (2000s).
2.3.3.2.6. claiming that the melting pot is melting (Obama’s inaugural address, 2009).
2.3.3.3. Okinawa overseas collective identity distinct from Japanese overseas collective identity.
2.3.3.4. Kurdish identity in EU member states, manifested against Turkey.
2.3.3.5. local identities and regional identities, additive versus integrative approaches to identity-formation:
   2.3.3.5.1. separatists as supporters of regional integration: the case of Wales.
   2.3.3.5.2. federalists as supporters of regional integration: the case of Bavaria.
2.3.3.6. The sovereign state as a conveyor of collective identity, competing with local and regional identities:
   2.3.3.6.1. nationality legislation.
   2.3.3.6.2. registration policy.
   2.3.3.6.3. migration policy.
2.3.4. The historical dimension of collective identities in social science perspective:
   2.3.4.1. Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions. Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005): recognizing the significance of the time dimension of collective identities but not subjecting them to critical scrutiny.
   2.3.4.3. The need to do critical historical research about collective identities (not all claims towards a long time dimension regarding collective identities are actually based on genuine sources): Anderson’s concept of the “Imagined Communities” was revolutionary in 1983 only in cultural anthropology.
2.3.5. The resulting lack of political manipulatability in cases of collective identities with a long time dimension.
2.3.6. Regional collective identities cannot be created on the basis of a political blueprint (empires cannot be regions in consequence of the application of the principle of voluntarism).
   2.3.6.1. the innate voluntarism of regional integration.
   2.3.6.2. geography and spatial proximity as categories of perception: intra-, trans- and international regionalism
2.3.6.3. regions featuring a longer tradition of collective identities than states in many parts of the world.
2.3.6.4. the state as one level of regionalness.
2.3.6.5. regional integration as a shift of collective identities in between levels of regionalness.
2.3.7. Contractualization and intergovernmental accommodation as an alternative to institutionalization in areas without established regional collective identities.
2.3.7.2. The institutionalist fallacy of the theory of intergovernmentalism: setting the EU as a model and taking state-centrism (etatism) for granted as the sole possible approach to regional integration.
2.3.7.3. Intergovernmentalism versus transgovernmentalism (Lecture V, 3.2.3.)

2.4. Collective identities and loyalties
2.4.1. The basic policy issue of regional integration: legitimacy.
  2.4.1.1. arguments about legitimacy in regional integration theory: conspicuously absent.
  2.4.1.2. bottom-up approaches to regional integration do not cover legitimacy issues.
  2.4.1.3. The contract theory of legitimacy:
      2.4.1.3.1. the legacy of political Aristotelianism and the theory of the government contract.
      2.4.1.3.2. Engelbert of Admont (c. 1310), ‘On the Origin of the Roman Empire’: the irrevocability of the government Covenant.
      2.4.1.3.3. John Quidort of Paris (c. 1306), *On the Power of the King and the Pope*: the revocability of the contract.
      2.4.1.3.5. Johannes Althusius (1563 – 1638), *On Politics* (1603): the theory of the social contract.
      2.4.1.3.6. Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679), *Leviathan* (1651): the irrevocability of the government Covenant.
      2.4.1.3.7. John Locke (1632 – 1704), *Two Treatises on Government* (London: Churchill, 1690 [recte 1689]): on the revocability of the contract.
      2.4.1.3.9. Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), on the revocability of the government
contract and the principles of constitutional “republicanism” under the rule of law.


2.4.1.4. Top-down approaches to regional integration take state legitimacy for granted and do not call into question the assumption that state legitimacy has priority for regional integration.

2.4.2. The relevance of legitimacy in regional integration practice:

2.4.2.1. the obvious case: if regional integration is supposed to receive general political support, it must be considered as legitimate by the electorate in democratically constituted states beyond formal political processes or in accordance with norms of international law (direct legitimacy, bottom-up approach, scarce empirical evidence), empirical testimony contrary to existing theoretical positions.

2.4.2.2. the less obvious case: regional integration as elite accommodation processes suggests that integration policies must be considered as legitimate if they flow out of democratically legitimate policies of democratically constituted states (indirect legitimacy, top-down approach, theoretically well reflected, frequently recorded in practice).

2.4.2.3. most empirical cases of regional integration processes belong to the less obvious case category (the practical implication of neofunctionalist theory).

2.4.3. The fallacy of the argument in the neofunctionalist analysis of the less obvious case category:

2.4.3.1. perceptions of differences in attitudes towards regional integration between the elites and the general public:

2.4.3.1.1. elites seen as more integration-focused than the general public (the common government nationalist perspective).

2.4.3.1.2. the general public seen as more integration-focused than the elites (the rare internationalist civil society perspective).

2.4.3.1.3. the public and the elites act in support of different and incompatible regional integration processes (a perception that is not covered by regional integration theory).

2.4.3.2. cases:

2.4.3.2.1. the EU constitution-making (as an obvious case).

2.4.3.2.2. EU accession of Turkey (as an obvious case).

2.4.3.2.3. the regional integration of Serbia (as a less obvious case): aspects of EU
accession, migration to Romania and Hungary as EU member-states, cross-border cooperation schemes involving post-Milošević Serbia; Serbia as an accession candidate to the EU after the surrender of Slobodan Milošević (1941 – 2006) in 2001 to the International Criminal Court at the Hague.

2.4.3.2.4. Moldova: dual citizenship with Romania is frequent; hence it is an obvious case for regional integration taking place between an EU member state and a non-EU state.

2.4.3.2.5. US-Mexico: NAFTA (as a less obvious case): the international border and the historical legacy of the US-Mexican War of 1848.

2.4.3.2.6. Costa Rica (as an obvious case): the domestic wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, the making of transnational social spaces and the creation of legitimacy for Central American regional integration, CACM.

2.4.3.2.7. East African Community (I) (as a less obvious case): colonial legacies as an impediment against legitimacy and, henceforth, an obstacle towards regional integration.

2.4.3.3. the use of collective identities as a check against politically unfeasible elitist regional integration strategies: the case of FTAA.

2.5. **Contractualization**

2.5.1. As an element of the theory of the legitimacy of the state:

2.5.1.1. classical theories of the government covenant.

2.5.1.2. voting by the feet: migration as an indicator of government legitimacy.

2.5.2. Applied to regional integration (in the sense of bottom-up regional integration processes).

2.5.2.1. focus on patterns of actions in a given group of populations rather than on norms.

2.5.2.1.1. movements (in the life world) and frequency of interaction.

2.5.2.1.2. habits (culture as tradition), such as intermarriage, not primarily the traveling concepts [in the sense of Mieke Bal, *Travelling Concepts in the Humanities*, Toronto, 2002]: concepts do not travel by themselves but only through agents or material containers (such as books)].

2.5.2.1.3. common political ideas.

2.5.2.2. focus on norms and institutions.

2.5.2.2.1. legal and other norms.

2.5.2.2.2. traditions of political institutions.
2.5.2.2.3. The pursuit of security.

3. Driving issues

3.1. Theories of ‘new regionalism’

3.1.1. Conventionality of the focus on institutions, norms and bureaucrats:


3.1.2. Conventionality of the focus on economics (not connected with identity-shifts, as it remains unclear what is regional about trade liberalization):


3.2. Processes
3.2.1. Focus on politics (“conventional”):
3.2.1.1. East African Community (I).
3.2.1.2. ASEAN 6.
3.2.1.3. OAS.
3.2.1.4. OAU.
3.2.1.5. Arab League (1945 -; 22 members).
3.2.2. Focus on economics (“new”):
3.2.2.1. the American schemes from LAFTA (1960 – 1980) through LAIA (1980 - ) to NAFTA (1994 -).
3.2.2.2. East African Community (II).
3.2.2.3. CASAREM.
3.2.2.4. COMESA.
3.2.2.5. SACU.
3.2.2.6. SADC.
3.2.2.7. ECCAS
3.2.2.8. ECOWAS.
3.2.2.9. APEC.
3.2.2.10. East Asian schemes, ASEAN PLUS THREE, intergovernmental accommodation.
3.2.3. Schemes shifting their focus:
3.2.3.1. from politics to economics: EAC.
3.2.3.2. from economics to politics: ECOWAS, ECCAS, EU.
3.2.3.3. Absence of identity shifts.
3.2.3.4. Absence of culture as a factor of integration.

3.3. Problems concerning the driving issues
3.3.1. The correlation between economic regional integration (trade) and collective identities poses difficulty.
3.3.2. The correlation of trade with politics (ECOWAS and the low level on intra-regional trade) poses difficulty.
3.3.3. Contraproductivity of accepting state sovereignty as a given in trade-focused regional integration processes.
3.3.4. Measuring gains and losses in trade-focused regional integration processes leads to skeptical views on integration.
3.3.5. Teleology: the difficulty of contextualizing regional integration:
3.3.5.1. The alleged focus on regional integration under the auspices of “new regionalism”: regional integration vs globalisation.

3.3.5.2. The alleged focus on regional integration under the auspices of neofunctionalism: regional integration vs. the state theoretically perceived as a nation-state (as used in: Timur Dadabaev, Towards Post-Soviet Central Asian Regional Integration (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2004).

3.3.6. Determining actors:

3.3.6.1. much initiative towards trade-focused regional integration comes from state government actors, some from trade lobbyists such as MNCs (although MNCs operate as regional and as global actors) = top-down approach.

3.3.6.2. “non-state actors” are taken into consideration solely in regional integration processes with a focus on politics and are reviewed solely in theories concerned with political integration processes = “new regionalism”.

3.3.6.3. Personal actors do not feature.

3.3.7. Neglected or absent issues.

3.3.7.1. the environment, except in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, comprising 39 countries, established 1996 (e.g., the Barcelona Convention protecting the Mediterranean Sea, 1976, amended in 1995).

3.3.7.2. personhood.

3.3.7.3. legitimacy.

3.3.7.4. migration.

3.3.7.5. security.

3.3.7.6. all cultural issues (except the Shanghai Cooperation Organization).

3.3.8. The sterility of the debate on “new regionalism”.

3.3.9. Lack of comparative research:

3.3.9.1. the notion of “development regionalism” (New and Critical Security and Regionalism, edited by James J. Hentz and Morten Bøås (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003): takes the concept of development for granted and regards as a given the theoretical postulate that structural differences exist between regional integration processes in so-called “developing” states and processes in so-called “industrialized” states, while ignoring the impacts of colonialism on regional integration upon the so-called “developing” states specifically in Africa and the South Pacific.

3.3.9.2. no attention paid in the debate on “new regionalism” to the impact of the dissemination of European concepts of the region and the state to other parts of the world.
3.3.9.2.1. the case of Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda’s objection against the East African Community (I) on the grounds that Uganda, the prospected EAC member state was a federation and that a federation above a federation is not possible.

3.3.9.2.2. the lack of ownership of the geographical names for the regions, e. g. Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Africa, and the difficulty of focusing regional integration on collective identity under the constraints of legacies of cultural diversity.

3.3.9.2.3. the colonial legacies impacting on regional institutions specifically in Africa, such as the East Africa High Commission and SACU.

3.4. Competing processes: state-making (nationalism), federation (federalism)

3.4.1. The conceptualization of regions as quasi-personal actors in theory, the legacy of biologism and the problems of admitting multiple actorship.

3.4.1.1. systems theory as an element of regional integration theory, e. g. Serrano.

3.4.1.2. regions as actors, e. g. Gilson.

3.4.1.3. the dilemma of biologistic theory: how does one categorize a region in cases of inter-regional relations, e. g. ASEM?

3.4.2. Competitors to regional integration:

3.4.2.1. State-making: if state-making is constructed as a process rivaling regional integration, both processes cannot occur simultaneously:

3.4.2.1.1. in neofunctionalist perspective: perceived lack of options to overcome the postulated nation-state other than regional integration.

3.4.2.1.2. in the “new regionalism” perspective: the biologistic fallacy of postulating “organic” or “natural” regional integration (Gilson): no reference to contractualization and collective identity.

3.4.2.1.3. the EU: the case of regressive migration policy-making through EU institutions and legislation: EU deepening as equivalent to a state-making process.

3.4.2.1.4. Shifts of collective identities lacking.

3.4.2.1.5. Focus on livelihood strategies lacking.

3.4.2.2. the federation.

3.4.2.2.1. theoretical attempts to distinguish between federalism and regional integration.

3.4.2.2.2. theories of federalism in the 1920s: Karl Loewenstein (1891 – 1973), ‘Das heutige Verfassungsrecht des britischen Weltreiches’, in: Jahrbuch des
öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 13 (1925), pp. 404-497.

3.4.2.2.3. theories of integration through trade (FTA), e. g. Balássa.
3.4.2.2.5. cases (historical):
   3.4.2.2.5.1. the Federation of the West Indies (1958 – 1962).
   3.4.2.2.5.2. the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria, 1958 – 1961).
   3.4.2.2.5.3. the United States of Europe: the plan of Victor-Marie Hugo of 1849 (1802 – 1885).
   3.4.2.2.5.4. the United States of Europe: the plan of Leo Trotzki of 1923 (1879 – 1940).
   3.4.2.2.5.5. Altiero Spinelli (1907 – 1986) and the early post-war federation plans for Europe
3.4.2.2.6. cases (current):
   3.4.2.2.6.1. no cases of regional integration overlapping with federalism.
   3.4.2.2.6.2. devolution as a consequence of regional integration: Scotland, the regions in Spain.
   3.4.2.2.6.3. the SUORI Growth Triangle (Singapore, Johor, Riau, since 1989).
3.4.3. NATO (SEATO, ANZUS), WTO (Lecture VII, 4.1.)

3.5. Conceptual rivals to regional integration: multilateralism, globalization, quests for the autonomy of local government

3.5.1. Multilateralism.
3.5.1.1. at the global level:
   3.5.1.1.1. the institutional legacy of functionalism: the UN and David Mitrany’s wartime A Working Peace System of 1943.
   3.5.1.1.2. international law and multilateralism.
   3.5.1.1.3. human rights issues and multilateralism.
   3.5.1.1.4. multilateralism as another word for globalism.
   3.5.1.1.6. Group of Six (since 1975: USA, UK, Japan, France, Germany, Italy) / Group of Seven (since 1976, Canada added) / Group of Eight (since 1998, with Russia added, while not being admitted to decisions regarding finance and
currency issues).

3.5.1.7. Group of Twenty: 19 states and the EU (first convened in 1999 as a response to the “Asian Financial Crisis”).

3.5.1.8. Group of Four: Brazil, Germany, India, Japan: seeking UN-Reform

3.5.1.2. at the regional level:

3.5.1.2.1. Moravcsik again: transgovernmentalism as regional or inter-regional multilateralism.

3.5.1.2.2. Elite accommodation strategies.

3.5.1.2.3. FTAs.

3.5.1.2.4. Cases:

3.5.1.2.4.1. APEC (1989 -).

3.5.1.2.4.2. the Mekong River Commission (1995 -), supported by the Asian Development Bank, succeeding the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East-proposed Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (established in 1957) on the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

3.5.1.2.4.3. Six-Party-Talks (2003 – 2008).

3.5.1.2.4.4. CASAREM (project in progress).

3.5.1.2.4.5. Nile Valley Cooperation.

3.5.1.2.4.6. Niger Valley Cooperation.

3.5.1.2.4.7. ASEM (1994 -).

3.5.1.3. Theoretical implications.

3.5.1.3.1. differences between multilateralism and regional integration.

3.5.1.3.1.1. multilateralism is focused on government activities, ignores other types of actors.

3.5.1.3.1.2. multilateralism is issue-oriented, tends to be non-institutional (although the case of APEC shows some degree of institutionalization).

3.5.1.3.1.3. multilateralism is not necessarily focused on regions or states.

3.5.1.3.2. overlaps between multilateralism and regional integration.

3.5.1.3.2.1. multilateral cooperation schemes within a region.

3.5.1.3.2.1.1. the 2008 bank rescue schemes within the EU and the G20 financial system stabilization process.

3.5.1.3.2.1.2. ASEAN Regional Forum.

3.5.1.3.2.2. multilateral cooperation schemes among actors in different regions.

3.5.1.3.2.2.1. the Višegrad Four (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, 1991 -), from 1991 to 1993, only Three, as there then still was the Czechoslovak
Republic), elite accommodation, drawing on “community of values”, i.e. shared anti-communism and shared intention of promoting social transformation; now focus on business, tourism, culture, now a subregional multilateral organization.

3.5.1.3.2.2.2. the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Donauländer (working group of administrative agencies in Danube River riparian states; consisting of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria in Germany, Oberösterreich, Niederösterreich, Vienna and Burgenland in Austria, Slovakia, Croatia, Moldau, Esztergom, Pest, Fojer, Becs, Tolna and Baranja in Hungary and the Czech Republic as an observer). Serbia excluded.

3.5.1.3.2.2.3. The Mediterranean Sea Cooperation (see above).

3.5.2. Multilateralism and globalism.

3.5.2.1. Inter-regionalism as multilateralism (ASEM): the possibility of developing inter-regional relations into global relations (Gilson).

3.5.2.2. Regional cooperation schemes claiming global significance, e.g. FTAA (Serrano).

3.5.3. Local government international relations.

3.5.3.1. Regional partnerships within regional institutions: the case of Baden-Württemberg, Lombardy and Catalunya in the EU.

3.5.3.2. Cross-border cooperation schemes within the EU: the Euroregions.

3.5.3.2.1. the Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa (1991-).

3.5.3.2.2. the Growth Triangle again.

3.5.3.3. Regional partnerships across boundaries of regional institutions:

3.5.3.3.1. the case of Baden-Württemberg and Kanagawa.

3.5.3.3.2. the case of the Brazil-California Chamber of Commerce.

3.6. The usefulness of collective identity as a corrective for analysis of regional integration processes

3.6.1. Regional-based multilateralism is not identity-conveying.

3.6.2. Colonial legacies provide obstacles towards identity-formation through regional institutions.

3.6.3. Regional military alliances and security communities are not identity-conveying: contra Emanuel Adler and Amitav Acharya (Lecture VI, 3.1.1.3.; Lecture VII, 4.2.1.).
Lecture VII: 
Regional Cooperation vs Regional Integration

1. Regional integration and legalization

1.1. How does regional integration proceed?
1.1.1. Economic processes: trade.
1.1.1.1. trade theory argues that trade does not necessarily make a region (Viner).
1.1.1.2. the practice shows that intensity of trade can matter in the context of regionalization processes but that market structures depend on legal infrastructures (the case of ECOWAS).
1.1.2. Political processes: regional integration as a variant or a deviant of state-making
1.1.2.1. conventional regional integration theory (neofunctionalism) distinguishes between processes aimed at unification (federation) and processes not aimed at unification (cooperation).
1.1.2.2. recent theory (“new regionalism”) distinguishes between trans- or intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik; Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European Integration, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000) and the definition of common political goals through consensus-making among intellectuals (Alex Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz, ‘European Integration and Supranational Governance’, in: Journal of European Public Policy 4, 1997, pp. 297-318) as strategies, between top-down and bottom-up decision-making processes (Grant and Söderbaum, New Regionalism in Africa), and between the availability or lack of availability of legalization incentives (Remapping Asia, edited by T. J. Pempel, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
1.1.2.3. the practice displays a variety of social and cultural processes supporting regional integration, among them migration and the use of social security systems across state or intra-state boundaries (e. g. Hong Kong).

1.2. Regional integration through legalization
1.2.1. The legacy of neofunctionalism: setting the primacy of the political.
1.2.2. legalization as institutionalization.
1.2.3. regionalization as legalization through legislation:
1.2.3.1. the case of the EU: the regressivity of EU legislation as modeled upon the
nation-state.

1.2.3.2. the legacy of imperial law in Europe (Katzenstein mistakes legacy for continuity and thus overlooks the significance of the discontinuity of imperial law in the nineteenth century).

1.2.4. the transfer of sovereignty rights as an act of legalization and the problem of divided sovereignty.

1.2.4.1. Jean Bodin (1530 – 1596).
1.2.4.2. Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645).
1.2.4.3. Johann Stephan Pütter (1725 – 1807).
1.2.4.4. cases displaying problems of associating regional integration with the reallocation of sovereignty rights:

1.2.4.4.1. the EU.
1.2.4.4.2. ASEAN
1.2.4.4.3. NAFTA.

1.2.5. Legitimacy and legalization.

1.2.5.1. legitimacy without institutions: voting by the feet.
1.2.5.3. legitimacy through institution-making: contractualism.
1.2.5.4. legitimacy through intermediation: state institutions as legitimizers of regional institutions.
1.2.5.5. controversies about legitimacy: what may regional institutions do?


1.2.6.1. arguments about the “weak state” syndrome.
1.2.6.2. the self-fulfilling prophecy that “weak states” generate unstable regional institutions.
1.2.6.3. the politics of “weak state” regional integration: can governments of “weak states” surrender sovereignty rights?

1.2.6.3.1. EAC (I).
1.2.6.3.2. ECOWAS.
1.2.6.3.3. clashes between domestic political constraints and constraints continuing from the colonial era (e. g. French monetary policy in West Africa).
1.2.6.4. critique of the concept of the “weak state”:
1.2.6.4.1. the European nation-state as the standard for the evaluation of “weakness”.


1.2.6.5. effects of regional integration processes among “weak states”:
1.2.6.5.1. “strengthening” “weak state” regimes through regional integration, such as ASEAN and CARICOM.
1.2.6.5.2. “weakening” “weak states” regimes through regional integration, such as the EAC (I).
1.2.6.5.3. “weakening” of regional institutions through “weak states”: no empirical case.
1.2.6.5.4. “strengthening” of regional institutions through “weak states”: no empirical case.
1.2.6.5.5. lack of empirical data for Buzan’s argument.
1.2.6.5.6. lack of feasibility of the concept of “weak state”.
1.2.6.5.7. the fallacy of accepting institutionalization as the sole track towards regional integration.

1.3. Regional Integration through social integration and the voluntariness of regional integration: regional integration takes place, when we want it, not through some metaphysical automatism (Lecture VIII)

2. Regional integration and governance

2.1. Regional integration without the governance of regional institutions
2.1.1. Social regional integration processes (e.g. through migration).
2.1.3. Intergovernment cooperation and governance at regional levels (e.g. in East Asia): the implementation through political practice of the East Asian Community, which so far exists as a plan of intellectuals only.

2.2. Defining governance
2.2.2. The contested role of institutions in governance.
2.2.3. Governance without government in regional integration theory:

2.2.3.1. the role of NGOs in regional governance.

2.2.3.2. resistance and rebellion: the popularity of regional institutions among protest and secessionist groups: cases of the Welsh and the Kurds.

2.2.3.3. “traditional” authorities and governance: pre-colonial government institutions as actors of governance within and across states. E. g. in West Africa.

2.2.3.4. the Eurocentricity of the notion of governance (set as an alternative against nation-state institutions).

2.2.3.5. Is there something like global governance?

2.3. Governance and regional integration

2.3.1. the concept of dispute settlement.

2.3.1.1. dispute settlement and governance: the case of NAFTA.

2.3.1.2. dispute settlement and cooperation: the case of the dissolution of EAC (I).

2.3.1.3. dispute settlement through regular regional courts.

2.3.1.4. various levels of dispute settlement:

2.3.1.4.1. at the globe and in between states: World Trade Organization (since 1994), the “World Court”.

2.3.1.4.2. at the region: NAFTA.

2.3.1.5. Rule-making as governance and as a precondition for dispute settlement: NAFTA.

2.3.1.6. dispute settlement neutral to regional integration.

3. Regional integration and subsidiarity

3.1. The origin of the concept.

3.2. The formal character of the concept.

3.3. Subsidiarity as a guideline for and measurement of regional integration as a shift of loyalties and collective identities.

4. Regional integration and the “Community of Values”

4.1. Military alliances as postulated regions

4.1.2. Counting letters.
4.1.3. Military alliances drawn on regions:
4.1.3.1. ANZUS (1951 -), New Zealand excluded in 1986 on the ground that the New Zealand government would not allow nuclear driven or nuclear weapons driven vessels into its waters.
4.1.3.2. SEATO (1954 – 1977), dissolved after the end of the Vietnam War.
4.1.3.3. NATO (1949 -), changing task structure.
4.1.3.6. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a “security community”?
4.1.3.7. No constructions of connections to regional integration in the case of the Japan-US Alliance.

4.2. Defense community vs security community at the regional level
4.2.1. Top-down decision-making based on political strategies (Acharya; Lecture VI, 3.1.1.3.).
4.2.1.1. A case of incomplete security community: ASEAN.
4.2.1.2. A case of security community by statute: ECOWAS.
4.2.2. security community and collective identity: a lacking relationship.

5. Exclusion vs inclusion: the self and the other
5.1. The political significance of tying collective identities to regional integration processes
5.1.1. a check against non-voluntaristic political regional integration schemes.
5.1.2. linking collective identities to the past.
5.1.3. admitting gradualism of changes of collective identities.
5.1.4. a tool of analysis for:
5.1.4.1. the existence of bottom-up integration processes.
5.1.4.2. the definition of inclusion as a strategy of regional integration.
5.1.4.3. an ideology of exclusionism (e. g. Turkey).
5.1.4.4. the legitimacy of regional integration processes based on consent.
5.1.4.5. manipulations designed for the accomplishment of unstated political goals.
5.1.5. a factor of controversy: who defines collective identity in a region?
5.1.5.1. formal legal processes.
5.1.5.2. processes of action, such as migration.
5.2. The cultural significance of collective identities
5.2.1. depoliticizing regional integration as a value in its own right.
5.2.2. focus on personhood.

6. Conclusion on regional integration / regionalism

6.1. Regional integration as a shift collective identities and related loyalties among various levels of governance, of which the state is merely one.

6.2. In today’s world, governance is predominantly tied to institutions of the state as the major actor in terms of international law.

6.3. The state holds a position of predominance even in view of increasingly numerous ‘non-state actors’.

6.4. The primary impact of regional integration lies on border regimes and governance but not on sovereignty.

6.5. The impact of regional integration is assessed as strong merely within the confines of neofunctionalist theory of regional integration.

6.6. Regional integration affects one constitutive element of the theory of the state, namely the quest for the unity of territory.

6.7. Regional integration will proceed when shifts of collective identities and related loyalties occur away from the state.

6.8. Processes of state-making are conceptually separate from regional integration.
6.8.1. Multiple collective identities within a region (the Spaghetti Bowl, e. g. Americas, Africa).
6.8.2. Various collective identities above the state (the block model, e. g. EU, ASEAN).
6.8.3. Various collective identities below the state (e. g. devolution processes in Spain, the UK).
6.9. Intergovernmentalism (as a strategy of cooperation among governments of sovereign states), security cooperation (within the confines of military security) and multilateralism (as a strategy of maintaining diplomatic influence) are not necessarily connected with regional integration.

6.10. The negative impact of colonialism and its legacy on regional integration.
Lecture VIII:
Migration Theory

1. Some general observations

1.1. The definition of migration as a political issue.
1.1.1. Definition of migration as a process of human action involves the subjective consciousnesses of actors.
1.1.1.1. Actors view migration as an integrated process of movement from the point of departure to one or several successive destinations.
1.1.1.2. Administrators view migration as a process of action that affects the territory under their control; hence migrants come into sight of administrators, as a rule, when they enter territory under the control of some administrators.
1.1.2. Dimensions of the migration definition:
1.1.2.1. The perspectivity of migration: who defines migration, what types of actions go into the concept, what kind of people are being classed as migrants? Answers differ between the perspective of migrants and the perspective of administrators.
1.1.2.2. The role of distance: how far does a migrant have to go in order to qualify as a migrant?
1.1.2.3. The role of the time dimension: for how long can a migrant be a migrant?

1.1.3. Two types of definitions
1.1.3.1. Defining migration as an administrative procedure (top-down definition).
1.1.3.1.1. The UN definition: migration as the process of moving to a new place of residence and staying there for one year or more.
1.1.3.1.2. The state-centric definition: establishing various administrative categories for exclusion and inclusion: the history of immigration classification in the USA.
1.1.3.2. Defining migration from the viewpoint of migrants (bottom-up definition): the relocation of residence across a border of recognized significance, whereby residence is the place to which the movements of the day return.

1.2. Migration vs immigration and emigration.
1.2.1. Medieval urban immigration regulations: stay for one year and one day, cause no trouble and become eligible for the acquisition of citizenship.
1.2.2. Migration restriction through institutions of the modern state.
1.2.3. The problematique of Art. 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): stipulating the human right to emigrate, while containing no provisions regarding a human right to immigrate.

1.2.4. The politics of differentiating between immigration and emigration (top-down perspective).

1.2.5. From the viewpoint of migrants, there is only one integrated migration process.

1.3. **Migration-receiving vs migration-sending states.**

1.3.1. The mythology of the ‘lost populations’.

1.3.2. Immigration administration, registration and the fallacy of population censuses.

1.3.3. The difficulty of maintaining population statistics and other demographic data.

1.4. **Migration and the border.**

1.4.1. Border-crossing as an administrative problem for the general population since the nineteenth century.

1.4.1.1. Kant’s peace theory, the quest for universal hospitality and the prospect of peace.

1.4.1.2. The case of the observers of the French Revolution in 1789: the border as a marker of imagined time differences.

1.4.1.3. The case of Otokichi (1832, 1837, 1854).

1.4.1.4. The case of the British *Alien Law* of 1905.

1.4.1.5. The history of the passport.

1.4.2. The history of emigration control and of immigration control.

1.5. **Migrants as foreigners – migrants and foreigners: the problem of collective identity.**

1.5.1. The evolution of the status of the resident alien.

1.5.2. Georg Simmel (1858 – 1918) and the sociological definition of the foreigner (a person who comes today and stays tomorrow, 1908).

1.5.3. The politics of choosing between inclusionism and exclusionism.

1.6. **Nativism: closing the door.**

1.6.1. How communities of people continue to exist:

1.6.1.1. the static approach: we are where we are.
1.6.1.2. the dynamic approach: we are foreigners or descendants of foreigners almost everywhere on earth.

1.6.2. consequences of choosing the approach

1.6.2.1. staticism supports exclusionism.

1.6.2.2. dynamism supports inclusionism.

1.6.3. None of the two approaches is principally applicable, the difficulty is deciding how to mix them:

1.6.3.1. *ius soli* as a means of inclusionism.

1.6.3.2. *ius sanguinis* as a means of exclusionism.

1.6.4. Migrationism as a theory of the explanation why we are where we are.

1.6.5. Migrations as ‘Invented Traditions’

1.6.5.1. The Tower of Babylon.

1.6.5.2. Polynesian Migration in the Pacific.

1.6.5.3. Australasian migration into Southeast Asia.

1.6.5.4. The myth of an Indo-European nation.

1.6.5.5. The myth of a Turanic nation.

2. Theory and practice of migration

2.1. Migration theory and the limitations of knowledge about migration motives:

2.1.1. Ex-post statements.

2.1.2. Statistical inference: the logic of ‘push and pull’.

2.1.3. Externally imposed versus internally generated migration motives:

2.1.3.1. in economic respects: the search for a better life and for wealth (external).

2.1.3.2. in political respects: dissatisfaction with government (internal).

2.1.3.3. in cultural or religious respects: the search for freedom (internal).

2.1.4. Moving vs staying as goals.

2.1.5. The general principle of migration motivation: migration takes place when the motivation to move is stronger than the motivation to stay: migration potential usually higher than actual manifest migration (Kingsley Davis).

2.1.6. Residentialism and evolutionism: the fallacy of the search for migration motives.

2.1.7. “New Migration”, NGOs and the individual migrant: livelihood strategies (not: struggle for survival).
2.2. **Migration patterns**
2.2.1. Ernest George Ravenstein (1834 – 1913)’s ‘laws’.
2.2.2. Step migration.
2.2.3. Return migration.
2.2.4. Migration networks.
2.2.5. Continuing migration.
2.2.6. Factors impacting upon migration decision-making:
2.2.6.1. Migrants’ wishes, desires and needs.
2.2.6.2. Policies of stability and institutions of the state.
2.2.6.3. Policies of human security and civil society organizations.
2.2.6.4. Residence rules and gender-specific migration.
2.2.6.5. Retirement migration and age-specific migration.

2.3. **Types of migration**
2.3.1. Voluntary migration.
2.3.2. Forced migration.
2.3.3. Migration within a state.
2.3.4. Migration across state borders.
2.3.5. Migration between village and town.
2.3.6. Migration across continents.

2.4. **Migration law: the top-down perspective**
2.4.1. Registration.
2.4.2. Nationality legislation: involvement of state institutions in regulating migration.
2.4.3. Legal distinctions between nationality and citizenship.
2.4.4. Priority given to immigration: twentieth century.
2.4.5. Priority given to emigration: nineteenth century.
2.4.6. The human rights of migrants: involvement of international organizations and institutions in regulating migration.

2.5. **Migration policy: the top-down perspective**
2.5.1. Migration policy as the hallmark of state sovereignty: the legacy of biologism.
2.5.2. Migration rules and political liberalism: freedom of migration as a principle but not perceived as a practical guideline for migration administration.
2.5.3. Migration policy and the molding of the work force.
2.5.4. Migration policy and the preservation of the ‘purity’ of the nation.
2.5.5. Migration policy and transnational labor markets.
2.5.6. Migration policy and national identification facilitation.
2.5.7. Migration policy and the regulation of transnational social spaces.
2.5.9. Migration and gender:
2.5.9.1. Ravenstein once more.
2.5.9.2. the ‘feminization’ of migration.

2.6. Migration and development: the top-down perspective
2.6.1. Poverty alleviation through migration: shoveling out paupers.
2.6.2. The economics of migrant remittances.
2.6.3. Migration markets.
2.6.4. The ‘migration industry’.
2.6.5. Theoretical issues: development through migration? The implications of migration hump theory.

2.7. The evolution of migration theory
2.7.1. Theory in service to the state I: rationalizing immigration as acts of ‘voting by the feet’ (cameralism, eighteenth century): Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717 – 1771).
2.7.3. Theory in service to the state III: improving policy to stop immigration (twentieth century).
2.7.5. Critical migration theory and ‘New Migration’ [Anthony Fielding, ‘Migrations, Institutions and Politics. The Evolution of European Migration Policies’, in:

2.8. Absent perspectives: bottom-up

2.8.1. Migrants’ perception on migration: the continuing process of the relocation of residence beyond borders.

2.8.2. Migrants’ perceptions of borders.

2.8.3. Mix of migration motives instead of one dominant motive.

2.9. “New Migration”: the impact of constructivism on migration theory and migration research


2.9.2. Analysing migrant networks and considering push-and-pull as ideology.

2.9.3. Admitting non-government actors as migration regulators (some of them being migrant controlled).
2.9.4. Overcoming the distinction between sending and receiving countries.

2.9.5. Accepting migration as a potentially continuing process.

2.10. Migration and regional integration: the clash of perspectives

2.10.1. Migration in the region: the case of emigration from the UK and the case of immigration into Germany: migrants as definers of a region: The British National Statistics is explicit in admitting that migration data have been assembled on the basis of the UN-sponsored definition of migration and reveals a generally increasing net in-migration during the decade from 1994 to 2003. The net demographic gain from in-migration to the UK was 223,000 people in 2004, up 72,000 against the figure for 2003. In that year, of the 512,600 people migrating to the UK, 105,800 were British citizens, 64,000 EU citizens other than British, 165,800 Commonwealth citizens and 196,900 others (including people from Hong Kong). Of the 361,500 out-migrants from the UK in 2003, 190,000 were British citizens, 49,900 EU citizens other than British, 58,000 Commonwealth citizens and 62,000 others. The figures suggest the net out-migration of 85,000 British citizens against the net in-migration of 14,100 EU citizens other than British, 110,300 Commonwealth citizens and 134,900 others. As the category of EU citizens excludes people with British citizenship, the real number of migrants between the UK and the EU is higher than the stated figures, if the assumption holds true that British citizens also migrate to the rest of the EU and back. For all these figures the absolute numbers as well as the percentage rates increased gradually between 1994 and 2003. The figures seem to suggest the predominance of migration within the Commonwealth. Thus Australia alone received 62,400 in-migrants from the UK in 2003, more than half of all migrants moving from the UK to Commonwealth states. The figure is less striking for migration from Australia to the UK; yet 40,500 migrants moved from Australia to the UK in 2003, second only to the figure of 44,000 in-migrants from Bangladesh, India and Sir Lanka together. These figures indicate a net in-migration gain of 17,800 people for Australia, who, it may be inferred, were most likely holders of British or Australian citizenship. However, the full range of migration patterns concerning the UK emerges only in view of the figures for migrants to and from

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3 British National Statistics (note 85), Table 2.1, p. 4.
non-Commonwealth states. Thus, in 2003, little less than one third of all in-migrants, namely 101,100 people came from the EU, second only to the combined figure for ‘other’ states (including Hong Kong).\(^4\) Figures for out-migration from the UK confirm the predominance of migration between the UK and the EU, if Commonwealth countries are excluded. Of 230,000 people leaving the UK to non-Commonwealth countries in 2003, 121,700, that is more than 50%, went to the EU. Moreover, their numbers have increased dramatically since 1994, when 94,800 people came to the UK from the rest of the EU, while 75,600 took the opposite direction. Whereas there was net in-migration from the EU to the UK in 1994, there was net out-migration from the UK to the EU in 2003. By contrast, figures remained virtually unchanged for migration to and from the USA in the same period, hovering around 26,000 and 28,000 in either direction. Thus, recent migration statistics do not support the view that there is some ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the USA. Instead, they confirm that, beyond the established patterns within the Commonwealth, all statistical indicators show a dramatic increase in the frequency of migration between the UK and the rest of the EU in either direction.

2.10.2. The regressiveness of the migration policy of a regional institution: the EU demonstrates its willingness to evolve as a state through constructing its migration policy as that of a state.

2.11. Migration and the state

2.11.1. Exclusion as the dominant goal of immigration restriction in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: personhood and the issue of human security.

2.11.2. Integration as the dominant goal of migration administration: identity and the issue of human rights.

2.11.3. Expatriate networks designed to maintain control over migrants and encourage their return:

2.11.3.1. Brain Gain Network (Philippines).
2.11.3.2. Rebuild Afghanistan.com (Afghanistan).
2.11.3.3. Worldwide Indian Network (India).
2.11.3.4. The Global Korean (Republic of Korea).
2.11.3.5. The Brain Drain Reverse Project (Thailand).

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\(^4\) Excluding Non-EU Europe, the USA, the rest of America outside the Commonwealth and the Middle East.
2.12. Migration and the Community


2.12.3. The problem of overburdening migrants with tasks through the conversion into political strategies of academic research results: is it fair to devise migration policy on the basis of the finding that migrants are not lost to the communities of their origin but remain in contact and may provide some form of information to the people left behind?

3. Migration research

3.1. Sociology: the traditional social-science approach

3.1.1. Nineteenth-century Cathedra Socialists.

3.1.2. Nineteenth-century administrators.

3.1.3. Migrants as ‘lost nationals’.

3.1.4. The logic of the ‘push-and-pull’ model again.

3.1.5. The quest for the integration of migrants: the rise and fall of the ‘Melting Pot’ metaphor

3.1.5.1. The physicalist use of the metaphor: Michel Guillaume Jean de Crèvecoeur (1735 – 1813, Letters from an American Farmer, 1782).


3.1.6. Migration, citizenship and personhood.
3.1.7. Social science, statistics, migration policy and legislation.
3.1.8. Migration and globalization.
3.1.9. Migration economics: focuses on labor migration.

3.2. Political science: a recently added social-science approach
3.2.1. The belated interest of political scientists in migration and the legacy of nationalism in the academic world.
3.2.2. The practical implications of the comparative study of migration policy.
3.2.3. The dichotomy of inclusion vs exclusion as determinants of migration policy.
3.2.4. Migration, democratic legitimacy and the right to vote.
3.2.5. Politics as the molding of collective identities: debates about migration legislation, nationality legislation, registration administration and the ‘ethnicity’ of migrants, especially in the case of the Kurds.

3.3. Cultural studies and history: a neglected social-science approach
3.3.2. Local communities and migrants: outgoing and incoming as political processes (the cases of cities and the French Kingdom in the Middle Ages).
3.3.3. Transnational networking among local groups as consequences of migration processes: the case of the Trukees.
3.3.6. Migration history as a corrective of migration sociology and migration policy: challenging the myths of countries of immigration and countries of emigration.
3.3.7. The challenge of migration for the state: reducing the unity of population as a definitional aspect of the theory of the state.
Lecture IX: Security

1. Types of security providers in current practice

1.1. Private providers

1.1.1. Insurance companies.
1.1.2. Civil society organizations, local, national, transnational.
1.1.3. Private security services.

1.2. State domestic providers: the police.

1.3. Public providers of security across borders: the army.

1.4. Lack of transnational public security providers.

1.5. Security recipients: state populations.


1.7. Security provision as a public matter, contractualism, legitimacy, the public sphere, democratic consent and security: the historical relativity of the distinction between public versus private.

1.7.1. The rule “Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbari debet”.

1.7.2. The four basic sources of state legitimacy:

1.7.2.1. Metaphysical belief systems:

1.7.2.1.1. religion: beliefs in divinely ordained rulers or institutions.
1.7.2.1.2. nationalism: the belief in the a priori existence of nations or similarly structured groups with political actorship.

1.7.2.2. Rationalist hypotheses:

1.7.2.2.1. the government contract: beliefs in the generation of legitimate government through consent.

1.7.2.2.2. Socialism: the Dictatorship of the Proletariate.

1.7.3. The conceptual history of the distinction between the public and the private.

1.7.3.1. Jürgen Habermas’s orthodoxy [Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, first published (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1962); English version (Cambridge, MA: MIT

1.7.4. Aristotelian political theory, Aristotelianism and the need to explain rule by humans over humans.
1.7.5. The emergence of contractualism.
1.7.6. Security provision as the basis for contractual agreements about government.
1.7.7. Interconnectdness between the range of the security concept and the distinction between the public and the private.

2. ‘New security’ or the ‘not-so-new’ security debate

2.1. Various definitions of war and the militarization of the security debate in the nineteenth century:
2.1.1. Clausewitz, On War: ‘war is the continuation of politics [i.e. diplomacy] with other means’ (juxtaposing war against diplomacy in terms of means)
2.1.2. Clausewitz, On War: ‘War is a violent conflict among nations in arms with regular armed forces deployed by legitimate governments’ (implements the definition of international law)
2.1.3. Clausewitz, On War: ‘War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will’ [a definition within the broad definitional framework established by Hugo Grotius in his De jure belli ac pacis libri tres (1625)]
2.1.4. Clausewitz, On War: ‘War is a clash of opposing forces from which follow self-evidently that the stronger one not merely annihilates the other one but pulls it along with its own movement.’ (applies a notion of dynamism suggesting that warfare must be associated with movement and progress)
2.1.5. Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p.12: ‘In order to say intervention, military action is required and then the military forces have to meet with opposition during the episode.’ [lack of distinction between intervention and war, as these criteria are valid for war at large]

2.2. The demilitarization of the security debate since the 1980s [Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983); second edn (New York:

2.2.1. Structural change of the type of casualties in the course of twentieth-century warfare.  
2.2.2. The difficulty of differentiating between ‘wars within states’ and ‘international wars’.  
2.2.3. Asymmetrical warfare.  
2.2.4. Irregular warfare.  
1.1.1. The propagandistic concept of ‘small war’ as ‘colonial warfare’: Charles Edward Callwell (1859 – 1928), Small Wars (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996) [first published (London, 1896)], p. 21: ‘Practically it [the term small war] may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field’; the Small War as unregulated and unconstrained war again.  
2.2.5. .  

2.3. The notion of comprehensive security: the emphasis on economic security in postwar Japan and the history of the notion of comprehensive security focused on the individual before the twentieth century:  
2.3.1. The search for security in afterlife as the notion of comprehensive security.  
2.3.2. Justus Lipsius (1547 – 1606).  
2.3.3. Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679).  

2.4. The notion of collective security: Helsinki and the formation of collective military security.  


2.5.1. The Middle East as a case of conflict over water resources (e.g. Israel versus the
Palestinians).

2.5.2. Central Asia as a case of conflict over water resources (e.g. Uzbekistan versus Kirgistan and Tajikistan).


2.6.1. The Canadian definition of human security in terms of one of the Four Freedoms of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt is negative in the sense that it categorizes something that recipients of security do not want. In acadmic contexts, however, it is mandatory to define matters in a posisitive sense by saying what is the case or what is the goal. The latter definition would have to include aspects of:

2.6.1.1. planning security.

2.6.1.2. sustainability (in the sense of the Material-Input per Service Unit Concept or the Factor Ten analysis [Friedrich Schmidt-Bleek, Das MIPS-Konzept. Faktor 10 (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1998)]).

2.6.1.3. political and social stability as well as opportunity to pursue the production and reproduction of culture.

2.7. The notion of cultural security as a response to problems resulting from the legacy of colonialism.

2.8. The notion of regional security as a response by new security theorists to regional integration: Barry Buzan, ‘Regional Security. Complex Theory in the


2.10. The blurring of the distinction between the public and the private: private wars, private security providers, and the search for security as a strategy of livelihood.

3. The felt problem of securitization


3.2. Security provision and political debate: the problematique of secretizing and excluding security issues from political debate.

3.3. The felt dangers of securitization debates: focus on military issues: democratic legitimacy, the public sphere and the difficulty of securitizing with legitimacy: speech act theory and the impact of politics on the security debate (Wæver, as above 2.2.)

3.4. The concept of the security-providing market: the public sphere, debating over the range of the concept of security and the legitimacy of security providers.

3.5. Security and regional integration:
3.5.1. Transnationality of the security-providing market.
3.5.2. The state-centric concept of military security in the light of the security dilemma.
3.5.3. Alliance-making and security versus regional integration.
3.5.4. The notion of “collective security” as a Cold-War ideology: the poverty of thinking war without aggression.
3.5.5. The notion of “security community” as an issue of controversy in regional integration:
   3.5.5.1. The European Defense Community project.
   3.5.5.3. The reshaping of the debate through the widening of the security concept (human security).
3.5.6. Security and migration: restrictive immigration policies as felt factors of state security and manifest factors of migrant insecurity.
3.5.7. The interdependence of security and legitimacy
   3.5.7.1. The political theory of contractualism, principles of democratic representation, the separation of the public and the private spheres and the concept of security.
   3.5.7.2. Security provision as the core purpose of government.
   3.5.7.3. The felt success of security provision as a basis for the legitimacy of government.
      3.5.7.3.1. the focus on the state in ‘Western’ political theory: John Rawls.
      3.5.7.3.2. the focus on the state in the political practice of ‘developing’ countries.
      3.5.7.3.3. in local civil society.
      3.5.7.3.4. in transnational civil society.
      3.5.7.3.5. in international institutions.
   3.5.7.4. The pluralism of security providers and state legitimacy.
   3.5.7.5. Three cases:
      3.5.7.5.1. the military government in Myanmar and the concept of security:
3.7.5.1.1. the principles of the legitimacy of a military government: strong power base (through the availability of martial arms) but weak legitimacy base (as a consequence of coup d’etat).

3.7.5.1.2. if the coup d’etat is justified under a narrow concept of security defined in exclusive terms of military security, the military government has to argue that there is an impending external threat (of an invasion or so); if this is the argument, then the military government must demonstrate its capability to remove the threat immediately, or it will be swept away.

3.7.5.1.3. if the coup d’etat is justified under a wide concept of security, defined in terms of comprehensive or human security, such as some danger for the maintenance of domestic law and order (this is the usual type of justification of a military takeover), the military government has to demonstrate its capability to deliver comprehensive security over time and at a level superior to other security providers or other types of government.

3.7.5.1.4. In his case, the military government must seek to control as far as possible the public sphere so as to undermine the coming up of potential rival security providers; the military government drapes its rule under the veil of a constitution outlining representative institutions, but these representative institutions do not actually debate government policy as they are headnodding bodies.

3.7.5.1.5. the military government also has to penetrate deeply into the private sphere of the house; hence the boundaries between the public and the private spheres become blurred; the vaguely defined boundary between the public and the private spheres stand against principles of democratic legitimacy.

3.7.5.1.6. The test case: Cyclone Nargis (2008) and the staunch resistance of the government of Myanmar against admitting internal aid that could be seen as sidetracking the government.

3.7.5.2. The case of Afghanistan:

3.7.5.2.1. the worsening of the security situation in Kunduz province since 2005/06.

3.7.5.2.2. the appearance of rival security providers (the central government, the local government, the ISAF force, local NGOs, transnational NGOs, resistance forces).

3.7.5.2.3. impending state failure.

3.7.5.3. The case of Syria:
3.7.5.3.1. A classical case a ‘little’ or ‘small’ war involving ‘insurgents’ and a regular army

3.7.5.3.1.1. The concept of the ‘litte’ or ‘small’ war;
3.7.5.3.1.2. Levels of violence in a ‘little’ or ‘small’ war;
3.7.5.3.1.3. Strategic options of the regular army: the use of overwhelming weaponry;
3.7.5.3.1.4. Strategic options of ‘insurgents’: hit-and-run tactics, keeping the combat going until the regular army faces legitimacy problems and gives in;
3.7.5.3.1.5. The combat ends when the regular army gives in without having been defeated.

3.7.5.3.2. Solution patterns: persuading both sides that they will have to make political concessions sooner or later, whence making them sooner is advantageous for both sides.

3.7.5.3.3. The utter vanity of plans seeking to ‘enforce’ peace.

4. Historical considerations on the notion of security

4.1. The origin of the concept of military security

4.1.1. Rethinking war in the ‘West’ at c. 1800: the “nationalization” of war.
4.1.1.3. Carl von Clausewitz (1770 – 1831).
4.1.2. The conceptualization of the ‘nation-in-arms’ as the security provider.
4.1.3. The security of the nation vs the security of the person.
4.1.4. The war – peace – war sequence and the demand for the willingness to sacrifice.
4.1.5. The rising costs of war during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

4.2. Prior to nationalism: the long history of the notion of human (or comprehensive) security

4.2.1. The pluralism of security providers to the end of the eighteenth century.
4.2.2. Public sphere, the security-provision market and the notion of security.
4.2.3. Kleinschmidt’s rule: the broader the terms are in which the notion of security is being defined, the less rigidly is the sphere of the public separated from the
sphere of the private, and the less rigidly the separation of both spheres is conceived, the higher is the number of competitive providers of comprehensively defined security and the more divers the means of security provision tends to be.

4.3. **The establishment of the institutional difference between the army and the police**

4.3.1. Max Weber’s definition of the state: the monopoly of the legitimate use of force (coercion).
4.3.2. The history of the word ‘police’.
4.3.3. Policing agencies in the early nineteenth century.
4.3.4. The emergence of police departments in nineteenth-century local government.
4.3.5. Surveillance as security provision: the concept of the Kōban.
4.3.6. The diversification and internationalization of police authorities (Interpol / Europol).
4.3.7. Armies as domestic ordering forces.

4.4. **The subjection of private security provision to the rule of state law**

4.4.2. The making of civil codes.
4.4.3. State-controlled fire fighters.
4.4.4. Regulating health insurance and old-age pension schemes.
4.4.5. The limits of service of private security providers: earthquake insurances, financial crises and investment risks.

4.5. **The slow demise of the older, wider comprehensive security-provision schemes**

4.5.1. Giving up security of afterlife (c. 1200).
4.5.2. Giving up security provision across the generations: the introduction of retirement (c. 1500).
4.5.3. Giving up armies as means of maintaining domestic order and security (c. 1800).

5. **Security and international relations**

5.1. **Comprehensive security in international relations**
5.1.1. In the old world:

5.1.1.1. The preservation of peace as a request following from legitimacy theory.

5.1.1.2. Security provision as the expected capability of the ruler: the case of Gustav Vasa.

5.1.1.3. The ruler as a guarantor of human willingness to act towards the preservation of the divinely-willed stability of the world: from Thomas Aquinas to Carl von Dalberg.

5.1.2. In the current world:

5.1.2.1. Conceptual limitations of war:

5.1.2.1.1. PKO.

5.1.2.1.2. PEO.

5.1.2.1.3. Humanitarian interventions.

5.1.2.2. Sanctions and security provision.

5.1.3. Transgovernmentalism and security cooperation: a realist approach to security regimes.

5.2. The challenge of security for the state

5.2.1. The competitive security-provision market and the measurement of government security-providing achievements.

5.2.2. War efforts and security provision as factors of legitimacy (wars needing to be definable as ‘just’).

5.2.3. Security provision and the demand for the unity of government in the theory of the state.
Lecture X: Concluding Remarks

1. The three processes of regional integration, migration and security provision in
   their effects on the state as defined according to Jellinek
   1.1. The logic of Jellinek’s triad of unities: all or nothing.
   1.2. Regional integration increases the flexibility of borders and reduces the unity
        of territory.
   1.3. Migration increases the multiplicity of collective identities and reduces the
        unity of population.
   1.4. Human security increases the number of state, non-state and transnational
        security providers and reduces the unity of government.
   1.5. “Failed States” may emerge as a result of the combination of the three
        effects.

2. Apparently possible responses:
   2.1. Regional disintegration, isolationism (will not work due to high social and
        political costs).
   2.2. Migration restriction policies (will not work due to the lack of government
        migration restriction capability in the long term).
   2.3. Limitation of political actorship to institutions of the state (will not work
        because of the lack of compatibility with the principles of democratic legitimacy
        which in itself is tied to success in the provision of security)

3. Remaining possibility: the redefinition of the concept of the state
   3.1. Politics of sovereignty: governments use the privileges that they obtain
        through the application of the sovereignty principle
   3.2. Questioning the theory of sovereignty
       3.2.1. Separating sovereignty and the notion of subjectivity of international law by
            admitting new non-sovereign actors as subjects of international law
            3.2.1.1. Regional institutions (EU has already been admitted as actor with subjectivity
                     of international law).
            3.2.1.2. PLO.
            3.2.1.3. Taiwan.
   3.2. Renouncing the unity of population as a definitional element for the state.
   3.3. The problem of the implementation of a revised definition of the state given
        the prevailing vested interests of governments.
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For further references see: [www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht.de/kleinschmidt](http://www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht.de/kleinschmidt)

List of readings for each session

**I: Theories of the state**

Assigned source text:

Unilateral Declarations of Denmark to be Associated to the Danish Act of Ratification of the Treaty on European Union (1992) [course material no I/2 C]

Secondary literature:


**II: Regional Integration: An Historical Overview, Part I: The Region Before the State**

Assigned source text:
Dudi Chwa, Kabaka of Buganda, Letter to Sir Ormsby Gore, Colonial Office in the Government of the United Kingdom, September 1927 [course material no III/1 E]

Secondary literature:

**III: Regional Integration: An Historical Overview, Part II: The State Succeeding the Region as a Major Category in International Relations**

Assigned source texts:

Secondary literature:

**IV: Regional Integration: An Historical Overview, Part III: The Region After the State**

Assigned source text:

Secondary literature:

**V: Regional Integration Theory**

Assigned source texts:
AGEG: Cross/Border Cooperation Schemes (1999) [course materials no V/1 A].
Secondary literature:

**VI: Institutional vs contractual integration: shifting loyalties and identities**

Assigned source text:

Secondary literature:
Miles, Robert, Dietrich Thänhardt, eds: *Migration and European Integration* (London: Pinter, 1995).

**VII: Regional Cooperation vs Regional Integration**

Assigned source text:

Secondary Literature:

**VIII: Migration theory**

Assigned source text:
Treaty of Amsterdam, Art 62 (1997) [course materials no IX/ 1 B].

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**IX: Security**

Assigned source text:


Secondary literature:


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