Truth Behind LDP's Loss
Fall 1993
By Tomohito Shinoda
Washington-Japan Journal, Volume II, Number 3
On August 5, Japan witnessed the establishment of Morihiro
Hosokawa's non-LDP party government, an unprecedented event since
the Liberal Democratic Party took over power 38 years ago. The
new government's top priority is political reform. It was this
issue that toppled the previous administration and forced a
general election. Japan's political turmoil seems to evolve
around the issue of political reform. However, it is actually the
product of inner-party fighting within the LDP.
It all started with the death of former LDP Secretary General
Shintaro Abe in May 1991. His death left his faction--an
intra-party group that works to achieve the premiership for its
leader--in a state of confusion as to who would succeed him as
leader. The largest faction in the LDP, led by former Prime
Minister Noboru Takeshita, intervened in the leadership selection
process. Many members of the Abe faction were upset by this
interference, and went against the Takeshita faction's preference
by choosing former Foreign Minister Hiroshi Mitsuzuka. This shook
the status-quo within the ruling party. The solid coalition
between the Takeshita and Abe factions broke down, leading to an
LDP break-up two years later.
In Japanese Politics, it is often said, "The number is power."
The magic number was the equivalent of one quarter of the LDP
members. As long as the LDP has more than a half of the total
lower house members, it remains the ruling party. If a coalition
of factions is larger than a majority of all LDP diet members,
the coalition can be the mainstream within the party: It can have
decisive power over the selection of the prime minister and the
execution of major policies. The faction which holds a majority
within the coalition controls the coalition, thus the party, and
therefore the government. By this rule of "a majority of a
majority," a faction with over a quarter of the LDP members could
demonstrate strong influence in the political scene.
The largest faction, led by Takeshita and previously by former
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, had long been influential within
the party because other factions constantly sought its favor in
order to benefit from the large membership count. Receiving
support from this faction was crucial for potential candidates to
achieve the premiership and for any prime minister to execute
major policies. At its peak the Tanaka faction was comprised of
more than one-third of the LDP diet members, and the subsequent
Takeshita faction, until its break-up, maintained more than a
quarter.
Under the Toshiki Kaifu Administration (1989-91), the Takeshita's
faction dominated the political scene enjoying a solid coalition
with the Abe and Komoto factions. Toshio Komoto was indebted to
the Takeshita faction, strong in the transportation policy area,
for rescuing Komoto's own company, Sanko Kisen Shipping which had
gone bankrupt. Shintaro Abe was loyal to the coalition with
Takeshita, knowing that the same coalition would choose him to
the premiership in the near future. With the loss of support from
the Abe faction, that faction could not sustain party control,
tied up only with the smallest Komoto faction. The three other
factions began publicly calling for the resignation of Kaifu.
On September 301991, political reform bills on which Prime
Minister Kaifu "staked his cabinet's life" died. Although Kaifu
expressed his desire to dissolve the lower house to force a
general election, his action was blocked by the Takeshita
faction. Kaifu's weakness was underscored, and the anti-Kaifu
campaign within the LDP accelerated. The Takeshita faction knew
that it could no longer maintain party control by supporting the
Kaifu Administration, and withdrew its support for Prime Minister
Kaifu. Powerless, Kaifu had no choice but to resign.
Once Kaifu's resignation became a matter of fact, all three
possible candidates asked for support from the dominant Takeshita
faction. Former LDP Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa, a young
leader of the faction only 49 years old at that time, called
meetings with the three candidates to his private office. This
was rather a humiliating experience for the three who were older
and more senior politicians. Miyazawa, swallowing his
widely-known pride, begged Ozawa with a forced smile for his
support, calling him "Great Secretary General." The Takeshita
faction subsequently picked Miyazawa who, in turn, promised to
delegate the power over party affairs to Takeshita's faction. The
Takeshita faction managed to form another dominant intra-party
coalition with the obedient Miyazawa faction.
Miyazawa had to accept the Takeshita faction's strong influence
over the formation of his first cabinet. Six members of
Takeshita's faction were appointed to cabinet posts, while the
Miyazawa faction had to settle for only two. Miyazawa could not
even control the post of Chief Cabinet Secretary, which serves as
the prime minister's right-hand man. The influence of the
Takeshita faction in LDP politics was dominant throughout the
first year of the Miyazawa Administration. Virtually all
important policy decisions required the approval of the Takeshita
faction.
The dominance of the Takeshita faction, however, did not last
much longer. Last October its co-leader, Shin Kanemaru was forced
to retire from the political scene due to his involvement with
the Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin which had made fraudulent loans to firms
allegedly affiliated with a Japanese mafia group. The other
co-leader, Noboru Takeshita was also in trouble with his own
scandal of a possible connection with a Japanese mafia group, and
could no longer control the faction. There arose a power struggle
for leadership within the faction. As a result, the Takeshita
faction began to fragment into two groups--one led by Keizo
Obuchi and the other by Tsutomu Hata and Ichiro Ozawa.
Last December when the split within the Takeshita faction became
obvious, Prime Minister Miyazawa reshuffled the cabinet. This
time Miyazawa, without the influence of the Takeshita faction,
freely chose cabinet members. He appointed Yohei Kono to the
Chief Cabinet Secretary--the appointment previously blocked by
the Takeshita faction. Miyazawa publicly displayed the power
shift by selecting a member of the Ozawa group to the cabinet
against Ozawa's will. Furthermore, Miyazawa chose Seiroku
Kajiyama, a member of the Obuchi group who changed from a close
buddy of Ozawa to the leader of anti-Ozawa movement, to the
powerful position of the LDP secretary general. These acts threw
the humiliation suffered by Miyazawa at the formation of his
first Cabinet back in the face of Ozawa.
With Miyazawa's demonstration of his anti-Ozawa stance, all the
other factions allied with Miyazawa to contain the political
influence of Ichiro Ozawa. Ozawa and Hata, now cornered, began
openly calling for political reform. For them political reform,
which would change the political environment, was the only
possible way to crush the anti-Ozawa alliance within the LDP.
Ironically, further revelation of the scandal of Ozawa's former
mentor, Shin Kanemaru, strengthened public support for political
reform, and thus provided stronger backing for Ozawa's call.
Strong reformists in the group, such as former Director General
of the Environmental Agency Kazuo Aichi, publicly expressed their
determination to leave the party if Prime Minister Miyazawa did
not see political reform through. An assistant to Aichi
privately told me that many junior members of the group saw that
they would have a better chance of getting re-elected if they
left the party. For many in the group, the break-off from the
ruling party was for their survival rather than for political
reform.
The break-off of the Hata faction was a serious threat since it
meant that the LDP would lose a majority in the lower house.
While it is very difficult to tell how seriously Prime Minister
Miyazawa and LDP Secretary General Kajiyama took the threat,
Kajiyama convinced Miyazawa to block Ozawa's initiative by making
a party decision to pursue the original LDP-proposed political
reform bills; bills which could never pass the Diet. As a result,
the opposition parties submitted a non- confidence resolution
against the Miyazawa Cabinet. The Hata group joined them to pass
the resolution, and left the LDP to establish a new party, the
Renewal Party.
Timing was crucial for the Hata group. The general election had
to take place before the trial of Shin Kanemaru which started on
July 22. Once the details of Kanemaru's deeds were exposed, their
close association with Kanemaru might have devastated public
support for their group. The Hata group with their break-off from
the ruling party successfully shifted public attention away from
the Kanemaru trial to political reorganization. Issues for the
July 18 election focused on political reform which the Hata group
pursued, and the reformist image won Hata's new party 55 seats,
up from 36. The power struggle within the party, disguised as a
policy split, drove the LDP to lose a majority in the lower
house.
The death of Abe created a chain of unexpected events, which
ultimately led to the establishment of a new government, breaking
political stalemate in Japan. Despite the actual cause, Japan's
political changes are real. Real political debates are taking
place everyday for the first time in a long time. Political
parties are trying to persuade voters across the nation, rather
than please their client special interest groups and
constituents. Outspoken politicians have gained public support,
while traditional political insiders who mainly acted behind the
scenes have lost their stage. In order to emphasize the change,
the coalition government has chosen Hosokawa as their leader over
Tsutomu Hata who would have provided an image of old LDP
politics.
Of course, this was not the only reason for Hosokawa's rise to
the premiership. It was easier for the coalition government to
maintain its unity with Hosokawa as a leader. Some members of the
Japan Socialist Party, the weakest link of the coalition, were
openly opposed to the selection of the other strong candidate,
Hata. More importantly, there would be no future for the non-LDP
coalition government if Hata, with his impressive portfolio, were
chosen as the premier and then failed in political reform.
Picking Hosokawa provides a possible second chance for a
coalition government even if Hosokawa fails--Hata would emerge as
the back up leader to form a new government.
Political changes are so drastic that it is difficult to imagine
Japan going back to the old rigid political system which
developed under the long-reign of the LDP. It is unlikely for the
LDP to regain the majority in the powerful lower house by itself
for at least another three years. Japan's political situation is
fluid, and anything can happen. Whatever changes occur in Japan,
they will be healthy ones. Even the new LDP president Yohei Kono
admits that political change can carry desirable effects which
the LDP could not muster under its long reign due to the vested
interests of the iron triangle of the business-political-
bureaucratic links. And what kind of changes Japan will
experience depends on the interest and enthusiasm of Japanese
voters in politics.
Tomohito Shinoda is Washington Representative of Taro Kimura Inc.
He is nearing the completion of a book on the Japanese prime
minister, titled Struggle to Lead Japan.
On August 5, Japan witnessed the establishment of Morihiro
Hosokawa's non-LDP party government, an unprecedented event since
the Liberal Democratic Party took over power 38 years ago. The new
government's top priority is politica1 reform. It was this issue
that toppled the previous administration and forced a general
election. Japan's political turmoil seems to evolve around the
issue of political reform. However, it is actually the product of
inner-party fighting within the LDP.
It all started with the death of former LDP Secretary General
Shintaro Abe in May l991. His death left his faction--an
intra-party group that works to achieve the premiership for its
leader--in a state of confusion as to who would succeed him as
leader. The largest faction in the LDP, led by former Prime
Minister Noboru Takeshita, intervened in the leadership selection
process. Many members of the Abe faction were upset by this
interference, and went against the Takeshita faction's preference
by choosing former Foreign Minister Hiroshi Mitsuzuka. This shook
the status-quo within tbe ruling party. The solid coalition between
the Takeshita and Abe factions broke down, leading to an LDP
break-up two years later.
In Japanese Politics, it is often said, "The number is power." The
magic number was the equivalent of one quarter of the LDP members.
As long as the LDP has more than a half of the total lower house
members, it remains the ruling party. If a coalition of factions is
larger than a majority of all LDP diet members, the coalition can
be the mainstream within the party: It can have decisive power over
the selection of the prime minister and the execution of major
policies. The faction which holds a majority within the coalition
controls the coalition, thus the party, and therefore the
government. By this rule of "a majority of a majority," a faction
with over a quarter of the LDP members could demonstrate strong
influence in the political scene.
The largest faction, led by Takeshita and previously by former
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, had long been influential within the
party because other factions constantly sought its favor in order
to benefit from the large membership count. Receiving support from
this faction was crucial for potential candidates to achieve the
premiership and for any prime minister to execute major policies.
At its peak the Tanaka faction was comprised of more than one-third
of the LDP diet members, and the subsequent Takeshita faction,
until its break-up, maintained more than a quarter.
Under the Toshiki Kaifu Administration (1989-91), the Takeshita's
faction dominated the political scene enjoying a solid coalition
with the Abe and Komoto factions. Toshio Komoto was indebted to the
Takeshita faction, strong in the transportation policy area, for
rescuing Komoto's own company, Sanko Kisen Shipping which had gone
bankrupt. Shintaro Abe was loyal to the coalition with Takeshita,
knowing that the same coalition would choose him to the premiership
in the near future. With the loss of support from the Abe faction,
that faction could not sustain party control, tied up only with the
smallest Komoto faction. The three other factions began publicly
calling for the resignation of Kaifu.
On September 301991, political reform bills on which Prime Minister
Kaifu "staked his cabinet's life" died. Although Kaifu expressed
his desire to dissolve the lower house to force a general election,
his action was blocked by the Takeshita faction. Kaifu's weakness
was underscored, and the anti-Kaifu campaign within the LDP
accelerated. The Takeshita faction knew that it could no longer
maintain party control by supporting the Kaifu Administration, and
withdrew its support for Prime Minister Kaifu. Powerless, Kaifu had
no choice but to resign.
Once Kaifu's resignation became a matter of fact, all three
possible candidates asked for support from the dominant Takeshita
faction. Former LDP Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa, a young leader
of the faction only 49 years old at that time, called meetings with
the three candidates to his private office. This was rather a
humiliating experience for the three who were older and more senior
politicians. Miyazawa, swallowing his widely-known pride, begged
Ozawa with a forced smile for his support, calling him "Great
Secretary General." The Takeshita faction subsequently picked
Miyazawa who, in turn, promised to delegate the power over party
affairs to Takeshita's faction. The Takeshita faction managed to
form another dominant intra-party coalition with the obedient
Miyazawa faction.
Miyazawa had to accept the Takeshita faction's strong influence
over the formation of his first cabinet. Six members of
Takeshita's faction were appointed to cabinet posts, while the
Miyazawa faction had to settle for only two. Miyazawa could not
even control the post of Chief Cabinet Secretary, which serves as
the prime minister's right-hand man. The influence of the Takeshita
faction in LDP politics was dominant throughout the first year of
the Miyazawa Administration. Virtually all important policy
decisions required the approval of the Takeshita faction.
The dominance of the Takeshita faction, however, did not last much
longer. Last October its co-leader, Shin Kanemaru was forced to
retire from the political scene due to his involvement with the
Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin which had made fraudulent loans to firms
allegedly affiliated with a Japanese mafia group. The other
co-leader, Noboru Takeshita was also in trouble with his own
scandal of a possible connection with a Japanese mafia group, and
could no longer control the faction. There arose a power struggle
for leadership within the faction. As a result, the Takeshita
faction began to fragment into two groups--one led by Keizo Obuchi
and the other by Tsutomu Hata and Ichiro Ozawa.
Last December when the split within the Takeshita faction became
obvious, Prime Minister Miyazawa reshuMed the cabinet. This time
Miyazawa, without the influence of the Takeshita faction, freely
chose cabinet members. He appointed Yohei Kono to the Chief Cabinet
Secretary--the appointment previously blocked by the Takeshita
faction. Miyazawa publicly displayed the power shift by selecting
a member of the Ozawa group to the cabinet against Ozawa's will.
Furthermore, Miyazawa chose Seiroku Kajiyama, a member of the
Obuchi group who changed from a close buddy of Ozawa to the leader
of anti-Ozawa movement, to the powerful position of the LDP
secretary general. These acts threw the humiliation suffered by
Miyazawa at the formation of his first Cabinet back in the face of
Ozawa.
With Miyazawa's demonstration of his anti-Ozawa stance, all the
other factions allied with Miyazawa to contain the political
influence of Ichiro Ozawa. Ozawa and Hata, now cornered, began
openly calling for political reform. For them political reform,
which would change the political environment, was the only possible
way to crush the anti-Ozawa alliance within the LDP. Ironically,
further revelation of the scandal of Ozawa's former mentor, Shin
Kanemaru, strengthened public support for political reform, and
thus provided stronger backing for Ozawa's call. Strong reformists
in the group, such as former Director General of the Environmental
Agency Kazuo Aichi, publicly expressed their determination to leave
the party if Prime Minister Miyazawa did not see political reform
through. An assistant to Aichi privately told me that many junior
members of the group saw that they would have a better chance of
getting re-elected if they left the party. For many in the group,
the break-off from the ruling party was for their survival rather
than for political reform.
The break-off of the Hata faction was a serious threat since it
meant that the LDP would lose a majority in the lower house. While
it is very difficult to tell how seriously Prime Minister Miyazawa
and LDP Secretary General Kajiyama took the threat, Kajiyama
convinced Miyazawa to block Ozawa's initiative by making a party
decision to pursue the original LDP-proposed political reform
bills; bills which could never pass the Diet. As a result, the
opposition parties submitted a non- confidence resolution against
the Miyazawa Cabinet. The Hata group joined them to pass the
resolution, and left the LDP to establish a new party, the Renewal
Party.
Timing was crucial for the Hata group. The general election had to
take place before the trial of Shin Kanemaru which started on July
22. Once the details of Kanemaru's deeds were exposed, their close
association with Kanemaru might have devastated public support for
their group. The Hata group with their break-off from the ruling
party successfully shifted public attention away from the Kanemaru
trial to political reorganization. Issues for the July 18 election
focused on political reform which the Hata group pursued, and the
reformist image won Hata's new party 55 seats, up from 36. The
power struggle within the party, disguised as a policy split, drove
the LDP to lose a majority in the lower house.
The death of Abe created a chain of unexpected events, which
ultimately led to the establishment of a new government, breaking
political stalemate in Japan. Despite the actual cause, Japan's
political changes are real. Real political debates are taking place
everyday for the first time in a long time. Political parties are
trying to persuade voters across the nation, rather than please
their client special interest groups and constituents. Outspoken
politicians have gained public support, while traditional political
insiders who mainly acted behind the scenes have lost their stage.
In order to emphasize the change, the coalition government has
chosen Hosokawa as their leader over Tsutomu Hata who would have
provided an image of old LDP politics.
Of course, this was not the only reason for Hosokawa's rise to the
premiership. It was easier for the coalition government to maintain
its unity with Hosokawa as a leader. Some members of the Japan
Socialist Party, the weakest link of the coalition, were openly
opposed to the selection of the other strong candidate, Hata. More
importantly, there would be no future for the non-LDP coalition
government if Hata, with his impressive portfolio, were chosen as
the premier and then failed in political reform. Picking Hosokawa
provides a possible second chance for a coalition government even
if Hosokawa fails--Hata would emerge as the back up leader to form
a new government.
Political changes are so drastic that it is difficult to imagine
Japan going back to the old rigid political system which developed
under the long-reign of the LDP. It is unlikely for the LDP to
regain the majority in the powerful lower house by itself for at
least another three years. Japan's political situation is fluid,
and anything can happen. Whatever changes occur in Japan, they will
be healthy ones. Even the new LDP president Yohei Kono admits that
political change can carry desirable effects which the LDP could
not muster under its long reign due to the vested interests of the
iron triangle of the business-political- bureaucratic links. And
what kind of changes Japan will experience depends on the interest
and enthusiasm of Japanese voters in politics.
Tomohito Shinoda is Washington Representative of Taro Kimura Inc.
He is nearing the completion of a book on the Japanese prime
minister, titled Struggle to Lead Japan.